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Thoughts about Thoughts: The Structure of Fregean Propositions
Nathan Bice
This dissertation is about the structure of thought. Following Gottlob Frege, I
define a thought as the sort of content relevant to determining whether an assertion
is true or false. The historical component of the dissertation involves interpreting
Frege’s actual views on the structure of thought. I argue that Frege did not think
that a thought has a unique decomposition into its component senses, but rather the
same thought can be decomposed into senses in a variety of distinct ways. I extend
Frege’s position and use it to develop an account of the hierarchy of senses, the senses
expressed by indexicals and demonstratives, and the distinction between logical and
non-logical structure. I also discuss various connections with the nature of meta-
representation, our capacity for reflective judgment, some aspects of the structure of
conscious experience, the way we perceive regions of space and durations of time, and
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0.1 Content and Thought
This dissertation is about the structure of thought. By ‘thought’ I don’t mean a
particular event of thinking, but rather an aspect of the content expressed by such an
event. In particular, by ‘thought’ I mean the sort of content relevant to determining
whether an assertion (or event of thinking, utterance, sentence, etc.) is true or false.
That is, I will use ‘thought’ as a technical notion that can be abstracted from an
intuitive notion of ‘content’ or ‘meaning’. This usage stems from Gottlob Frege.1
Hence, a thought is an abstraction from the complete content of e.g. a declarative
sentence, and it fixes a truth-condition.
The value of discussing thoughts is that it allows us to isolate the aspect of meaning
relevant to determining truth or falsity. We can avoid getting caught up in debates
about the exact nature of linguistic meaning so long as we agree that one aspect of
meaning is that which determines the conditions under which what is said is true or
1For example: “So one has to separate off from the content of a sentence the part that alone
can be accepted as true or rejected as false. I call this part the thought expressed by the sentence.”
(1906c, PW pg. 197-8)
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false.2
Thoughts are structured entities. When I compare the assertions ‘John has brown
hair’, ‘Mary has brown hair’, ‘Jim has brown hair’, etc., I can recognize that by hold-
ing the expression ‘has brown hair’ fixed while allowing the rest of the assertion to
vary, I vary the conditions under which the corresponding assertions are true in a
systematic way. Hence the expression ‘has brown hair’ makes a systematic contribu-
tion to the truth-conditions of assertions containing it, from which we can conclude
that the corresponding expressed thoughts have a structural feature in common. This
structural feature is the aspect of the content or meaning of the expression ‘has brown
hair’ in virtue of which it contributes to the truth-conditions of complete sentences
in which it occurs. Following Frege, I call this structural feature the sense of the ex-
pression, and identify the sense of a complete declarative sentence with the thought
expressed by it.3
Note that I will not attempt to give individuation-conditions for thoughts within
2Of course, there is little I can say here to convince the reader who doesn’t think there are
any meanings at all, or that nothing ever really means anything, or that meanings don’t fix truth-
conditions. Nor will I convince the reader who doesn’t think that the sort of abstraction I suggest is
possible (I would be curious, however, how such a reader makes sense of many ordinary properties
that seem to be arrived at via abstraction from cases). Such a reader should still find something of
value in what follows, since many of the claims I make throughout this dissertation do not depend
upon this starting-point.
3This is Frege’s official definition of sense in the Grundgesetze (note that for Frege complete
declarative sentences refer to truth-values): “Every such name of a truth-value expresses a sense,
a thought. For owing to our stipulations, it is determined under which conditions it refers to the
True. The sense of this name, the thought, is: that these conditions are fulfilled...Now, the simple or
complex names of which the name of a truth-value consists contribute to expressing the thought, and
this contribution of the individual name is its sense. If a name is part of the name of a truth-value,
then the sense of the former name is part of the thought expressed by the latter.” (1893, pg. 50-1)
Frege wanted the notion of sense to play various roles, including being the mode of presentation
(or way of thinking) of its referent (1892a, pg. 26-7/158) and (in the case of a complete thought)
being the object of belief (ibid pg. 37/166). We will discuss these roles in Chapters 2 and 3. I will
argue in Chapter 3 that irrespective of Frege’s own views on the matter, the conception of sense
(and thought) I have just outlined ought to be considered the most fundamental.
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this dissertation. I will, however, argue that thoughts ought to be characterized
at a higher level of abstraction than they often are in the literature. I will give
various reasons for this, including (1) reflection on cases, (2) the resolution of various
issues concerning the hierarchy of senses and the contribution of demonstratives and
indexicals to truth-conditions, and (3) connections to various other philosophical
positions.
While investigating the structure of thoughts for its own sake is an arguably
worthwhile project in the Philosophy of Language and Mind,4 I argue throughout this
dissertation that such an investigation reveals fruitful connections with the nature
of meta-representation, our capacity for reflective judgment, some aspects of the
structure of conscious experience, the way we perceive regions of space and durations
of time, our conscious awareness of our own perceptions and events of thinking, and
the distinction between logical and non-logical structure.
0.2 Summary of the Dissertation
This dissertation proceeds as follows: Chapter 1 is a purely historical discussion
of Gottlob Frege’s actual views on the structure of thought. I begin by tracing
Frege’s evolving conception of content from its beginnings in the Begriffsschrift to
his eventual distinction between sense and reference. I argue that Frege did not
hold that a thought has a unique decomposition into its constituent senses (as many
4Note that thoughts (also known as “Fregean propositions”) remain widely discussed in the
philosophical literature. Cf. Christopher Peacocke (2008) and Tyler Burge (2010) as paradigm
examples.
3
authors assume), but rather held that the same thought can be decomposed into
senses in a variety of distinct ways. I show that this is the natural extension of his
earlier views.
Here is a simple example: Frege wanted pairs of sentences such as ‘John loves
Mary’ and ‘Mary is loved by John’ to express the same thought. But the “loves”
relation is distinct from its inverse: the “is loved by” relation. So the sense expressed
by ‘loves’ is distinct from the sense expressed by ‘is loved by’, since their referents
are distinct. Hence, if the sentences express the same thought, this thought must
be decomposable into senses in at least two distinct ways. In effect, Frege wanted
to characterize thoughts at a level of abstraction at which the transition from active
to passive voice doesn’t affect the thought expressed. Any difference in meaning
between the two sentences is irrelevant to determining their shared truth-value, and
hence such differences shouldn’t arise at the level of abstraction we’re considering.5
Chapter 1 continues by examining a puzzle discussed in the Frege literature, stem-
ming primarily from Michael Dummett (1981): how could a thought both be built
up out of senses as parts and yet be decomposable into senses in distinct ways? If an
entity is built up out of parts, then doesn’t it have a unique decomposition into the
parts from which it could be constructed?
In response, I first make an interpretive point that clarifies some aspects of Frege’s
account of the structure of thought. I show that Frege was committed to using
his own function/object distinction to analyze the structure of thoughts. This is
5This example isn’t intended to convince the reader of the need for multiple decompositions of
thought; I merely provide it as an especially simple case of the sort of thing Frege had in mind.
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because in an indirect context, Frege believed that expressions refer to the senses
they ordinarily express (1892a, pg. 28/159). For example, if I assert ‘Copernicus
believed that the planetary orbits are circles’, the expressions ‘the planetary orbits’
and ‘are circles’ refer to their ordinary senses. But the expression ‘are circles’ is
unsaturated, and hence it must refer to a function on Frege’s view. In particular,
it must refer to a function from the referent of ‘the planetary orbits’ to the referent
of the complete expression ‘the planetary orbits are circles’. But the referent of this
complete expression in this context is the thought ordinarily expressed by it, and
hence the ordinary sense of ‘are circles’ not only refers to a function, it is a function
from senses to thoughts which contain it as a part.
I then provide various quotations that decisively show that Frege thought of the
part/whole distinction as being such that a whole can be decomposed into (or built
up out of) parts in a variety of distinct ways. Thus the puzzle dissolves.
I conclude Chapter 1 by emphasizing the connection between multiple decomposi-
tions and potential inferences: grasping a thought in a particular way makes a variety
of potential inferences salient while masking others. The Appendix to Chapter 1 in-
cludes every quotation that I consider to be relevant to the Multiple Decompositions
Thesis, and is meant to decisively establish that this controversial interpretation is
correct.
The motivation behind Chapter 1 is not, of course, merely to correct various
misinterpretations of Frege. I suggest that the aspects of Frege’s account that I
have emphasized are part of a correct account of the structure of thought. This will
become especially clear in Chapters 2 and 3, in which I argue that the treatment
5
of the structure of thought emphasized in Chapter 1 allows us to resolve various
well-known issues concerning the hierarchy of senses, demonstratives, and indexicals.
Chapter 2 focuses on the hierarchy of senses. As pointed out above, Frege thought
that in indirect context, expressions refer to their ordinary senses. They thereby
express indirect senses. But in a doubly-embedded indirect context (e.g. ‘Frege
believed that Copernicus believed that the planetary orbits are circles’), expressions
will refer to their indirect senses and express doubly indirect senses. Iterating this
procedure leads to an infinite hierarchy of senses.
Several authors have criticized this aspect of Frege’s view, with Donald Davidson
arguing that it would make language unlearnable (1965, pg. 14-15 in the 1984 reprint).
Tyler Burge (2005), Christopher Peacocke (2008), and Saul Kripke (2008) all defend
Frege against Davidson and others, and I discuss each author’s resolution in turn (all
argue that the hierarchy can be completely specified via a recursive reference rule,
and is thus learnable).
I point out, however, that Frege’s own view was more complex than it may appear
and in fact relies on the Multiple Decompositions Thesis. In particular, I argue that
Frege believed that any thought that p is identical with the thought expressed by ‘the
thought that p is true’. Hence, any thought can be decomposed into a sense referring
to the complete thought and the sense of ‘is true’, a sense which maps the sense of
‘the thought that p’ to the thought that p.
Furthermore, Frege says that the ordinary sense of ‘the thought that p’ is the
indirect sense of ‘p’, and hence an indirect sense which refers to a thought is a part of
that very thought. I also point out that the structure of an indirect sense mirrors the
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structure of the sense it refers to. Compare a map of a region that is located within
that very region: e.g. a shopping mall with a map including a point labeled “You are
here”. I discuss the indexical ‘here’ in the following chapter.
In order to motivate this somewhat technical view of the structure of thoughts
about thoughts, I point out connections with the structure of conscious experience.
Note that whenever I reflect on the totality of my own conscious experience, simply
by virtue of doing so, a part of that experience is representing the whole. Hence this
structure exists in meta-representation of our own conscious experience, and hence it
should be somewhat unsurprising that it is preserved in thoughts about thoughts.
I also argue that reflection on various cases of indirect contexts suggests that both
ordinary senses and indirect senses are expressed in such contexts, and furthermore
are expressed in a way that makes their connection salient. I then attempt an expla-
nation, starting with the following question: why is it so useful to be able to represent
our conscious experience as structured in various ways? I suggest the answer is: to
aid in conscious decision-making leading to various actions, including mental actions
such as judging, inferring, etc.
In particular, if I represent my conscious experience as structured in such a way
that aspects of it represent various objects instantiating properties and bearing re-
lations to each other, then I can compare how things appear to me with various
additional pieces of information I have about how they actually are. Without this
meta-representational ability, reflectively judging whether the appearances match re-
ality would be impossible. I suggest that it is in service of this ability that we are
capable of meta-level reflection on our own beliefs and the beliefs of others, and hence
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in the context of a belief ascription I should not only represent the thought ascribed,
but also the relation between that thought and what the thought is about, and that
is why both ordinary senses and indirect senses are expressed in a way that makes
their connection salient.
I conclude Chapter 2 by demonstrating that the account I’ve given, which is a
modification of Frege’s own account, resolves various general issues involving the
hierarchy of senses that are not resolved by the accounts of Burge, Peacocke, or
Kripke.
Chapter 3 turns to demonstratives and indexicals, traditionally a problematic
domain for Fregean theories of content. I begin by developing and criticizing a na¨ıve
Fregean theory of the contribution of contextual factors to the expression of thoughts.
On such a view, tensed thoughts include senses as components referring to particular
times (e.g. the time of utterance), and thoughts have unique decompositions into
senses. I point out that such an account would make preservation of thought over
time impossible. In effect, one would be unable to grasp a tensed thought at any time
other than the time at which it was originally expressed.6 Naturally, I argue later
in the chapter that we can resolve this issue if we allow thoughts to have multiple
decompositions into senses.
I also discuss the well-known modal objections stemming from Saul Kripke (1980)
and David Kaplan (1989). In effect, demonstratives and indexicals seem to behave
as if they have the same reference even when evaluated with respect to other possible
6This point was made by Kripke (2008), although he (incorrectly) interprets Frege as committed
to this view. I extend Kripke’s point and consider various possible responses.
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states of the world; they appear to be rigid designators. It isn’t clear how a Fregean
theory of context can account for this.
I turn to interpreting Frege’s actual views on demonstratives and indexicals. I
discuss an interpretation due to Kripke (2008) and defend it against criticism from
Wolfgang Ku¨nne (2010) and Tyler Burge (2012). On Kripke’s interpretation, when
I utter ‘I am here now’, the subject, place, and time of utterance themselves are
used as names of themselves, thereby expressing autonymous senses. In effect, one
is using aspects of the context as self-referential pieces of language. I show that this
interpretation is well-supported by the textual evidence.
Frege wanted the same tensed thought to be expressible at different times, claiming
that ‘Today it is raining’ uttered one day and ‘Yesterday it was raining’ uttered at the
same place the next day express the same thought.7 I point out that Frege appealed
to multiple decompositions of thought here. I then develop this view and show that
Frege was committed to e.g. the sense expressed by the combination of ‘Today’ and
the time of utterance having the structure of a timeline and the sense expressed by
the combination of ‘here’ and the place of utterance having the structure of a space.
Before defending this view as correct, I address a well-known objection due to
Kaplan (1989): someone might not realize how many days have passed since their
original utterance, and thereby fail to recognize whether their new utterance expresses
the same thought or a distinct thought, even if they are an ideally linguistically
competent speaker. I point out that this consequence is acceptable provided that
7Kripke (2008) claims that Frege shouldn’t have said this, given his other commitments. I show
that Kripke is mistaken, stemming from his failure to recognize the Multiple Decompositions Thesis.
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we take the truth-conditional conception of thought as fundamental, as I have been
doing throughout the dissertation.
Returning to the view of the structure of senses outlined above, I point out that
when I assert that today it is raining here, I am still committed to its having rained
at that location on that day when I consider it from the perspective of tomorrow.
The truth-conditions of my assertion do not depend on the temporal perspective from
which I am viewing the event.
Note that the spatial analogue of a shift in one’s temporal perspective on an
event as occurring over a particular duration of time is a shift in spatial perspective
on an object as having a particular geometric shape. I point out that a perception
of an object as a cube carries commitments to how that object would appear from
a different perspective. I suggest that an elegant way to capture this idea is to let
the representational content expressed by that perception have the structure of a
space with that object as origin: any point in that space corresponds to a particular
perspective on that object from which I would still perceive it as a cube. This
captures my commitments regarding how that object would appear from another
angle, and allows me to explain how another perceiver at another point in space
could be perceiving the object in the same way.8
I claim that the position on the structure of senses I outlined above is the natural
extension of this view from the realm of perception to the realm of thought. The sense
8Obviously, this notion of way of perceiving is at a particular level of abstraction. I take it to
be clear that there is a level of abstraction at which two people in the same room can perceive a
cubic object in the same way, with both carrying commitments to how that object appears from the
other’s perspective.
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expressed by the combination of an utterance of ‘here’ and the place of utterance has
the structure of a space in which each point in the space corresponds to a perspective
on the place referred to by ‘here’. The shift in perspective is captured at the level of
sense via multiple decompositions: the very same sense can be grasped as a function
of various points in the space while the full sense remains the same even as I shift
my perspective. The analogous remarks with respect to time allow two utterances
of ‘Today it is raining here’ and ‘Yesterday it was raining here’ to express the same
thought.
I then turn to the modal objections. I point out that on the Fregean view I’ve
outlined, indexicals are rigid designators after all, maintaining fixed reference even
when evaluated with respect to different possible states of the world. This is due to
the autonymous senses expressed by subjects, places, and times of utterances used
as names of themselves. I note that this account could be extended to a Fregean
treatment of demonstratives and proper names as rigid designators.
This may feel like a mere technical trick. Is there any reason to think that sub-
jects, times, and places are actually used as names of themselves? I suggest that
using entities as representations of themselves is ubiquitous in thinking, and (very
tentatively) suggest a model of consciousness of our own perceptions under which
those perceptions are used as representations of themselves (recall that I discussed
consciousness of one’s own perceptions in the previous chapter in connection with the
hierarchy of senses).
The tentatively-suggested model is the following: an especially simple way of con-
structing a self-referential representation is combining a representation of an entity
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with that entity. My ability to recall my conscious experience a moment ago implies
that my mind is constantly constructing meta-representations of my conscious expe-
rience. If such a meta-representation were combined with my conscious experience
itself in the appropriate way, each element of that experience could be treated as a
representation of itself. This captures the self-referential phenomenology of human
consciousness, and in the particular case of perception explains why my perceiving an
object and my conscious awareness of that perception have a similar phenomenology
(in the latter case I am using that very perception to represent itself). Furthermore,
this model also explains why I never have such meta-representations of my own per-
ceptions without having those perceptions, and why there is a sense in which those
meta-representations are immune to certain sorts of error.
I close Chapter 3 by returning to the issues of thought preservation outlined at
the chapter’s beginning, arguing that the view I’ve defended gives the correct answer
in the cases I’ve discussed.
Chapter 4 discusses logical form. I begin by arguing that my treatment of thoughts
as structured entities allows me to characterize deductive inference as a transition
between thoughts whose guaranteed truth-preservation can be explained solely by
appeal to logical forms instantiated by those thoughts. I point out that part of the
value of a contemporary formal language is that it allows us to constrain the semantics
so that we can only give an explanation of truth-preservation by appealing to struc-
tural features of truth-conditions (and the corresponding thoughts) corresponding to
sentences of the formal language. The question, then, is which structural features of
thoughts ought to count as logical forms.
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I turn to defending Frege’s position that complete declarative sentences refer to
special objects: the True and the False. I begin by asking the question: why is it so
cognitively useful for us to see the world as made up of objects?
I point out that in Chapter 3 I argued that a perception of an object as a cube
carries commitments to how that object would appear from other points in space. I
suggested capturing these commitments by treating the representational content of
such a perception as a space of possible perspectives on that object. I then point out
that this space has quite a bit of structure to it, since e.g. I am committed to the
appearance of the cube shifting in a determinate way as I move closer to it (i.e. it
will take up more of my visual field), and this is grounding various expectations of
mine regarding how things will appear as I shift my position in space.
With a nod to Immanuel Kant (1781/1787), I argue that the cognitive value of
representing something as an object is that it allows me to unite various representa-
tions as of the same thing in accordance with particular rules. In the visual perceptual
case, this grounds my expectations that my visual experiences a few moments from
now will be anything like my visual experiences a moment ago (there is a thing in
the world that I’m shifting my perspective on), and that your visual experiences are
currently similar to mine (e.g. we’re both perceiving the same cube).
Turning back to truth-values, I argue that when I make a sincere assertion, I’m
attempting to describe the world as it actually is. I consequently suggest treating the
True as the actual world, the intended referent of assertion.9 I point out that many of
9I also point out that Frege himself seems to have held this position in his (1892a), although he
seems to have given it up later.
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our inferences presuppose that we’re experiencing the same world over time, as does
our assumption that someone else’s experiences are anything like our own. Much like
the more general case of objects, I argue that truth-preserving inferences between
thoughts maintain fixed reference to the actual world while varying its representation
in accordance with particular rules. These rules are grounded on its being the same
world that one is continuing to represent.
I then turn to atomic form. I argue that being able to learn from experience
requires making a distinction between particular things and patterns or structures
that multiple things have in common. More generally, I argue that learning from
experience requires making something like an object/property/relation distinction,
which is thus itself unlearnable because any learning presupposes it.
I then give several arguments that the object/property/relation distinction is nec-
essary for the possibility of rational agency. For one, inferential transitions between
thoughts require distinguishing between particular thoughts and general structures
instantiated by those thoughts, with the relevant structures determined by the rules
governing the inferential transitions.
I claim that if a structure is both unlearnable and necessary for the possibility of
rational agency then it ought to be considered a logical form. In effect, such structural
features correspond to the structure that one would have to put in place if one were
designing a rational mind, and in that sense can be thought of as fundamental to
the structure of thought. I spend the rest of the chapter considering whether the
structures of thoughts corresponding to the sentences of classical first-order logic
satisfy these two conditions.
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Following a classic argument due to Lewis Carroll (1895) and a more recent argu-
ment due to Saul Kripke, I argue that both Modus Ponens and Universal Instantiation
are such that you couldn’t come to recognize them as truth-preserving and make in-
ferences grounded on that recognition without already inferring in accordance with
them.10 I consider whether the corresponding logical connectives are both unlearnable
and necessary for the possibility of rational agency, and consider similar arguments
regarding the other classical logical connectives.
I close the chapter by returning to the hierarchy of senses discussed in Chapter
2. I argue that this structure is not in fact necessary for the possibility of rational
agency, although it is a natural extension of primitive rational agency to the level
of meta-representational capacities. I suggest that finding other natural extensions
of logical form (and other examples of logical form beyond classical first-order logic)
would be a worthwhile enterprise.
Note that while there are many interconnections between the four chapters, they
were written in such a way that they can be read independently of each other with
minimal loss of understanding. For example, Chapter 3 takes various aspects of
the Frege interpretation defended in Chapter 1 for granted, but could still be read
independently of Chapter 1 provided the reader is willing to grant me those aspects
for the sake of argument. The overarching theme of the dissertation remains, however:
the structure of thought.
10Regarding Kripke’s argument, cf. (Padro 2015): imagine trying to teach someone to infer in
accordance with Universal Instantiation. They take it on your authority that every instance of
Universal Instantiation is truth-preserving. However, when confronted with a particular instance of
Universal Instantiation they remain skeptical. The point being, getting from the universal claim to
a particular instance is itself an application of Universal Instantiation.
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0.3 A Note on Translation
Much of this dissertation will involve interpreting the work of Gottlob Frege. When
providing quotations, I rely on English translations of Frege’s original German essays
and correspondence, contained in (Frege 1979), (Frege 1980), and (Frege 1984). I
also use the T. Bynum translation of Frege’s Begriffsschrift (1879), the J. L. Austin
translation of Frege’s Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik (1884), and the P. Ebert and M.
Rossberg translation of both Volumes I and II of Frege’s Grundgesetze der Arithmetik
(1893/1903a). Whenever a work of Frege appeared in print, I will cite that work’s
original pagination followed by its pagination within the translation I’m relying on:
e.g. ‘(Frege 1892a, pg. 35-6/164-5)’.
Since some basic terms have been translated in different ways, let me note the
following: I translate ‘Sinn’ as ‘sense’, ‘Bedeutung’ as ‘referent’ or ‘reference’, and
‘Satz’ as ‘sentence’ or ‘theorem’ (depending on the context). Whenever I deviate from
this practice I include a footnote with an explanation. Whenever I have made my own
adjustment to a cited translation, I have included that adjustment within brackets:
e.g. ‘[referent]’. I occasionally make adjustments in order to account for certain cases
of anaphora, e.g. replacing ‘it’ by ‘[language]’. Finally, in some cases I have felt the
need to add context to a quotation (e.g. to explain what Frege was referring to). I
also use brackets for this purpose, including my initials within the brackets to indicate
that it is my own addition: e.g. “Such a designation [‘the negation of the negation
of A’—NB] is to be regarded as...”.11
11If the reader is confused by any of these uses of brackets, I encourage them to consult either
the referenced English translation or the original German.
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Chapter 1
The Decomposition of Thought
1.1 Introduction
Gottlob Frege famously introduced the notion of the gedanke or thought expressed
by a complete declarative sentence as the sort of content relevant to determining
whether that sentence is true or false. Here is one of many examples: “So one has
to separate off from the content of a sentence the part that alone can be accepted
as true or rejected as false. I call this part the thought expressed by the sentence.”
(1906c, PW pg. 197-8)1
Furthermore, when discussing the structure of thoughts, Frege helped himself to
mereological language, often speaking of parts of a thought corresponding to the
significant parts of a sentence expressing it.2 For example, when I utter the sentence
1In this discussion I follow Frege in treating content as an intuitive notion from which the more
technical notion of thought can be isolated.
2For example: “How can [language] achieve so much? By virtue of the fact that thoughts have
parts out of which they are built up. And these parts, these building blocks, correspond to groups
of sounds, out of which the sentence expressing the thought is built up, so that the construction of
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‘John has brown hair’, my utterance expresses the thought that John has brown hair,
a thought which contains the sense of ‘John’ and the sense of ‘has brown hair’ as
parts.3
The goal of this chapter is to further elucidate Frege’s conception of the structure
of thoughts. I will argue that Frege held that a thought does not have a unique
decomposition into senses, but rather the same thought can be decomposed into
senses in many distinct ways. This Multiple Decompositions Thesis will be especially
important in later chapters.
This chapter is divided into two parts. In the first part, I will trace Frege’s
evolving conception of content from his first reflections in the Begriffsschrift of 1879
to his eventual distinction between sense and reference in 1891. In the second part, I
will consider some potential problems with the Multiple Decompositions Thesis noted
in the literature. The Appendix to this chapter includes a list of every quotation
I consider to be relevant to the Multiple Decompositions Thesis, and is meant to
decisively establish that this controversial interpretation of Frege is correct.
the sentence out of parts of a sentence corresponds to the construction of a thought out of parts of a
thought. And as we take a thought to be the sense of a sentence, so we may call a part of a thought
the sense of that part of the sentence which corresponds to it.” (1914, PW pg. 225)
Frege explicitly calls such mereological language “figurative” in the following passage: “To be
sure, we really talk figuratively when we transfer the relation of whole and part to thoughts; yet the
analogy is so ready to hand and so generally appropriate that we are hardly ever bothered by the
hitches which occur from time to time.” (1923-6, pg. 36/390) However, this passage should be taken
with a grain of salt; this was one of Frege’s last papers, and it is unclear whether Frege’s earlier
positions are really compatible with such a noncommittal account of the mereological structure of
thoughts.
3We will discuss Frege’s notion of “sense” (“Sinn”) throughout this dissertation. Briefly: I take
the most fundamental notion of the sense of an expression to be the aspect of the expression’s
content in virtue of which it contributes to the truth-conditions of complete declarative sentences
which contain it.
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1.2 Logic, Formal Languages, and Conceptual
Content
Frege’s primary goal in constructing his Concept-Script (Begriffsschrift) of 1879 was
to demonstrate that arithmetical reasoning, which appeared to depend essentially on
intuition or insight, was in fact reducible to a sequence of purely logical inferences.
Frege realized that in order to do this he needed to develop a formal language in
which all hidden presuppositions are made explicit and even the smallest step in a
chain of reasoning is represented; inferences needed to be entirely “free of gaps”.
Regarding his formal language, Frege states in the Preface that “I have omitted
the expression of everything which is without importance for the chain of inference.”
(Frege 1879, pg. iv/104) His motivation is clear: Frege intends to ensure that anything
that is not relevant to the logical structure of a chain of inferences is simply not
expressed by sentences in his formal language. That way, he can avoid the vagaries
and imprecision of natural languages, along with the various aspects of linguistic
meaning that are irrelevant to logic. Frege calls what is expressed by the expressions
of his formal language conceptual content,4 where the conceptual content of complete
declarative sentences is also known as judgeable content.5
4Note that Frege uses this expression more broadly to apply to e.g. geometric content as well,
although this generalization won’t be relevant to our present purposes. I am grateful to Haim
Gaifman for pointing this out to me.
5Since this is prior to Frege’s sense/reference distinction, Frege was a bit sloppy about distin-
guishing the content expressed by an expression from the content represented by (or referred to by)
that expression. Perhaps it would be better to say, as Frege wrote to Husserl, for example (Letter
to Husserl 5/24/1891, PMC pg. 63), that conceptual content is a fusion of sense and reference,
and hence the content expressed and the content represented are identical. This issue will reappear
throughout this section.
Of course, one may think that this distinction between expression and representation is unfair
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In Frege’s view, past logicians relied too much on the grammar of natural lan-
guages and thereby failed to recognize that the logical structure of (the content ex-
pressed by) a sentence or collection of sentences in an inference is often quite different
from its grammatical structure (Frege 1879, pg. vi/107). Hence, Frege’s formal lan-
guage is designed so that its grammar makes the logical structure of the contents
expressed within it transparent. To do so, Frege replaced the traditional distinction
between subject and predicate with his new distinction between argument and func-
tion. In fact, Frege considered his replacement of the standard subject/predicate
analysis of content by an argument/function analysis to be one of his most important
advances in logic. Let’s briefly consider why.
Why does Frege think that the subject/predicate analysis of content failed to
elucidate underlying logical structure? Consider a well-known example of an Aris-
totelian syllogism: “All men are mortal. Socrates is a man. Therefore, Socrates is
mortal.” On a subject/predicate analysis, the sentences ‘All men are mortal’ and
‘Socrates is mortal’ are distinguished only by their distinct subjects: ‘All men’ in
the former and ‘Socrates’ in the latter.6 On a subject/predicate analysis, these two
to early Frege, since it nearly takes for granted his later sense/reference distinction. Nothing that
follows will hinge on these issues, although I will continue to speak of conceptual content as both
expressed and represented.
6While it is also true that the two sentences differ in their usage of the verb “to be” (in English, at
least), note that the following holds: (1) a sentence with a compound subject such as ‘Aristotle and
Socrates are mortal’ also uses the plural form; (2) Frege is ultimately concerned with the respective
roles of ‘All men’ and ‘Socrates’ in deductive inferences, and he will argue quite convincingly that
they play fundamentally different roles.
One might argue that this focus on inferential role is the right approach as follows: why is it
so useful for us to recognize the sentences we utter as structured entities? It is useful partially
because it allows us to make inferences to and from an uttered sentence, inferences hinging on the
object/property/relation distinction, for example. More generally, it allows us to recognize relations
between sentences that obtain in virtue of such structure. We shall return to this issue in later
chapters.
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subjects are of the same logical type. But what is the meaning of the expression ‘All
men’? Does it refer to the class of men, or some mereological fusion of all men, or
the Platonic form MEN, or, unlike ‘Socrates’, is it simply not the sort of thing that
refers at all?7 Due in no small part to such considerations (although strictly speaking
Frege wasn’t yet distinguishing sense from reference), Frege provides an alternative
argument/function analysis of content that treats these two subject-expressions as
having fundamentally different logical forms, ultimately stemming from their distinct
roles in deductive inference.
In order to elucidate Frege’s alternative argument/function analysis of content,
let’s consider the sentence ‘Hydrogen is lighter than carbon dioxide.’ Frege points out
that we can replace the term ‘Hydrogen’ by, for example, ‘Oxygen’ in order to get a
sentence that represents (expresses) a distinct conceptual content: ‘Oxygen is lighter
than carbon dioxide.’ Yet, there is a strong connection between these two sentences.
Frege calls the fixed component the function, and the replaceable component the
argument.
Interestingly, Frege says, “This distinction has nothing to do with the conceptual
content, but only with our way of viewing it.” (Frege 1879, pg. 15/126) We could have
also considered ‘carbon dioxide’ to be the argument and ‘being heavier than hydrogen’
to be the function, or both ‘hydrogen’ and ‘carbon dioxide’ to be the arguments and ‘is
lighter than’ to be the (two-place) function; this makes no difference to the conceptual
content itself. Notice the sharp difference from an analysis based upon grammatical
7Note that although it may seem that Aristotle is the target here (and Frege himself suggests as
much, although this explanation of Frege’s motivation is my own), Aristotle did not actually hold
such a na¨ive view of the relation between logical form and natural language.
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structure such as the subject/predicate analysis briefly discussed above.
Consider also the sentence ‘Cato killed Cato.’ According to Frege, this could be
analyzed in at least three ways (ibid pg. 16/127): taking ‘Cato’ as argument and
‘killing Cato’ as function, taking ‘Cato’ as argument and ‘being killed by Cato’ as
function, or taking ‘Cato’ as argument and ‘killing oneself’ as function (in the last
case, we treat both instances of the term ‘Cato’ in the sentence as replaceable by a
single argument). None of this affects the conceptual content, but merely our way of
viewing or grasping it.
But what are the functions and arguments: the expressions themselves or the
content of the expressions or something else entirely? Also, what do the functions map
their arguments to? Regarding the first question, there is some textual evidence that
in 1879 Frege considered functions and arguments to be parts of expressions rather
than contents. Let’s consider Frege’s official statement about carving an expression
into function and argument:
If, in an expression (whose content need not be assertible), a simple
or a complex symbol occurs in one or more places and we imagine it as
replaceable by another [symbol] (but the same one each time) at all or
some of these places, then we call the part of the expression that shows
itself invariant [under such replacement] a function and the replaceable
part its argument.” (ibid pg. 16/127)
Here Frege explicitly calls functions and arguments parts of the expressions rather
than the contents represented (expressed). Such a potential carving of the expression
is suggested by the structure of the expression itself.
Further support for this interpretation comes from Frege’s correspondence with
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Philip Jourdain. While Frege suggested many corrections to Jourdain’s essay Gottlob
Frege, he interestingly did not correct Jourdain’s claim about Frege’s Begriffsschrift-
era formalist sympathies: “Notice that here Frege, although he was careful to dis-
tinguish the sign ‘A’ from what it denoted, spoke of the expression as variable, and
defined the function as a certain part of the expression.” (Jourdain 1912, reprinted in
(Frege 1980, pg. 187 fn. 40)) It is possible, however, that this footnote was added to a
later draft that Frege didn’t correct. Further evidence comes from Frege’s treatment
of identity within the Begriffsschrift, which we will discuss shortly.
However, by 1881 he unambiguously treated functions and arguments as parts of
the content represented (expressed) rather than the expressions themselves.8
Regarding the second question, Frege states “For us, the different ways in which
the same conceptual content can be considered as a function of this or that argument
have no importance so long as function and argument are completely determinate.”
(Frege 1879, pg. 17/128)9 Frege also states that (outside of the special case of judg-
8“If, that is, you imagine the 2 in the content of possible judgement 24 = 16 to be replaceable
by something else, by (−2) or by 3 say, which may be indicated by putting an x in place of the 2:
x4 = 16, the content of possible judgement is thus split into a constant and a variable part.” (Frege
1880-81, PW pg. 16)
9Regarding the point about function and argument being completely determinate, Frege pro-
ceeds to give an example of a judgment in which the argument is indeterminate: “Whatever arbitrary
positive integer we take as argument for ‘being representable as the sum of four squares’, the [re-
sulting sentence] is always true.” (ibid pg. 17/128) The point Frege had in mind seems to be the
following: Let’s represent this judgment within the Begriffsschrift as follows: Σ(a)
N(a)
, where
‘a’ is a Latin letter used to express generality (as Frege discusses in Sections 1 and 11), ‘N ’ is an
abbreviation for ‘being a positive integer’, and ‘Σ’ is an abbreviation for ‘being representable as the
sum of four squares’. Certain carvings of this expression are ruled out by the content itself, since
one cannot, for example, treat the first occurrence of ‘a’ as replaceable while leaving the second
occurrence fixed (thereby treating it as part of the function), as one could in the ‘Cato killed Cato’
example, since this would allow one to transition to the judgment: “the circumstance that the value
of the function ‘being representable as the sum of four squares if 2 is a positive integer’ on any
argument is a fact is itself a fact”, which implies that any argument is representable as the sum of
four squares and obviously does not follow from the former judgment.
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ments of identity of content, on which more in a moment) “symbols are usually only
representatives of their contents—so that each combination [of symbols usually] ex-
presses only a relation between their contents...” (ibid pg. 13/124)
Consider also Frege’s remarks when describing his language, e.g. “ A
B
stands for [my emphasis—NB] the judgement that the third of these possibilities [i.e.
that A is denied and B is affirmed—NB] does not occur, but one of the other three
does.” (ibid pg. 5/115) The point being, expressions within Frege’s Begriffsschrift
do not merely represent objects and functions, as they will in Frege’s later work, but
rather conceptual contents grasped in particular ways. In particular, the expression in
the previous quote stands for the following judgment:10 “the circumstance that the
circumstance that B bears the material conditional relation to the circumstance that
A is a fact”. So, varying the carving of an expression into functions and arguments
is varying one’s way of representing (or way of expressing) the conceptual content
represented (expressed) by the full expression.
Consider also: “It is easy to see how regarding a content as a function of an ar-
gument leads to the formation of concepts.” (ibid pg. vii/107) These quotes suggest
that the function maps its argument(s) to a conceptual content, namely, the con-
ceptual content represented (expressed) by the complete expression initially carved
into function and argument. Note that even in a case in which one uses an unstruc-
10Well, it would stand for a judgment, provided that one specified what the Greek letters ‘A’ and
‘B’ are abbreviations for, in accordance with Frege’s footnote at the beginning of Section 2. Note
also that Frege is referring to the expression within his formal language as opposed to the judgment
represented (expressed) by it. In this chapter I also slide between using and mentioning expressions
involving the judgment stroke in order to avoid unnecessary complications. I expect the reader to
determine the intended meaning from the context.
24
tured expression such as ‘A’ in order to represent a judgeable content, one can treat
that expression as the argument of the content stroke function, which maps it to the
judgeable content represented (expressed) by ‘A’ (i.e. A). Just as the judgment
stroke can be seen as an abbreviation for the predicate ‘is a fact’ (ibid pg. 4/113),
the content stroke can be seen as an abbreviation for the function ‘the circumstance
that’ (ibid pg. 2/112).
With that said, let’s turn to the interesting case of identity judgments. In Section
8, Frege made several seemingly-contradictory claims about identity judgments:
Identity of content differs from conditionality and negation by relating
to names, not to contents. Although symbols are usually only represen-
tatives of their contents–so that each combination [of symbols usually]
expresses only a relation between their contents–they at once appear in
propria persona [i.e. as themselves—NB] as soon as they are combined
by the symbol for identity of content, for this signifies the circumstance
that the two names have the same content. Thus, with the introduction
of a symbol for identity of content, a bifurcation is necessarily introduced
into the meaning of every symbol, the same symbols standing at times for
their contents, at times for themselves. (ibid pg. 13-14/124)
Thus, the need of a symbol for identity of content rests upon the
following fact: the same content can be fully determined in different ways;
but, that the same content, in a particular case, is actually given by two
{different} modes of determination is the content of a judgement. (ibid
pg. 14/125)
But how could expressions in the context of an identity judgment both represent
(express) themselves and represent (express) distinct modes of determination of the
same content?
I claim that Frege held the following position: (A ≡ B) represents (expresses)
the judgment that the circumstance that the expression ‘A’ and the expression ‘B’
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represent (express) the same conceptual content is a fact (under the presupposition
that what these Greek letters are abbreviations for has been specified). Each expres-
sion is intended as an abbreviation for a way of determining a conceptual content. In
the context of an identity-judgment, these expressions represent (express) themselves
qua ways of determining conceptual contents. On my interpretation, this is clearer
in the case of a structured expression such as ‘7 + 5’. This expression is itself a way
of determining the number 12, since the function ‘+ 5’ is part of the very expression,
and when applied to the remainder as argument (the numeral ‘7’) gives the number
12 as value. In the context of an identity judgment such as 7 + 5 ≡ 12, ‘7 + 5’ is
used to represent itself, a way of determining a conceptual content.11
As mentioned above, this is further evidence that in 1879 Frege considered the
function/argument distinction to apply at the level of expression rather than con-
tent.12 However, since by 1881 Frege did not hold this view, the correctness of such
11For further support of this interpretation, consider the opening remarks of “On Sense and
Reference”, in which Frege asserts both that in the Begriffsschrift he assumed identity was a relation
between names or signs of objects and “In that case the sentence a = b would no longer refer to the
subject matter, but only to its mode of designation; we would express no proper knowledge by its
means.” (Frege 1892a, pg. 26/157)
12Note also that on this interpretation Frege is committed (circa 1879) to a way of determining
the conceptual content of a complex expression proceeding top-down. Given an expression such
as ‘(7 + 5) + 7’, the value of the function ‘+ 5’ on input ‘7’ is the conceptual content represented
(expressed) by ‘(7+5)’. However, the function ‘+’ takes the expression ‘(7+5)’ as input as opposed
to its conceptual content. So, one can’t reach this conceptual content bottom-up by first applying the
‘+ 5’ function to ‘7’ and then applying the ‘+’ function to both the result of the former application
and ‘7’. Instead, one arrives at this carving by first carving the complete expression into ‘(7+5)’ and
‘7’ as arguments with ‘+’ left as fixed remainder. One can then further carve the expression ‘(7+5)’
into ‘7’ as argument and ‘+ 5’ as fixed remainder, or (for example) into ‘7’ and ‘5’ as arguments
and ‘+’ as fixed remainder.
In effect, one is initially given the conceptual content of the complete expression. One then
considers a way in which that expression can be viewed as determining that conceptual content,
and one possible answer is that this content is the value of the function ‘+’ on inputs ‘(7 + 5)’ and
‘7’. The conceptual content of the complete expression also depends upon the conceptual content of
‘(7+5)’, and hence one can also look for a way in which that expression can be viewed as determining
its own conceptual content. The number of times one can continue this process depends upon the
structural complexity of the expression under consideration.
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a formalist interpretation will be unimportant in the remainder of this chapter.
Now we are in a position to understand some of the advantages of the argu-
ment/function analysis of content. Recall that on a subject/predicate analysis, in
the sentences ‘All men are mortal’ and ‘Socrates is mortal’, the expressions ‘All men’
and ‘Socrates’ are treated as being of the same logical type. They play very different
roles in inference, however. For example, from ‘Socrates is mortal’ I can infer ‘Some-
one is mortal’ (this is often known as Existential Introduction), but I cannot infer
this from ‘All men are mortal’.13 Furthermore, from ‘All men are mortal’ I can infer
‘If Bob is a man, then Bob is mortal’ (this is often known as Universal Instantiation),
and I can make a similar inference involving any other proper name in the place of
‘Bob’, but I cannot infer such things from ‘Socrates is mortal’.14 As Frege will em-
phasize after his sense/reference distinction, ‘All men’ doesn’t behave like a referring
expression at all.
Frege captures this distinction within his formal language by treating ‘is mortal’
as a function that maps ‘Socrates’ as argument to the judgeable content that Socrates
is mortal as value, while the judgeable content represented (expressed) by ‘All men
are mortal’ can instead be viewed as the value of the generality function applied to
the function corresponding to ‘if x is a man, then x is mortal’ as argument. The
13Here I am making the standard contemporary assumption that a universally-quantified condi-
tional doesn’t carry an existential commitment. Hence, one needs to add the premise ‘There are
men’ in order to logically imply the conclusion ‘Someone is mortal’. As should be clear, disagreement
on that point isn’t relevant to the more general distinction between the inferential roles of the two
expressions.
14To be fair, one might think that from ‘Socrates is mortal’ one could infer ‘If Bob is Socrates,
then Bob is mortal.’ But note the distinct inferential roles of ‘Bob is a man’ and ‘Bob is Socrates’.
From ‘Bob is Socrates’ and ‘Jim is Socrates’ I can infer ‘Bob is Jim’, but from ‘Bob is a man’ and
‘Jim is a man’ I cannot infer ‘Bob is Jim’.
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generality function maps a function of one argument to a judgeable content that is a
fact exactly if that function of one argument always maps its argument to a judgeable
content that is itself a fact, no matter what that argument is. In this way, Frege can
capture the distinct inferential roles of such expressions via his formal language.
Furthermore, Frege ought to do so since the grammar of his language is intended to
make the logical structure of its expressions transparent, and such logical structure
is determined entirely by the role such expressions play in logical inference.15
Let’s return to our discussion of multiple decompositions of content. Notice that
Frege’s formal language is not set up to represent judgeable contents simpliciter,
but rather judgeable contents plus particular ways of carving their representations
up into arguments and functions.16 When expressing ‘Cato killed Cato’ in Frege’s
formal language, for example, we must make a choice about what we will treat as the
argument(s) and what we will treat as the function(s). For instance, we might choose
to represent this content as ‘ KilledCato(Cato)’.17 However, not all logical inferences
15Incidentally, I think that Frege’s implied meta-level reading of judgments with universal content
(as judgments about whether the values of functions on arbitrary arguments are themselves always
facts, cf. the beginning of Section 11) has been insufficiently discussed. Strictly speaking, such
a judgment concerns a judgeable content that is itself about the result of applying a function to
arbitrary expressions as arguments, namely, about whether or not it will always result in a fact.
Hence, such a content is about whether arbitrary expressions of a particular form always represent
(express) facts.
Of course, a possible alternative to this reading is that Frege was simply being a bit sloppy, and
he certainly does revise his views on quantification, functions, etc. later. Still, I think that it is
important to recognize areas in which Frege’s conception of logic, even merely circa 1879, seems
to be quite different from standard contemporary conceptions of logic. Furthermore, given that in
Frege’s later work the universal quantifier is a 2nd-level function from functions to truth-values,
there is a natural continuity from his early conception to his later conception.
16One can of course leave a judgeable content unanalyzed, like an atomic sentence in proposi-
tional/sentential logic. One would then represent the judgeable content in Frege’s system as an
unstructured entity (Frege himself uses capital Greek letters). However, one would then obviously
not be able to formally represent logical inferences dependent upon the structure being ignored.
17It is perhaps better to represent it as ‘ A(c)’, where ‘A’ and ‘c’ are treated as abbreviations
in the obvious way.
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from the judgeable content represented (expressed) by ‘Cato killed Cato’ will be
salient once we have chosen a particular way to carve up this representation. For
example, although this judgeable content logically entails that there exists someone
killed by Cato, one cannot represent such an inference formally once one has chosen
to carve this representation in the way we did above: with ‘Cato’ as argument and
‘killed Cato’ as function. Instead, one could formally represent the inference from this
judgeable content to the judgeable content represented (expressed) by the sentence
‘Someone killed Cato’. This point applies to Frege’s formal language across-the-board.
Importantly, when representing a conceptual content in such a formal language,
one must choose to represent it in such a way that will make the possibility of certain
inferences salient and mask the possibility of certain others. Proper formal represen-
tation is, at bottom, relative to the desired inferential structure of the argument(s)
being considered/constructed. In the context of making an inference, we must grasp
the contents involved in particular ways.
Frege also discusses multiple carvings and their role in concept-formation in his
Letter to Marty of 1882:
Now I do not believe that concept formation can precede judgement
because this would presuppose the independent existence of concepts, but
I think of a concept as having arisen by decomposition from a judgeable
content. I do not believe that for any judgeable content there is only one
way in which it can be decomposed, or that one of these possible ways
can always claim objective preeminence. In the inequality 3 > 2 we can
regard either 2 or 3 as the subject. In the former case we have the concept
‘smaller than 3’, in the latter, ‘greater than 2’. We can also regard ‘3 and
2’ as a complex subject. As a predicate we then have the concept of the
relation of the greater to the smaller. (Frege, Letter to Marty 8/29/1882,
PMC pg. 101)
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Note that Frege now discusses decomposing judgeable contents themselves rather
than merely expressions for such judgeable contents. Presumably one carves the
judgeable content via carving its expression.18 However, it isn’t until the Grundlagen
der Arithmetik that Frege really starts to put this conception of content to work, and
it is there that we will turn next.
1.3 Some Remarks on the Grundlagen
In The Foundations of Arithmetic of 1884, Frege gives a detailed philosophical analysis
of the concept of number, with the aim of philosophically motivating his project of
reducing arithmetic to logic. It would take us too far afield to consider the essay in
detail, so instead we’ll focus on the aspects of the essay most relevant to our general
discussion of Frege’s evolving conception of content.
Frege opens the Grundlagen by pointing out that although everyone uses and
speaks about numbers all the time, it seems that no one, not even a mathematician,
can give a satisfactory answer to the question ‘What is the number 1?’ or ‘To what
does the numeral ‘1’ refer?’ Frege says that one common response is ‘The number one
is a thing.’ Yes, but which thing is it? Frege points out that if everyone were allowed
to treat the number one as whichever thing he or she liked, then “the same [sentence]
about one would mean different things for different people,—such [sentences] would
18Compare Frege’s claim in “Function and Concept” that “We recognize the function in the
expression by imagining the latter as split up, and the possibility of thus splitting it up is suggested
by its structure.” (Frege 1891, pg. 7/141) Consider also the quotation from “Boole’s Logical
Calculus and the Concept-Script” cited in footnote 8 and Frege’s discussion of concept acquisition
immediately following that passage.
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have no common content.” (Frege 1884, pg. i) Note the underlying interest in the
objective, shareable content of mathematical assertions in a public language.
Here are two quotations that reveal Frege’s emphasis on the generality of laws
of thought and his insistence on an anti-psychologistic treatment of the content of
mathematical assertions:
Thought is in essentials the same everywhere: it is not true that there
are different kinds of laws of thought to suit the different kinds of objects
thought about. Such differences as there are consist only in this, that
the thought is more pure or less pure, less dependent or more upon psy-
chological influences and on external aids such as words or numerals, and
further to some extent too in the finer or coarser structure of the concepts
involved...(ibid pg. iii-iv)
Never let us take a description of the origin of an idea for a definition,
or an account of the mental and physical conditions on which we become
conscious of a [theorem] for a proof of it. A [theorem] may be thought,
and again it may be true; let us never confuse these two things.19 (ibid
pg. vi)
At the end of the Introduction, Frege states his three fundamental principles (ibid
pg. x):
(1) always to separate sharply the psychological from the logical, the subjective from
the objective;
19I have chosen to translate ‘satz’ as ‘theorem’ in this case, since that seems closer than ‘sentence’
or ‘proposition’ to Frege’s intended meaning. It is also worth noting that the word being translated
here as ‘idea’ is ‘vorstellung’, which is often found in Kant and translated as either ‘representation’
or ‘presentation’. This choice of vocabulary reflects Frege’s primary criticism of Kant’s account of
arithmetic; namely, that it is far too subjective. However, I think it is clear that Frege misunderstood
Kant’s account, although perhaps he understood the so-called “Neo-Kantians” he interacted with
quite well (cf. his “Dialogue with Pu¨njer on Existence” (before 1884)). In any case, Frege states
that he will always use this word in the psychological, subjective sense.
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(2) never to ask for the meaning20 of a word in isolation, but only in the context of
a [sentence];
(3) never to lose sight of the distinction between concept and object.
Principle (2) is known as the Context Principle. Frege immediately motivates it
as follows: “If the second principle is not observed, one is almost forced to take as the
meanings of words mental pictures or acts of the individual mind, and so to offend
against the first principle as well.” (ibid pg. x). Later in this essay (ibid pg. 71),
Frege says “Only in a [sentence] have the words really a meaning. It may be that
mental pictures float before us all the while, but these need not correspond to the
logical elements in the judgement. It is enough if the [sentence] taken as a whole has
a sense; it is this that confers on its parts also their content.”
Note the suggestion once again that the content expressed by a complete, declar-
ative sentence is more objective than the content expressed by a word or phrase in
isolation. Why does Frege think this? Only the former sorts of content can be true
or false, and truth and falsity are the primary markers of objectivity for Frege. Frege
does not want to waste time considering what ideas different people associate with
the word ‘chair’ (or what have you); he is only interested in its objective content
in the public language, and he suggests that the content of an arbitrary expression
is determined by the contribution it makes to the content expressed by complete,
20Although Frege uses ‘bedeutung’ here, I’ve chosen to follow both Michael Beaney (1997) and J.
L. Austin in translating ‘bedeutung’ as ‘meaning’, since Frege had not yet made his sense/reference
distinction. Tyler Burge (2005) argues that Frege would later accept both versions of the updated
Context Principle: one version about reference and one version about sense.
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declarative sentences containing that expression in such a language.21
Regarding Principle (3), Frege states: “it is a mere illusion to suppose that a
concept can be made an object without altering it.” (ibid pg. x) Frege means that
concepts are essentially predicative while objects are not. Objects are complete;
concepts are unsaturated and must be saturated by an argument in order to form a
judgeable content with a determinate truth-value.
Importantly, Frege also distinguishes the objective from the actual. By the latter,
Frege means something like “that which is capable of acting on the senses.”22 As
Frege says:
The axis of the earth is objective, so is the center of mass of the solar
system, but I should not call them actual in the way the earth itself is
so...If to be recognized were to be created, then we should be able to say
nothing positive about the equator for any period earlier than the date
of its alleged creation...What is objective in [space] is what is subject to
laws, what can be conceived and judged, what is expressible in words.
What is purely intuitable is not communicable. (Frege 1884, pg. 35)
Frege then argues that numbers, like the center of mass of the solar system, are
objective but non-actual; they are neither physical nor mental. (ibid pg. 37-38)
With such preliminaries out of the way, let’s consider Frege’s account of number
in detail, since it reveals quite a bit about Frege’s conception of content circa 1884.
Now, Frege is trying to learn about the concept of number by analyzing the content of
numerical expressions. Frege is trying to determine the content of numerical expres-
sions by reflecting on the content of complete, declarative sentences containing those
21I remind the reader of Frege’s top-down approach to the determination of content in the Be-
griffsschrift, as we discussed in footnote 12 above.
22Cf. (Frege 1897, PW pg. 138).
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expressions, in line with Principle (2) above. Now, what is the difference between
the content of the sentence ‘Bob has two apples’ and the content of the sentence
‘Bob has one pair of apples’? While the two contain distinct numerical expressions,
they certainly don’t seem to be making distinct claims about the physical world, but
rather merely reflect distinct ways of conceptualizing it. As Frege puts it (referring
to different examples):
Now what changes here from one judgement to the other is neither any
individual object, nor the whole, the agglomeration of them, but rather
my terminology. But that is itself only a sign that one concept has been
substituted for another. This suggests as the answer to the first of the
questions left open in our last paragraph, that the content of a statement
of number is an assertion about a concept. (ibid pg. 59)
For example, if I say that Venus has 0 moons, I have asserted that the concept
“being a moon of Venus” has the property of having nothing fall under it. Note that
this is still objective and factual. Once the concept F is held fixed (and provided it
doesn’t have vague extension), there is only one correct answer to the question, ‘How
many F s are there?’ Frege argues that we can now explain why many have thought
that numbers are arrived at via abstraction (a view which Frege criticized earlier):
many concepts are acquired via abstraction, and a number is then discovered in the
concept. According to Frege, some other concepts are acquired by combining simple
concepts into a more complex concept (e.g. positive whole number) via what are
roughly the standard Boolean operations of conjunction, disjunction, and negation.
Frege also speaks of a third way of acquiring new concepts, suggested earlier, and
we’ll turn to this topic in a moment.
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Frege next turns to the task of defining the numbers 0 and 1. He first gives an
analysis of the content of sentences of the form ‘The number n belongs to the concept
F ’: ‘The number 0 belongs to the concept F ’ is true if, for any object a, a does not
fall under the concept F . ‘The number 1 belongs to the concept F ’ is true if 0 does
not belong to the concept F and whenever both a and b fall under the concept F , it
follows universally that a is identical to b. More generally, ‘The number n+1 belongs
to the concept F ’ is true if there is an object a which falls under F such that the
number n belongs to the concept “F , but not a”. (ibid pg. 67)
Frege is unsatisfied with this, however. He famously points out that we could
never “decide by means of our definitions whether any concept has the number Julius
Caesar belonging to it, or whether that same familiar conqueror of Gaul is a number
or not. Moreover we cannot by the aid of our suggested definitions prove that if the
number a belongs to the concept F and the number b belongs to the same concept,
then necessarily a = b.” (ibid pg. 68) What Frege is getting at here is that all
we’ve done is given the sense of the phrases ‘the number 0 belongs to’, ‘the number
1 belongs to’, etc.; we aren’t yet able to show that a number belonging to a concept
is unique, nor that nothing else is a number belonging to a concept besides what
falls under our recursive definition. In contemporary parlance, we haven’t yet given
identity-conditions for the natural numbers.
Recalling Principle (2), Frege states:
Since it is only in the context of a [sentence] that words have any
meaning, our problem becomes this: To define the sense of a [sentence]
in which a number word occurs...If we are to use the symbol a to signify
an object, we must have a criterion for deciding in all cases whether b is
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the same as a, even if it is not always in our power to apply this crite-
rion...When we have thus acquired a means of arriving at a determinate
number and of recognizing it again as the same, we can assign it a number
word as its proper name. (ibid pg. 73)
Given all this, Frege intends to define the numbers by means of the concept of
identity, which he takes as both purely logical and already understood (via Leibniz’s
definition of identity: “Things are the same as each other, of which one can be
substituted for the other without loss of truth”, quoted by Frege on pg. 76). The
way that Frege intends to go about this has been thoroughly discussed in recent
philosophy (e.g. (Hale and Wright, 2001)). Let’s consider it in detail.
Frege begins with a different example. Consider the judgment ‘Line a is parallel
to line b’ (in symbols: ‘a//b’). Frege says that this judgment
can be taken as an identity. If we do this, we obtain the concept of
direction, and say: “The direction of line a is identical with the direction
of line b.” Thus we replace the symbol // by the more generic symbol
=, through removing what is specific in the content of the former and
dividing it between a and b. We carve up the content in a way different
from the original way and this yields us a new concept. (ibid pg. 74-75)
This is the third way of acquiring new concepts that Frege discusses (the other two
being abstraction and Boolean combination). Recall our discussion above of carving
a conceptual content in different ways. Frege also suggests a metaphor to explain the
difference between this method of acquiring new concepts and the method I called
the Boolean combination of simple concepts to make a more complex concept: the
latter is like using lines already given to demarcate an area in a new way; the former
is like drawing new boundary lines that were not there in the first place. (ibid pg.
100-101)
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Anyway, Frege then tries to give a more formal treatment of the intuitive story
just discussed. To begin with, Frege suggests we stipulate that the sentence ‘The
direction of line a is identical with the direction of line b’ is to mean the same as ‘Line
a is parallel to line b’. Since Frege accepts Leibniz’s Law of Identity, he suggests that
we check the adequacy of this definition by determining whether, whenever line a is
parallel to line b, ‘the direction of line a’ can always be substituted for ‘the direction
of line b’ (and vice versa) in a complete, declarative sentence without loss of truth.
Frege doesn’t stop there, however. He says that we still can’t use our semi-formal
definition to determine whether England, for example, is equal to the direction of
the Earth’s axis. What we’re still missing is the concept of direction (the acquisition
of which was the point of Frege’s intuitive story quoted above), which would allow
us to say that our definition applies only to directions. Frege solves this problem to
his satisfaction by defining ‘the direction of line a’ as the extension of a particular
concept: namely, the concept line parallel to line a.
Why this concept? Because of obvious facts about its extension such as: its
extension is identical to the extension of another concept of the form line parallel to
line b exactly if lines a and b are in fact parallel. This is due to the nature of the
relation being parallel to. In contemporary mathematical parlance, it is an equivalence
relation.23 He can then show that everything he argued above holds of this object, and
hence fix the content expressed by any sentence containing the phrase “the direction
23In a letter to Russell written nearly twenty years later, Frege makes it clear that he believed
that such a method works exactly if the relation under consideration is an equivalence relation. Cf.
(Frege, Letter to Russell 7/28/1902, PMC pg. 141). Incidentally, this letter also suggests that Frege
still considered such a move to be legitimate in his later work.
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of line a”.
How in particular does this story involve carving a content in a new way? Here is
a reconstruction of the reasoning involved: One begins with the content expressed by
the sentence ‘line a is parallel to line b’, carved in the way suggested by that sentence
(with lines a and b as objects bearing the parallel relation to each other). From there,
one can recarve this content by holding one of the relata fixed while allowing the other
to vary, as suggested by the sentence ‘a has the property of being a line parallel to
line b’. Here, one recognizes that one could have just as easily carved this content in
the way suggested by the sentence ‘b has the property of being a line parallel to line
a’. This fact, along with facts about equivalence relations, implies that the extension
of the concept line parallel to line b is identical to the extension of the concept line
parallel to line a. Hence, Frege exploited the transition from a two-place relation to a
one-place property in which a particular relata is held fixed while the other is allowed
to vary. (Frege 1884, pg. 79)
Frege brings these ideas to bear on the concept of number. First of all, the
arithmetical analogue of being parallel will be being equinumerous : two concepts are
equinumerous exactly if the objects which fall under them can be placed in one-to-one
correspondence (this is Hume’s Principle). Think of trying to determine whether you
have just as many apples as you do oranges if you have no idea how to count: you
can successfully do so by lining up each apple next to a unique orange and making
sure that there are just enough oranges for this to be possible and no more. In doing
so, you have defined what mathematicians call a bijective function between the set of
apples and the set of oranges. As Frege would say, you’ve shown that the concepts
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being one of my apples and being one of my oranges are equinumerous.
Just as in the direction case, Frege defines ‘the number that belongs to the concept
F ’ as the extension of a particular concept: namely, the concept equinumerous to the
concept F . He later defines the individual numbers as the numbers belonging to
particular concepts (0, for example, is the number which belongs to the concept not
identical with itself, which works as a definition because everything is self-identical).
Frege then proceeds to prove that these definitions both satisfy the desiderata he
listed previously and can be used to derive all of the desired arithmetical properties
of number (he even extends his definitions into the transfinite). The formal details
are unimportant for our present purposes.
It is important to note, however, that Frege considered his particular choice of
definition of number to be inessential: one could have defined the numbers in an-
other way, maybe even as something other than extensions of concepts (but for the
logicist reduction to work, it would have to be a “logical object”).24 This is a math-
ematician’s definition, by which I mean that Frege isn’t arguing that numbers were
these particular extensions of concepts all along, but rather that we can formally
define numbers in this way and thereby capture all of the essential properties that
24On page 117, Frege says, “This way of getting over the difficulty cannot be expected to meet
with universal approval, and many will prefer other methods of removing the doubt in question.
I attach no decisive importance even to bringing in the extensions of concepts at all.” Note also
Frege’s remark that it seems odd to say that a Number is more inclusive than some other extension
of a concept (like the extension of is male is more inclusive than the extension of is a bachelor),
but “neither is there anything to prevent us speaking in this way, if such a case should ever occur.”
(ibid pg. 81) That is to say, this is an inessential consequence of our chosen modeling, nothing more.
It’s just like the number two being an element of the number three on the standard set-theoretic
definition of the natural numbers in ZFC. Robert May has suggested to me that Frege changed his
mind about this in his later work, eventually finding extensions of concepts to be essential to his
logical project.
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we want numbers to have (for mathematical purposes, at least). This allows us to fix
the content expressed by every complete, declarative sentence containing numerical
expressions. Furthermore, the particular definitions we have chosen (extensions of
concepts) are logical objects on Frege’s view. Hence, it seems that once the details
have been worked out, Frege’s goal of reducing arithmetic to logic will have been
achieved.
Compare a popular set-theoretic definition of an ordered pair: (a, b) is defined as
the set {{a}, {a, b}}. Now, few would accept that this set-theoretic definition tells
us what ordered pairs were all along. Instead, it is sufficient as a definition simply
because this set has the main property we want our ordered pairs to possess; namely,
(a, b) = (c, d) exactly if a = c and b = d, and hence (a, b) 6= (b, a) unless a = b.
Other properties of whatever ordered pairs really are, whatever those properties may
be, seem to be irrelevant for mathematical purposes, provided our formal definition
shares the appropriate structure with the notion we’re attempting to model. Provided
an appropriate structural isomorphism exists, we can let the set {{a}, {a, b}} act as
a “stand-in” for the ordered pair (a, b).25
There is much more that could be said about the adequacy of Frege’s account
of number, but we’ve already dwelt on this topic long enough. A final remark on
the Grundlagen: Frege calls the laws of number laws of laws of nature, since “They
assert not connexions between phenomena, but connexions between judgements; and
among judgements are included the laws of nature.” (ibid pg. 99) Numbers are
25Haim Gaifman has pointed out to me that this point is also made by W.V. Quine in his (1960,
pg. 257-62).
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neither physical nor psychological, but logical.
With his philosophical motivation complete and his argument sketched, Frege
still needs to fill in all the formal details (this would become the Grundgesetze der
Arithmetik (Basic Laws of Arithmetic) Volumes I (1893) and II (1903a)). As is well-
known, this led to contradiction.26 Before that, however, Frege turned to philosophy
and wrote a series of highly influential essays on more general issues in the philosophy
of language. We will now turn to the first of these essays.
1.4 Function and Object, Sense and Reference,
Thought and Truth-Value
The centrality of the mathematical concept of function in Frege’s thought led him to
consider functions in mathematics more generally and develop a particular position
on the nature of functions. This, coupled with worries about the content of identity-
statements and worries about substitution failures in indirect discourse, arguably led
him to his famous distinction between sense and reference. Let’s consider Frege’s first
published discussion of this distinction: his “Function and Concept” of 1891.
Frege begins “Function and Concept” by considering a standard answer to the
26I will not extensively discuss the contradiction in Frege’s formal system in this dissertation.
Frege himself (and most scholars) trace the contradiction to Frege’s Basic Law V, which (when
translated into a more contemporary style) states that for any first-level function f of one argument
and any first-level function g of one argument, the course-of-values (or value-range) of f is identical
to the course-of-values of g if and only if for any object a, f(a) = g(a).
Strictly speaking, one can retain Basic Law V while making other adjustments to Frege’s formal
system in order to avoid the contradiction, but it is highly doubtful that any formal adjustments will
recover Frege’s attempt to reduce arithmetic to logic (see (Hale and Wright 2001) for a well-known
attempt). Frege himself gave this project up.
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question ‘What is a function?’: namely, a function of x is a mathematical expression
containing x. Hence, ‘2(x3) + x’ is a function of x and ‘2(23) + 2’ is a function of
2. Frege responds, “This answer cannot satisfy us, for here no distinction is made
between form and content, sign and thing signified...a mere expression, the form for
a content, cannot be the heart of the matter; only the content itself can be that.”
(Frege 1891, pg. 2-3/138)27
Frege continues his criticism of the opposing formalist view: “Difference of sign
cannot by itself be a sufficient ground for difference of the thing signified.” (ibid pg.
3/138) According to Frege, this confusion is what leads to silly claims such as 2 + 5
and 3 + 4 are “equal but not the same”. Frege motivates these points in several ways.
First of all, he points out that one isn’t going to discover the property of being the
multiplicative identity by investigating the numeral ‘1’, just like one isn’t going to
discover whether London is pretty by staring at the word ‘London’. Marks on paper
have chemical and physical properties that can be investigated, but one isn’t thereby
investigating numbers. Introducing new numerals doesn’t give us new numbers with
new properties to be investigated any more than calling my laptop ‘Richard’ gets me
a new object with new, interesting properties to discover.
A natural thing to say is that ‘2 + 5’, ‘3 + 4’, and the numeral ‘7’ are different
ways of picking out the same object; they are different expressions with the same
reference. Frege points out that the conception of different expressions having the
same reference has been underlying our talk of numbers all along. One says the
27Note that on my interpretation, Frege is criticizing his own view from the Begriffsschrift,
although this controversial interpretive claim won’t be important in what follows. Also, Frege
obviously never made the mistake of confusing numbers with expressions.
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equation ‘x2 = 4’ has two roots, but it would have indefinitely many if, e.g. 2, 1
+ 1, and 6/3 counted as distinct. Based upon these considerations, Frege concludes
that expressions such as ‘2(23) + 2’ refer to numbers (in this case, the number 18),
not functions. The expression ‘2(x3) + x’, on the other hand, indefinitely indicates
a number: it both isn’t a function and doesn’t refer to a function. The function,
says Frege, is “what is present in ‘2.x3 + x’ over and above the letter ‘x’.” (ibid pg.
6/140) We recognize the same function in the expressions ‘2(13) + 1’, ‘2(43) + 4’,
‘2(53) + 5’, etc. The essential feature of the function here is revealed by what these
expressions have in common; each expression can be understood as referring to the
result of applying the same function to different arguments. Frege uses ‘2.( )3 +
( )’ in order to refer to this function (although he isn’t completely satisfied with this
expression either).
Frege then states, “I am concerned to show that the argument does not belong
with a function, but goes together with the function to make up a complete whole;
for a function by itself must be called incomplete, in need of supplementation, or
‘unsaturated’. And in this respect functions differ fundamentally from numbers.”
(ibid pg. 6/140) These suggestive remarks form the basis of Frege’s fundamental
ontological distinction between objects and functions (including concepts, as we shall
see), as alluded to in Principle (3) of the Grundlagen. Functions are essentially
incomplete in a way that objects are not.
Later in this essay, Frege briefly discusses what he means by ‘Object’: “I regard
a regular definition as impossible, since we have here something too simple to admit
of logical analysis. It is only possible to indicate what is meant. Here I can only say
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briefly: An object is anything that is not a function, so that an expression for it does
not contain an empty place.” (ibid pg. 18/147)28 Let’s consider another of Frege’s
suggestive remarks, mentioned in footnote 18 above: “We recognize the function in
the expression by imagining the latter as split up, and the possibility of thus splitting
it up is suggested by its structure.” (ibid pg. 7/141)
Compare carving up the content of a complete, declarative sentence into objects
and functions/concepts. The contents expressed by ‘London is pretty’, ‘Paris is
pretty’, ‘Venice is pretty’, etc., can each be grasped as asserting that a different
object falls under the same concept, namely, being pretty. One might think that what
Frege is doing here is carving up that which is expressed by an expression (including
expressions that are not sentences), what he’ll later call the sense of the expression,
into argument-senses and function-senses. Each such carving will thus have partic-
ular objects and functions as referents corresponding to these argument-senses and
function-senses. This is the natural extension of his Begriffsschrift-era views on carv-
ing expressions into arguments and functions, and we’ll see below that Frege was
committed to it.
The value of a function on a particular argument is the referent of the expression
formed by replacing each of the empty spaces in an expression which refers to the
function by a name of (i.e. expression referring to) that argument. Hence, in the
example above, ‘2(13) + 1’ can be thought of as referring to the result of applying the
following function to the number 1: cube the argument, multiply the result by 2, and
add this result to the original argument. Note that we could also carve up the sense
28Pace Frege, I think we can and should say more. This will be a topic of Chapter 4.
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of the expression ‘2(13) + 1’ into the sense of the expression ‘2’ and the sense of the
remainder, where the remainder refers to the function that takes an argument (the
number 2 in this case), multiplies it by 13, and adds 1 to the result. Frege doesn’t
address this point in this paper, but it seems to fit nicely with his earlier views on
conceptual content.
In fact, Frege provides us with an excellent geometric metaphor to elucidate his
conception of the object/function distinction, a metaphor which immediately suggests
the possibility of multiple decompositions of content:
We may compare this [the splitting up of a mathematical expression
into argument-expression and function-expression—NB] with the division
of a line by a point. One is inclined in that case to count the dividing-point
along with both segments; but if we want to make a clean division, i.e. so
as not to count anything twice over or leave anything out, then we may
only count the dividing-point along with one segment. This segment thus
becomes fully complete in itself, and may be compared to the argument;
whereas the other is lacking in something – viz. the dividing-point, which
one may call its endpoint, does not belong to it. Only by completing it
with this endpoint, or with a line that has two endpoints, do we get from
it something entire. (ibid pg. 7/141)
Recall that Frege began his career as a geometer, and geometry provides many
obvious examples of multiple decompositions: e.g. carving a square into two triangles
or two rectangles.
Frege’s notion of function is very general. For instance, he speaks of the func-
tion x2 = 1.29 But what is the value of this function on a particular argument?
Equivalently, what does the corresponding completed expression refer to? In this
29Frege allows himself to use such expressions for functions provided that it is kept in mind that
the letter ‘x’ merely serves to indicate where a name of an argument would go in order to construct
an expression which refers to the value of the function on that particular argument.
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case, replacing the ‘x’ in this expression by a numeral, for example, will result in a
complete, declarative sentence. Frege points out that the resulting sentence will be
true if ‘x’ is replaced by ‘1’ or ‘−1’ and false if ‘x’ is replaced by ‘0’ or ‘2’. The point
is, as we vary the argument while holding the function fixed, the truth-value of the
corresponding sentences also varies. Frege concludes, “I now say: ‘the value of our
function is a truth-value’, and distinguish between the truth-values of what is true
and what is false. I call the first, for short, the True; and the second, the False.”
(ibid pg. 13/144) This reveals part of Frege’s motivation for regarding sentences as
referring to truth-values. There is more to be said here, but since Frege’s treatment
of truth-values will be a major topic of Chapter 4, let’s move on to Frege’s stated
motivation for the sense/reference distinction.
I’ll reproduce Frege’s first published explanation of the sense/reference
(Sinn/Bedeutung) distinction here in full:
The objection here suggests itself that ‘22 = 4’ and ‘2 > 1’ nevertheless
tell us quite different things, express quite different thoughts; but likewise
‘24 = 42’ and ‘4.4 = 42’ express different thoughts; and yet we can replace
‘24’ by ‘4.4’, since both signs have the same [reference]. Consequently,
‘24 = 42’ and ‘4.4 = 42’ likewise have the same [reference]. We see from
this that from sameness of reference there does not follow sameness of the
thought expressed. If we say ‘the Evening Star is a planet with a shorter
period of revolution than the Earth’, the thought we express is other than
in the sentence ‘the Morning Star is a planet with a shorter period of
revolution than the Earth’; for somebody who does not know that the
Morning Star is the Evening Star might regard one as true and the other
as false. And yet both sentences must [refer to] the same thing; for it
is just a matter of interchange of the words ‘Evening Star’ and ‘Morning
Star’, which [refer to] the same thing, i.e. are proper names of the same
heavenly body. We must distinguish between sense and [reference]. ‘24’
and ‘4.4’ certainly have the same [reference], i.e. are proper names of the
same number; but they have not the same sense; consequently, ‘24 = 42’
and ‘4.4 = 42’ [refer to] the same thing, but have not the same sense (i.e.,
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in this case: they do not contain the same thought). (ibid pg. 13-14/144-
145)
This paragraph reveals a great deal about Frege’s underlying motivation. First
of all, Frege is implicitly assuming a principle of the Compositionality of Reference:
the reference of an expression is determined by (is a function of) the referents of
parts of the expression. Hence, if one replaces a part of an expression by a distinct
expression with the same reference as that part, the reference of the larger expression
remains the same. Hence, since many such replacements result in expressions which
intuitively express quite different contents although reference is preserved, we must
distinguish such content, which Frege calls sense, from reference. Again, Frege calls
the sense expressed by a complete, declarative sentence a thought. He thus replaces
his old notion of judgeable content by thought and truth-value.30
The last sentence also suggests that Frege is implicitly assuming a principle of the
Compositionality of Sense: the sense of an expression is determined by (is a function
of) the senses of parts of the expression. Hence, if one replaces a part of an expression
by a distinct expression with the same sense as that part, the sense of the resulting
expression remains the same.
30Frege makes this point explicitly in his Letter to Husserl of 5/24/1891. (PMC pg. 63) Recall our
discussion above of Frege’s argument/function distinction in the Begriffsschrift : there, a function
was a meaningful expression that mapped other expressions (arguments) to the conceptual content
represented/expressed by the complete expression (of which the function and arguments were parts).
Now, one might see Frege as specifying two sorts functions which determine the content, one at the
level of sense and one at the level of reference: namely, (1) a function-sense that maps argument-
senses to the complete sense of the corresponding complete expression (including the case of a
complete thought), (2) the function corresponding to that function-sense (as its referent) that maps
objects (corresponding to the referents of the argument-senses) to objects (corresponding to the
referent of the complete expression, which will be a truth-value in the case of complete, declarative
sentences). I will argue that Frege was committed to this view below.
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A final remark on this paragraph: Frege suggests a way of determining that two
sentences express distinct thoughts: consider whether it is possible for a (linguistically
competent) agent to regard one as true and the other as false. If so, the thoughts
expressed are distinct. This criterion isn’t specific enough to be especially useful, but
we’ll consider it further in Chapter 3.
Frege defines a concept as a function whose value is always a truth-value. He
motivates this by considering again the function x2 = 1: it maps arguments to the
True and the False. So, for instance, the value of this function on argument −1 is
the True. Frege says we can express this as ‘−1 is a square root of 1’ or ‘−1 falls
under the concept: square root of 1’. Similarly, we can express the fact that this
function takes 2 to the False by saying ‘2 does not fall under the concept: square
root of 1’. For Frege, a function seems to be (roughly speaking) anything with which
one could (in principle) associate a unique, definite object (the “output”) given any
object whatsoever (as “input”). So, there seems to be an intimate connection between
functions from objects to truth-values and concepts. Hence, Frege identifies them. A
concept is just a function whose range consists of the two truth-values: the True and
the False. So, the extension of a concept is subsumed under Frege’s more general
notion of the course-of-values or value-range of a function.31
31Note that Frege does not identify a function with its graph, as in modern Set Theory. Note
that a course-of-values is not the same thing as a set of ordered pairs (the graph of a function). In
particular, since Frege requires that every function be defined over absolutely everything, including
its own course-of-values, every course-of-values will be radically non-well-founded. Frege was not
working with a background set theory here, at least as understood in accordance with the iterative
conception of set. He was against the idea of defining sets/classes/extensions via “aggregating”
their elements, and instead took concepts to be the prior notion. For example, “But it is surely
a highly arbitrary procedure to form concepts merely by assembling individuals, and one devoid
of significance for actual thinking unless the objects are held together by having characteristics in
common. It is precisely these which constitute the essence of the concept.” (Frege 1880-81, PW pg.
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With respect to his formal system, Frege insists that the domain of a function
be absolutely everything whatsoever. Frege insists on this so that an expression
such as ‘a + b’ has a reference no matter what objects ‘a’ and ‘b’ refer to, even if
in some cases one picks the reference of the resulting expression by an arbitrary
rule. For example, we can stipulate that ‘2 + the Moon’ refers to the False, and
hence the addition function can still be defined when we take the Moon as one of
its arguments. Similarly, Frege requires that within a formal system concepts have
sharp boundaries: for any argument whatsoever, a concept should have a truth-value
as its value. Otherwise, in certain cases the concept would take no value at all, and in
particular the corresponding sentences wouldn’t refer to truth-values. For example,
if the function x+1 had no value on some argument, the concept x+1 = 10 wouldn’t
take a truth-value as value on that argument either.
Why does Frege place such draconian requirements upon functions and concepts
within his formal system? Frege is well aware that many expressions in natural lan-
guage fail to refer, and many (perhaps most) concepts have vague extensions. Recall
that Frege’s original motivation for studying language was to develop a precise, for-
mal language for expressing conceptual content in a way that elucidates the structure
of logical inference, particularly in arithmetical reasoning. As soon as sentences in his
formal language can lack truth-value, Frege’s logical laws no longer apply universally.
34) See also Frege’s discussion in section 150 of Volume II of the Grundgesetze.
Since we aren’t considering Frege’s formal system or the nature of its inconsistency in detail, these
distinctions aren’t really important for our purposes. For Frege, the course-of-values is an object,
while the function is not an object. Frege calls this notion of function the logically prior one. One
wouldn’t have come up with, e.g., the static, set-theoretic definition without some intuitive notion
of a rule or procedure that produces a unique output for every input. Compare our discussion of
ordered pairs above.
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More importantly, such sentences fail to be about the world at all, on Frege’s
view. For instance, if in a simple sentence of the form ‘F (a)’, ‘a’ lacks a referent,
then what is the concept referred to by the expression ‘F ( )’ predicated of ? What
is it saturated by? At best, such sentences may express thoughts in the realm of
fiction, such as the thought expressed by ‘Odysseus was set ashore at Ithaca while
sound asleep.’ When we utter such sentences, we aren’t interested in truth-value,
but rather merely the thought being expressed.32 Hence, Frege insists that all the
expressions in his formal language (and any “scientific” language) have reference, all
functions are defined for any argument, and all concepts have precise extensions.
Thus we have seen how Frege’s conception of content naturally evolved from the
Begriffsschrift to his eventual distinction between sense and reference. Let’s now
discuss the structure of senses in more detail. We will do so in the context of a puzzle
for Frege’s conception of content that has been widely discussed in the literature.
1.5 A Puzzle
Recall that Gottlob Frege considered the thought expressed by a complete declarative
sentence to be the sort of content relevant to determining whether that sentence is
true or false. Here is one of many examples in which he made this claim: “So one
has to separate off from the content of a sentence the part that alone can be accepted
as true or rejected as false. I call this part the thought expressed by the sentence.”
(1906c, PW pg. 197-8)
32Frege makes these points in “On Sense and Reference” (1892a), which we will address directly
in the following chapter.
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Furthermore, when discussing the structure of thoughts, Frege helped himself to
mereological language, often speaking of parts of a thought corresponding to the
significant parts of a sentence expressing it.33 For example, when I utter the sentence
‘John has brown hair’, my utterance expresses the thought that John has brown hair,
a thought which contains the sense of ‘John’ and the sense of ‘has brown hair’ as
parts.
Since a thought is a more abstract entity than the full content of a complete
declarative sentence (a content which may include elements irrelevant to the truth
or falsity of the sentence), it is no surprise that Frege wanted distinct sentences
to be capable of expressing the same thought. For example, on Frege’s view the
sentences ‘John loves Mary’ and ‘Mary is loved by John’ express the same thought;
the transition from active to passive voice does not affect the thought expressed.
Discussing a similar example, Frege says “Although in actual speech it can certainly
be very important where the attention is directed and where the stress falls, it is of
no concern to logic.” (1897, PW pg. 141) Intuitively, the sentence ‘John loves Mary’
carries no more and no less information than the sentence ‘Mary is loved by John’;
any difference between the two is irrelevant to determining their (shared) truth-value.
Many Frege scholars have found this aspect of Frege’s view to be in tension with
his view that thoughts have parts corresponding to the significant parts of sentences
33Here is the example from the Introduction once again: “How can [language] achieve so much?
By virtue of the fact that thoughts have parts out of which they are built up. And these parts, these
building blocks, correspond to groups of sounds, out of which the sentence expressing the thought
is built up, so that the construction of the sentence out of parts of a sentence corresponds to the
construction of a thought out of parts of a thought. And as we take a thought to be the sense of a
sentence, so we may call a part of a thought the sense of that part of the sentence which corresponds
to it.” (1914, PW pg. 225)
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expressing them. Returning to our simple example, how could ‘John loves Mary’ and
‘Mary is loved by John’ express the same thought, given that the thought expressed
by the former sentence contains a part corresponding to ‘loves’ while the latter does
not? Surely the thought expressed by the latter sentence instead contains a part
corresponding to ‘is loved by’. These parts cannot be the same, since the former
denotes the “loves” relation while the latter denotes its obviously distinct inverse:
the “is loved by” relation.34
There are plenty of other seemingly-problematic examples in Frege’s writings,
some of which involve multiple analyses of the same sentence. Here is one: “Now if
the same proper name occurs in both consequent and antecedent, we may regard the
hypothetical thought as singular if we think of it as being analysed into the complete
part that corresponds to the proper name and the unsaturated part left over.” (Frege
1906b, PW pg. 188) Thus, the thought expressed by the sentence ‘If John loves
Mary, then John is happy’ can not only be analyzed into the two thoughts expressed
by ‘John loves Mary’ and ‘John is happy’ connected by the sense corresponding to
the material conditional; it can also be analyzed into the sense expressed by ‘John’
and the predicative sense corresponding to the remainder of the sentence (with both
instances of ‘John’ removed: ‘If ( ) loves Mary, then ( ) is happy’). Yet these analyses
give distinct logical forms: the former corresponds to a material conditional between
atomic sentences (e.g. ‘L(j,m) −→ H(j)’) while the latter corresponds to an atomic
sentence (e.g. ‘K(j)’).
34I trust the reader familiar with Frege’s “concept horse” problem can rewrite this sentence in
their preferred style, if they so choose.
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It follows that on Frege’s view, the structure of a thought does not determine a
unique logical form. However, when one constructs a formal language for expressing
thoughts (in order to give a precise account of various inferential transitions between
thoughts, for example), one may choose to construct one’s language in such a way
that it satisfies unique readability : for every well-formed formula of the language,
there is exactly one procedure for generating that formula from its component parts
(e.g. ‘((p ∧ q) ∧ r)’ is uniquely generated by applying the operator ‘∧’ to atomic
sentences ‘p’ and ‘q’, followed by again applying ‘∧’ to ‘(p ∧ q)’ and ‘r’). This
gives a unique decomposition of any well-formed formula into its components. The
point being, on Frege’s conception of thought, the same thought can be expressed by
logically distinct sentences and in distinct formal languages, even if each choice of
expression has a unique decomposition.
Interestingly, Frege’s own formal language, as developed in the Grundgesetze
(1893), does not satisfy unique readability. For example, the formula ‘ f(a)’ can
be read as the application of the horizontal to the result of applying the function-
name ‘f(ξ)’ to the object-name ‘a’, but it can also be read as the application of
the horizontal to the result of applying the two-place function-name ‘φ(ξ)’ to the
function-name ‘f(ξ)’ and the object-name ‘a’, where this two-place function-name
refers to the relation between an object and a concept under which it falls. (ibid pg.
39)
Frege was quite explicit that the same thought can be analyzed in distinct ways.
For example, in the essay quoted above he says, “If several proper names occur in a
sentence, the corresponding thought can be analysed into a complete and unsaturated
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part in different ways. The sense of each of these proper names can be set up as the
complete part over against the rest of the thought as the unsaturated part.” (1906b,
PW pg. 192)35
But how could a thought have multiple analyses, given that a thought is built up
out of its constituent senses as parts?36 Won’t the structure of a thought be uniquely
determined by its constituent senses and the way they are combined? Wouldn’t any
distinct analysis of a thought force either distinct senses as constituents or a distinct
manner of combination? While it is true that, as I pointed out in footnote 2, in
one of his last papers Frege explicitly called his mereological treatment of thoughts
“figurative”, this doesn’t give us a satisfactory answer to these questions.37 Frege
treated thoughts as composed of senses, and hence similar questions arise however
one understands such composition.
In the rest of this chapter, I’ll undertake a careful reading of Frege’s remarks on
the structure of thought and address the controversies that have appeared in recent
scholarship. I will first discuss the sort of structure that thoughts should have on
Frege’s conception, and explain why (pace Dummett, Bell, Penco, and others) this
treatment of thoughts doesn’t conflict with his other views. I will then argue that a
proper appreciation of Frege’s understanding of the part/whole relation will allow us
35There are many additional examples. Prior to making his sense/reference distinction, Frege
spoke of multiple analyses of judgeable content in (Letter to Marty 8/29/1882, PMC pg. 101) and
(1884, pg. 74-5), among others. After making this distinction, Frege spoke of multiple analyses in
(1892b, PW pg. 107-8), (1906b, PW pg. 187), and (1906c, PW pg. 201-2), among others. Once
again, see the Appendix for a comprehensive list of every Frege quotation that I consider to be
relevant to the Multiple Decompositions Thesis.
36See footnote 33.
37Indeed, as I pointed out in footnote 2, it isn’t clear that this retreat from mereology is really
compatible with Frege’s earlier views.
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to reconcile his remarks on multiple analyses of the same thought with his remarks
on a thought being composed of senses as parts that correspond to the significant
parts of a sentence expressing it.
1.6 The Structure of Thought
In Chapter 15 of his The Interpretation of Frege’s Philosophy (1981), Michael Dum-
mett argues that Frege held the following four theses:
A1. A thought may be analyzed in distinct ways.
A2. A thought is not built up out of its component [senses];38 rather, the constituents
of the thought are arrived at by analysis of it.
B1. The senses of the parts of a sentence are parts of the thought expressed by the
whole.
B2. A thought is built up out of its constituents, which correspond, by and large, to
the parts of the sentence expressing it. (ibid pg. 261)
As Dummett points out, the A theses seem to contradict the B theses. How can
a thought be analyzed in distinct ways into distinct constituents if a thought is built
38Dummett actually writes ‘concepts’ rather than ‘senses’ here, claiming to follow Frege’s early
usage of ‘concept’ (‘Begriff’). Dummett claims that early Frege used ‘concept’ in roughly the sense
in which he would later use ‘sense’ (‘Sinn’). (ibid pg. 261-2) As is well-known, after making his
sense/reference distinction, Frege did not use the word ‘concept’ to denote a component of a thought,
but rather the referent of a predicate. Pace Dummett, I do not think early Frege used ‘concept’
to in effect mean thought-constituent, since a judgeable content is partly a union of thought and
truth-value (sense and reference), and have replaced ‘concepts’ by ‘senses’ in order to avoid confusion.
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up out of its constituents? How could a thought both be and not be built up out of
its component senses? Could Frege have failed to notice this?
According to Dummett, the A theses and B theses correspond to two different
relations of a whole thought to its parts: the A theses assume a relation much like
that of a country that can be subdivided into regions in multiple ways for various
purposes, with no unique best subdivision, while the B theses assume a relation much
like that of a molecule to its atoms, with a unique analysis of that molecule into its
constituent atoms. (ibid pg. 263-4)
Dummett mentions a possible solution: Peter Geach has defended the view that for
Frege the structure of a thought is best analyzed using Frege’s own argument/function
distinction (Geach 1975, pg. 149). On such an interpretation, just as e.g. the number
16 is the value of the function f(x) = x2 on the argument 4 and the value of the
function g(x) = 4x on the argument 2, the same thought can be the value of multiple
functions on multiple arguments. So, the thought that John loves Mary could be
seen as the value of the function-sense expressed by ‘loves Mary’ with the object-
sense expressed by ‘John’ as argument. But it could also be seen as the value of the
function-sense expressed by ‘John loves’ with the object-sense expressed by ‘Mary’
as argument.
For Geach, this explains why Frege often spoke of one part of a thought needing to
be incomplete or unsaturated in order for the parts of that thought to hold together.39
Just as the referent of an incomplete expression is itself incomplete or unsaturated for
39Frege says this in multiple places. For example: “For not all the parts of a thought can
be complete; at least one must be ‘unsaturated’, or predicative; otherwise they would not hold
together.” (1892c, pg. 205/193)
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Frege, the sense of an incomplete expression is incomplete as well. Given that Frege
treats the referent of an incomplete expression as a function that must be saturated
by an argument (or arguments) in order to result in a value, it is unsurprising that
he treats the sense of an incomplete expression as incomplete in the same way: as
a function that must be completed by an argument (or arguments) to result in a
complete sense as value.40
Dummett rejects this analysis of the structure of thought. Recall thesis B1: the
senses of the parts of a sentence are parts of the thought expressed by the whole.
Hence, given Geach’s interpretation, a function-sense will be a part of its value along
with its argument. For example, given that the sense of ‘loves Mary’ is a function
from the sense of ‘John’ to the thought that John loves Mary, this function-sense,
being the sense of ‘loves Mary’, is also a part of the thought that John loves Mary.
This is quite different from the case of reference. Consider again the number 16. Few
would find it plausible that the function f(x) = x2 is a part of 16 in addition to
mapping the number 4 to it. Functions over the natural numbers are not parts of
those numbers.
Dummett notes this difference while primarily criticizing the interpretation for
leaving us unable to say how the sense of a predicate contributes to the condition
under which a sentence containing that predicate is true. (1981, pg. 251-2) Recall
that Frege often introduced thoughts as the sort of content of a complete declarative
sentence relevant to determining whether that sentence is true or false. Hence, a
40Recall that I also suggested this interpretation above, which I developed independently. I will
argue for it below.
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thought fixes a truth-condition.41 According to Dummett, if the sense of a predicate
is a function from the sense of a name to a thought, then we can provide no account
of how it contributes to fixing that truth-condition. The way the sense of a predicate
contributes to fixing a truth-condition must be via determining a condition that
objects either satisfy or fail to satisfy. This sense just is a way of determining such
a condition, where that condition is a function from objects to truth-values. But if
this sense is itself a function from object-senses to thoughts, then it isn’t a way of
determining such a condition. (1981, pg. 270)
Dummett also complains that in order to understand such a function, we would
already need to know what thoughts are and how to identify particular thoughts, so
this account is of no help in explaining what thoughts are or how we grasp them.
(ibid pg. 267ff) I see little reason to accept Dummett’s insistence that to form a
conception of a function, we must already know its range of possible values. Consider
a function corresponding to a process of construction. I may have no idea what the
output will be until after I have engaged in the process. I discover the output by
engaging in the process relative to a particular input, and I conceive of the output
as the result of that process. Frege’s own geometric example meant to help explain
the nature of a function, which we discussed above and will return to below, can be
viewed in this way.
41Consider the following famous passage from Volume I of the Grundgesetze: “Every such name of
a truth-value expresses a sense, a thought. For owing to our stipulations, it is determined under which
conditions it refers to the True. The sense of this name, the thought, is: that these conditions are
fulfilled...Now, the simple or complex names of which the name of a truth-value consists contribute
to expressing the thought, and this contribution of the individual name is its sense. If a name is
part of the name of a truth-value, then the sense of the former name is part of the thought expressed
by the latter.” (1893, pg. 50-1)
58
Returning to Dummett’s primary criticism, there are two separate questions here.
The first is whether Geach’s position on the senses of predicates was Frege’s actual
view. The second is whether this view is tenable. Regarding the first question, it
is clear that Frege was in fact committed to the senses of predicates being functions
from the senses of names to thoughts. Note that on Frege’s view, when I assert the
sentence ‘Copernicus believed that the planetary orbits are circles’, the expressions
‘the planetary orbits’ and ‘are circles’ refer to their customary senses, and the com-
plete expression ‘the planetary orbits are circles’ refers to the thought customarily
expressed by it.42 Hence, the referent of this complete expression ought to be a func-
tion of the referents of ‘the planetary orbits’ and ‘are circles’, and since the former
expression is complete while the latter is unsaturated, the latter must refer to a func-
tion on Frege’s view, in particular, a function mapping the referent of the former to
the complete thought.43 Hence, the customary sense of ‘are circles’ not only refers
to a function; it is a function from senses to thoughts. In this case, it maps the
customary sense of ‘the planetary orbits’ to the complete thought expressed by ‘the
planetary orbits are circles’, a thought which contains both senses as parts.
In my view, much of the resistance to treating the sense of a predicate as a
function from senses to thoughts while at the same time being a part of the thoughts
it maps to comes from various prejudices concerning functions that have little to do
42Cf. (1892a, pg. 28/159). We will discuss this in great detail in the next chapter; here I am
merely pointing out a consequence of this view.
43In support of this, note that in “Function and Concept”, Frege says that an object is “anything
that is not a function, so that an expression for it does not contain an empty place.” (1891, pg.
18/147) Given that Frege’s ontology divides completely into objects and functions, a function is
therefore anything whose expression does contain an empty place. Compare also his definition of
function-names in Volume I of the Grundgesetze. (1893, pg. 43-4)
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with Frege’s conception of them. As I pointed out above, in Frege’s “Function and
Concept” (1891, pg. 7/141), he uses the following analogy to explain the sense in
which functions are unsaturated while objects are not: Consider a line divided by
a single point. Now treat the line as divided into two segments, one which includes
the point and one which doesn’t. The segment which doesn’t include the point is
supposed to be analogous to a function while the other segment, being “complete
in itself”, is analogous to the object. Referring to the former, Frege says, “Only by
completing it with this endpoint, or with a line that has two endpoints, do we get from
it something entire.” (loc. cit.) Extending Frege’s analogy, what does this function
map the other line-segment to? The whole line, of course. And yet at the same time,
this function is a part of that line. More generally, it combines its arguments with
itself in order to form a longer line-segment.
I think that this is a perfectly acceptable notion of “function”, and find it plausible
that this is how Frege was thinking of the unsaturated senses of predicates as both
functions from complete senses to thoughts and parts of those thoughts.44 This is
not to say that all functions map their arguments to values which include those very
functions and arguments as parts, which Frege rejected explicitly in his (1919, PW
pg. 255), nor is this meant to somehow fully explain the nature of understanding a
predicate. The point is merely that nothing in Frege’s conception of functions implies
that a predicative sense can’t both be a part of its value (given a complete sense as
44In addition to Frege’s geometric example, consider a formal syntax in which predicate symbols
are functions from constant symbols and variables to atomic formulas. These functions will thus
be components of their values, since their values are atomic formulas containing them. I trust the
reader recognizes both this example and the previous geometric example as coherent, no matter how
strange this conception of functions may seem. Haim Gaifman has suggested the possibility of such
a formal syntax in unpublished work from 2006. I discuss set-theoretic objections below.
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argument) and count as a function.45 46
Furthermore, in response to Dummett, granting that the sense of a predicate is
a way of thinking of a condition that objects either satisfy or fail to satisfy (where
that condition is a function from objects to truth-values), there is nothing to stop
it from also being a function from object-senses to thoughts, as indeed it must be
in order to remain consistent with Frege’s views on the referents of expressions in
indirect contexts, the referents of incomplete expressions, and the compositionality
of reference (i.e. the referent of a whole expression is a function of the referents of its
significant parts). One might even say that the sense of a predicate is fundamentally
a way of thinking of a condition on objects while adding that it is itself incomplete,
much like its referent, and must be saturated by an object-sense to form a complete
thought. The logical form of a predicative sense doesn’t constrain its content to such
an extent that it can’t be a way of thinking of a function. Dummett has given us no
reason to think otherwise, and hence we have no reason to reject the view Frege was
clearly committed to.47
45In fact, as I pointed out above, prior to making his sense/reference distinction Frege seemed to
hold this view of conceptual contents carved into arguments and functions. Cf. his (1880-81, PW
pg. 16) in combination with Section 9 of his (1879).
46The reader might still be bothered by such a conception of a function, since this function’s
values for appropriate arguments will contain the function itself as a part. This may seem somehow
incompatible with the standard axioms of set theory (ZFC), since a set of ordered pairs can’t
include itself as an element of the second component of an ordered pair without violating the axiom
of foundation. Let me make a few brief points in response: (1) There is no reason that one’s formal
representation of a function as a set of ordered pairs must also represent the mereological structure
of the function’s values; set theory and mereology are distinct enterprises. (2) Even if one wants
one’s formal representation of such a function to be such that its values are sets containing that
function as an element, one can easily do so in a non-well-founded set theory, including ZFC itself
without the axiom of foundation. (3) For Frege, a function is fundamentally an unsaturated entity
while a set of ordered pairs is saturated (it is an object). Hence, such a formal representation doesn’t
respect Frege’s conception of functions in any case.
47Heck and May (2011) raise a similar complaint to Dummett’s: “Saying that thoughts are
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1.7 Parts and Wholes
The function/argument analysis of thought is still insufficient to solve our original
interpretive problem, however. As Dummett points out, even if this interpretive
position could be made tenable (as I argued it could in the last section), it would
only explain why Frege held the A theses, not the B theses, which seem to presuppose
a different conception of the structure of thought that is manifestly incompatible with
the A theses. (1981, pg. 266)
In fact, for us the problem is worse, since I have argued above that Frege held (or,
more carefully: was committed to) both the function/argument analysis of thought
and a part/whole conception of thoughts, so that the function-sense expressed by
‘loves Mary’ is both a function from the sense of ‘John’ to the thought that John
loves Mary and a part of that thought, thus leaving us seemingly unable to use the
function/argument analysis to explain why the same thought can be analyzed in
different ways. If such analysis can be made sense of, it is not simply on the model
of distinct numerical functions mapping distinct arguments to the same value: as I
the values of sense-functions in no way explains how the composition of senses determines truth-
conditions.” (ibid pg. 147) It isn’t meant to. All that is needed at the level of form is a structural
distinction between senses denoting objects and senses denoting functions (and senses denoting
second-level functions, etc.), which the function/argument analysis obviously provides. This is in
no way meant to completely explain the content of a thought, and in particular doesn’t provide a
complete explanation of the way in which a thought fixes a truth-condition, or of the contribution
the parts of a thought make to fixing that truth-condition.
Heck and May also complain that such a conception can’t explain why ‘The Morning Star is
a planet’ and ‘The Evening Star is a planet’ express distinct thoughts. (ibid pg. 147) While I
won’t address their complaint in detail here, it is important to recognize, as I argued above, that
Frege held both the function/argument analysis of thought and a part/whole conception of thought:
the predicative sense expressed by ‘is a planet’ is both a function from the sense expressed by ‘The
Morning Star’ to the thought expressed by ‘The Morning Star is a planet’ and a part of that thought
(along with its argument). This is why the sense of ‘is a planet’ can’t be a function of an arbitrary
argument to the thought that the Morning Star is a planet; it can only be a function of the sense
of ‘The Morning Star’ to that thought, since that thought will contain both this function and its
argument as parts.
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stated above, the function f(x) = x2 may map 4 to 16, but f is not a part of 16.
Dummett himself attempts to solve the interpretive problem by making a dis-
tinction between analysis and decomposition, arguing that thoughts have a unique
analysis but can be decomposed in multiple ways. Dummett argues that although
Frege never says so explicitly, he was clearly working with such a distinction, and the
apparent contradiction in his remarks can be resolved by interpreting the B-theses
in terms of analysis and the A-theses in terms of decomposition. (ibid pg. 271) For
Dummett, analysis reveals the ultimate constituents of the thought (and how they are
combined), while decomposition reveals a pattern that is shared by multiple thoughts
that can be exploited for the purposes of inference.48
This attempt at a resolution has been roundly criticized by Frege scholars. Many
point out that it seems to have little to no textual support.49 If Frege really dis-
tinguished analysis from decomposition, he never seemed to say so. It would be
preferable to find a resolution that corresponds to what Frege actually says.
There is another way of solving this interpretive problem. Note that Dummett
assumes that when Frege spoke of a thought as being built out of parts, Frege was
implying that there is a unique analysis of that thought into its component parts.
48To see what Dummett has in mind here, consider his example: ‘If anyone killed Brutus, then
he was an honorable man.’ From this sentence one can infer ‘If Brutus killed Brutus, then Brutus
was an honorable man.’ This inference is plausibly explained in virtue of the shared pattern ‘If
( ) killed Brutus, then ( ) was an honorable man’ present in both sentences. But this pattern
will not correspond to a constituent of the thought expressed by the latter sentence on Dummett’s
view, since the latter thought is uniquely analyzed into the sense corresponding to the material
conditional and the two thoughts expressed by ‘Brutus killed Brutus’ and ‘Brutus was an honorable
man’, each having a unique analysis of their own. Recognizing such a pattern in a thought that is
not a constituent of it corresponds to decomposing it in a particular way. (ibid pg. 273ff)
49Two examples are Currie (1985, pg. 286) and Garavaso (1991, pg. 201). There are various
other objections to Dummett’s interpretation that we needn’t discuss here, since we will see that
Dummett’s distinction between analysis and decomposition is unmotivated.
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That is, Dummett assumes that Frege thought of the part/whole distinction as being
such that a whole can only be built up out of parts in a unique way. But (1) there is
ample textual evidence that Frege thought of wholes as being analyzable into parts
in multiple, distinct ways. (2) Frege’s discussion of thoughts being built up out of
their parts does not imply that thoughts are the result of a temporal process, since
for Frege thoughts are timeless, abstract entities. Furthermore, Frege’s own examples
provide cases in which a whole is not only analyzable in distinct ways; it can be built
up out of parts in distinct ways as well.
Once we recognize these interpretive points, there is no need to postulate an
analysis/decomposition distinction, for Frege’s treatment of thoughts as built up out
of parts in no way contradicts his treatment of thoughts as having multiple analyses.
Given that Frege thought of wholes more generally as having multiple decompositions
into parts, Frege can quite consistently speak of a thought as built up out of parts
and as having multiple decompositions.50
Let’s first consider the textual evidence for (1). Here are four quotations which
demonstrate that Frege thought of wholes as divisible into parts in a variety of
nonequivalent ways, each of which occurred in the context of Frege distinguishing
extensions of concepts from aggregates (a distinction which, he argued, the set theo-
rists failed to appreciate):
50Levine (2002, pg. 202ff) also made essentially this point against Dummett, although unfortu-
nately it has been overlooked by many Frege scholars. In fairness to Dummett, in his earlier work
(e.g. (Dummett 1981)) he mentions the possibility of a part/whole relation in which the whole can
be decomposed into parts in multiple ways (I pointed this out above). His example is that of a
country that can be divided into component regions in different ways depending on one’s purposes
in doing so. (ibid pg. 264) The essential issue is Dummett’s insistence that a thought can only be
built up out of parts in a unique way, thus making the B-theses nontrivially incompatible with the
A-theses. I address this issue below.
64
What Mr. Schro¨der calls ‘inclusion’ or ‘subsumption’ is here, properly
speaking, nothing but the part–whole relation, extended in such a way
that every whole is to be treated as a part of itself. From the point of
view we are now adopting, we do not need the words ‘individual’ and
‘single thing’. Divisibility can be imagined as going on ad infinitum...and
we have no need at all to assume there are parts insusceptible of further
division; so perhaps it is better at this stage not to talk about elements
at all. (1895, pg. 434-435/211)
[I]f we are given a whole, it is not yet determined what we are to
envisage as its parts. As parts of a regiment I can regard the battalions,
the companies or the individual soldiers, and as parts of a sand pile, the
grains of sand or the silicon and oxygen atoms. On the other hand, if we
are given a class, it is determined what objects are members of it. (Letter
to Russell 7/28/1902, PMC pg. 140)
It is determined by a concept which objects fall under it; it is not
determined by an aggregate what should count as its parts, whether, for
example, in a regiment they are the individual soldiers, the companies, or
the battalions; or whether, in a chair, they are the atoms, the molecules,
or the artificially joined pieces of wood. (1903a, pg. 150)
The aggregate is composed of its parts. Whereas the extension of a
concept is not composed of the objects that belong to it...Now of course
it can happen that all objects which belong to the extension of a concept
are at the same time parts of an aggregate and what is more in such a way
that the whole being of the aggregate is completely exhausted by them...A
grain of sand is an aggregate. And it can be that the extension of the
concept silicic acid molecule contained in this grain of sand apparently
coincides with the aggregate which we call this grain of sand. But we could
just as well let the extension of the concept atom contained in this grain of
sand coincide with our aggregate. But in that case the two extensions of
concepts would coincide, which is impossible. From which it follows that
neither of the two extensions of concepts coincides with the aggregate, for
if one of them were to do so, then the other could with equal right be said
to do so. (1906a, PW pg. 183)
This establishes that a whole can be decomposed into parts in multiple ways,
on Frege’s view. Let’s turn to point (2): can a whole be built up out of parts
in multiple ways? Dummett’s claimed inconsistency in Frege hinges on a negative
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answer to this question. But as these examples already suggest, there is no reason to
think that Frege thought a whole must be built up out of parts in a unique way.51
More importantly, note Frege’s remark in one of the very papers that Dummett cites
as evidence for an inconsistency: “Compound Thoughts”. Frege says, “By filling
the gaps [in the unsaturated expression] with expressions of thoughts, we form the
expression of a compound thought of the second kind. But we really should not talk
of the compound thought as originating this way, for it is a thought and thoughts have
no origin.” (1923-26, pg. 40/394). The point being, thoughts are timeless entities
and shouldn’t be thought of as the result of a temporal process. That is merely a
helpful metaphor and should not be taken so literally.
Finally, here is a direct quotation from Frege on the matter: “We must notice,
however, that one and the same thought can be split up in different ways and so can
be seen as put together out of parts in different ways.” (1906c, PW pg. 201-2)
Hence, the apparent inconsistency in Frege dissolves. Frege can perfectly well
speak of a thought as built up out of parts while denying that a thought has a
unique analysis into its components, for each distinct analysis of the thought will
reveal distinct parts of the thought that combine into the whole.52 Consider again
Frege’s example of a line divided by a point. One can see this point as dividing the
line into two parts, one which contains the point and one which doesn’t. And yet,
51Take the third example. Constructing a chair by arranging its atoms is a different procedure
than constructing it by arranging its component pieces of wood.
52Returning to Dummett’s four theses, we can accept all four once we remove the insistence in
thesis A2 that a thought is not built up out of its component senses, which is in no way implied by
the latter half of the thesis: the constituents of a thought being arrived at by analysis of it. One
should instead say that a thought can be built up out of constituents in multiple ways.
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if we divided the very same line at another point, we would have a distinct pair of
parts that combine to form the very same line. These parts can further be divided
into parts ad infinitum. Crucially, one should not think of the line as unstructured.
Indeed, it is in virtue of the structure of the line that it is capable of being divided
into parts in this way.53 54
Frege held an analogous view of the structure of thoughts. To return to our simple
example, the thought that John loves Mary can be seen as composed of the function-
sense expressed by ‘( ) loves Mary’ and the object-sense expressed by ‘John’, but it
can also be seen as composed of the function-sense expressed by ‘John loves ( )’ and
the object-sense expressed by ‘Mary’. Furthermore, it can be seen as composed of the
function-sense expressed by ‘( ) is loved by John’ and the object-sense ‘Mary’, and in
various other ways as well. Each way of decomposing it corresponds to a particular
analysis of the whole thought into senses as parts.
1.8 Consequences
As we have seen, Gottlob Frege held that a thought does not have a unique decom-
position into parts, but rather the same thought can be decomposed into parts in
53As any elementary topology textbook makes clear, the real line has quite a bit of topological
structure that distinguishes it from other topological spaces. Analogously, a thought can have quite
a bit of structure and yet still be decomposable in multiple ways.
54Several Frege scholars have modified Frege’s account of thoughts in order to resolve its seeming-
inconsistency, including (Currie 1985), (Bell 1996), (Bermudez 2001), (Penco 2003), (Textor 2009),
and (Kemmerling 2011). We lack the space to discuss each scholar’s resolution in detail, and
must instead simply note that none of these scholars recognize Frege’s treatment of the part/whole
distinction, nor how it combines with Frege’s function/argument analysis of thought and his elegant
geometric metaphor regarding the nature of functions into a tenable position on the structure of
thought.
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various ways. We have seen two primary examples of this: (1) the transition from
a sentence in active voice to the equivalent sentence in passive voice does not affect
the thought expressed, and (2) any sentence containing names55 expresses a thought
that can be decomposed into a complete sense corresponding to one of those names
and a predicative sense corresponding to the remainder of the sentence. One could
also decompose a thought with multiple names into complete senses corresponding
to two or more names (or instances of the same name) and a predicative sense corre-
sponding to a relational expression. Since sentences often contain multiple names or
multiple instances of the same name, examples of type (2) will often suggest multiple
decompositions of the same thought.
How far do examples in Frege of multiple decompositions extend? In Section 5 I
showed that many examples of type (2) lead to multiple decompositions of the same
thought that have distinct logical forms. In fact, Frege pointed out that distinct
analyses may have distinct logical forms explicitly in (1906b, PW pg. 187), (1906c,
PW pg. 201-2), and (Letter to Linke 8/24/1919, PMC pg. 98).
A more controversial example of multiple decompositions is Frege’s famous re-
carving of the judgeable content that line a is parallel to line b into the judgeable
content that the direction of line a is identical with the direction of line b, a transition
meant to allow the thinker to acquire the concept of direction (1884, pg. 74-5). It is
unclear whether Frege would have still accepted this type of example of multiple de-
compositions after he made his sense/reference distinction, since it is not mentioned
55Here (following Frege) a name is understood broadly as any expression meant to denote an
entity, and hence a definite description counts as a name on Frege’s view. The reader unhappy with
this terminology may prefer the less-natural expression ‘entity-expression’.
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in the Grundgesetze.56 57
Another radical example is Frege’s assertion that the sentences ‘There is at least
one square root of 4’, ‘The concept square root of 4 is realized’, and ‘The number 4
has the property that there is something of which it is the square’ all express the same
thought. (1892c, pg. 199/188) Decomposing this thought in the manner suggested
by the first sentence results in a logical form with an existential quantifier as its
main connective, while the latter two suggested decompositions have distinct atomic
logical forms, with the first including an object-sense referring to a proxy-object for
the concept square root of 4 58 while the second includes an object-sense referring to
the number 4.59
In “Compound Thoughts” (1923-26) Frege identifies the thoughts expressed by
several logically equivalent types of sentences, including ‘A and B’ and ‘B and A’
56Frege did, however, bring up similar examples in a letter to Bertrand Russell of 7/28/1902,
stating that so long as the relation in question is an equivalence relation (to use the modern expres-
sion), “this relation can be transformed into an equality (identity)...” (PMC pg. 141). Whether this
counts as a case of multiple decompositions of the same thought depends upon what Frege meant
by “can be transformed into” or “can be replaced by”.
57Here is another example where Frege may have changed his mind: in “Function and Concept”,
Frege speaks of the two sides of a particular case of Basic Law V as “express[ing] the same sense,
but in a different way.” (1891, pg. 10-11/143) However, there is no evidence in the Grundgesetze
that Frege continued to think of Basic Law V in this way.
58Note that for Frege the expression ‘the concept square root of 4 ’ actually denotes a proxy-object
rather than a concept. This isn’t the place to discuss the “concept horse” problem beyond noting
this point and the resulting different decompositions of the expressed thought on Frege’s view.
59Near the end of the same paper (“On Concept and Object”), Frege makes several remarks
about the saturated/unsaturated distinction that suggest he thought of e.g. ‘The number 2 is a
prime number’, ‘The number 2 falls under the concept prime number ’, ‘The falls under relation
holds between the number 2 and the concept prime number ’, ‘The holds between relation holds
among...’, etc., as all expressing the same thought. (1892c, pg. 204-05/193) However, he does not
say so explicitly, instead stating “It is thus easy for us to see that the difficulty arising from the
‘unsaturatedness’ of one part of the thought can indeed be shifted, but not avoided.” (ibid pg.
205/193) If Frege meant that the unsaturatedness of one part of the thought can be shifted to
another part of the same thought, then this would indeed count as a case of multiple decompositions
of the same thought. Furthermore, such cases fit naturally with Frege’s explicit examples discussed
above.
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(ibid pg. 39/393), ‘A and A’ and ‘A’ (ibid pg. 39 fn. 5/393 fn. 21), ‘not (not B)’
and ‘B’ (ibid pg. 44/399), and ‘not[(not A) and A]’ and ‘If A then A’ (pg. 50/405).
He even suggests in a letter to Husserl that so long as two sentences don’t contain
logically self-evident component parts, if both sentences follow logically from each
other, they express the same thought. (Letter to Husserl 12/9/1906, PMC pg. 70)60
61
These various remarks on multiple decompositions suggest that thoughts are
grasped in particular ways corresponding to particular decompositions of those
thoughts into parts. And note that some decompositions of a thought will make
various inferences from that thought salient while masking others. For example, if I
grasp the thought that John loves Mary as consisting of the object-sense expressed
by ‘John’ composed with the predicative sense expressed by ‘loves Mary’, this will
immediately make salient a logical inference to the thought that someone loves Mary,
while if I grasp this very same thought as consisting of the object-sense expressed
by ‘Mary’ composed with the predicative sense expressed by ‘John loves’, this will
instead immediately make salient a logical inference to the thought that John loves
someone, while masking the inference to the thought that someone loves Mary.
As I emphasized above, the point is the following: In the context of making an
60Why the qualification? I suggest Frege was thinking of the following sort of case: compare
the sentences ‘John loves Mary and either Jim has brown hair or Jim does not have brown hair’
and ‘John loves Mary’. Although the two sentences are logically equivalent, the former contains
additional truth-conditional content not found in the latter, and hence expresses a distinct thought.
The thought expressed by the former must include an object-sense referring to Jim, while the latter
thought contains no such component. Hence, logical equivalence is not a sufficient condition for
thought identity.
61There are additional cases of multiple decompositions stemming from Frege’s remarks on truth
(e.g. 1892a, pg. 34/164), indexicals (e.g. 1918-19a, pg. 64/358), and (arguably) the hierarchy of
senses (1892a, pg. 28/159, 34/164, and 37/166). We will discuss these cases in Chapters 2 and 3.
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inference, we must grasp the thoughts involved in particular ways. Each way of grasp-
ing a thought makes various possible inferences salient while masking others. Hence
Dummett was right to link multiple decompositions to possible inferences, but still
wrong to treat analysis as a separate enterprise revealing the true structure of the
thought. Much like the real line, the thought is structured in such a way that it can
be decomposed into parts in many distinct ways, each of which reveals a different
aspect of its underlying structure.
In the next chapter, we’ll continue our discussion of the structure of sense by
considering Frege’s hierarchy of senses. In both Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 we will
see how the Multiple Decompositions Thesis is not only the correct interpretation of
Frege; it also resolves various issues concerning the structure of thought.
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1.9 Appendix
I call the first component a function, the second its argument. This dis-
tinction has nothing to do with the conceptual content, but only with our
way of viewing it. Although, in the mode of consideration just indicated,
“hydrogen” was the argument and “being lighter than carbon dioxide”
the function, we can also apprehend the same conceptual content in such
a way that “carbon dioxide” becomes the argument and “being heavier
than hydrogen” the function. (Frege 1879, pg. 15-16/126)
Consider now as our example: “the circumstance that the centre of
mass of the solar system has no acceleration, if only internal forces act
on the solar system”. Here, “solar system” occurs in two places. We can
thus consider this as a function of the argument “solar system” in various
ways, according as we think of “solar system” as replaceable by other
arguments at the first or the second or at both places—but in the last
case, replaceable by the same thing both times. These three functions are
all different. The proposition that Cato killed Cato shows the same thing.
Here, if we think of “Cato” as replaceable at the first occurrence, then
“killing Cato” is the function. If we think of “Cato” as replaceable at the
second occurrence, then “being killed by Cato” is the function. Finally,
if we think of “Cato” as replaceable at both occurrences, then “killing
oneself” is the function. (ibid pg. 16/127)
For us, the different ways in which the same conceptual content can
be considered as a function of this or that argument have no importance
so long as function and argument are completely determinate. (ibid pg.
17/128)
If we imagine that in a function a symbol, which has so far been re-
garded as not replaceable, is now replaceable at some or all of the places
where it occurs, we then obtain, by considering it in this way, a function
with another argument besides the one it had before. In this way, functions
of two or more arguments arise. Thus, for example, “the circumstance
that hydrogen is lighter than carbon dioxide” can be considered a func-
tion of the two arguments “hydrogen” and “carbon dioxide”. (ibid pg.
17-18/128)
We can also consider a symbol already previously regarded as replace-
able [at some places] as now further replaceable at those positions where
it was previously considered constant. (ibid pg. 17 fn./128 fn.)
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As opposed to this, I start out from judgements and their contents,
and not from concepts...We may now express 24 = 16 by the sentences
‘2 is a fourth root of 16’ or ‘the individual 2 falls under the concept “4th
root of 16”’ or ‘belongs to the class of 4th roots of 16’. But we may also
just as well say ‘4 is a logarithm of 16 to the base 2’. Here the 4 is being
treated as replaceable and so we get the concept ‘logarithm of 16 to the
base 2’: 2x = 16. (Frege 1880-81, PW pg. 16-17)
The fourth example gives us the concept of a multiple of 4, if we imag-
ine the 12 in [Frege’s notation for 12 being a member of a series beginning
with 0 and continuing to add 4 at each stage—NB] as replaceable by
something else; the concept of the relation of a number and its multiple
if we imagine the 4 as also replaceable; and the concept of a factor of 12
if we imagine the 4 alone as replaceable. (ibid pg. 32-33)
I do not believe that for any judgeable content there is only one way
in which it can be decomposed, or that one of these possible ways can
always claim objective pre-eminence. (Frege, Letter to Marty 8/29/1882,
PMC pg. 101)
The judgement “line a is parallel to line b”, or, using symbols, a // b,
can be taken as an identity. If we do this, we obtain the concept of
direction, and say: “The direction of line a is identical with the direction
of line b.” Thus we replace the symbol // by the more generic symbol
=, through removing what is specific in the content of the former and
dividing it between a and b. We carve up the content in a way different
from the original way and this yields us a new concept. (Frege 1884, pg.
74-75)
In the same way with the definitions of fractions, complex numbers
and the rest, everything will in the end come down to the search from a
judgement-content which can be transformed into an identity whose sides
precisely are the new numbers. In other words, what we must do is fix
the sense of a recognition-judgement for the case of these numbers. (ibid
pg. 114-15)
If we understand ‘x2− 4x = x(x− 4)’ in the same sense as before, this
expresses the same sense, but in a different way. (Frege 1891, pg. 11/143)
Thus, we split up this sign for the True, 3 > 2, into ‘3’ and ‘x > 2’.
We can further split up the ‘unsaturated’ part ‘x > 2’ in the same way,
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into ‘2’ and x > y, where ‘y’ enables us to recognize the empty place
previously filled up by ‘2’. (ibid pg. 27/154)
One can, indeed, say: ‘The thought that 5 is a prime number is true.’
But closer examination shows that nothing more has been said than in
the simple sentence ‘5 is a prime number’. The truth claim arises in each
case from the form of the assertoric sentence, and when the latter lacks
its usual force, e.g., in the mouth of an actor upon the stage, even the
sentence ‘The thought that 5 is a prime number is true’ contains only a
thought, and indeed the same thought as the simple ‘5 is a prime number’.
(Frege 1892a, pg. 34/164)
The sense of the sentence, ‘After Schleswig-Holstein was separated
from Denmark, Prussia and Austria quarrelled’ can also be rendered in the
form ‘After the separation of Schleswig-Holstein from Denmark, Prussia
and Austria quarrelled.’ (ibid pg. 42 fn. 9/170 fn. 14)
Thus the sense of the sentence previously used [‘If a number is less
than 1 and greater than 0, then its square is less than 1 and greater than
0’—NB] can be given in the form ‘The square of a number which is less
than 1 and greater than 0 is less than 1 and greater than 0’. (ibid pg.
44/172)
The thought of our sentence [‘If the Sun has already risen, the sky
is very cloudy’—NB] might also be expressed thus: ‘Either the Sun has
not risen yet or the sky is very cloudy’ – which shows how this kind of
sentence connection is to be understood. (ibid pg. 46 fn. 13/173 fn. 17)
Even the expressions ‘singular content of possible judgement’, ‘partic-
ular content of possible judgement’ are not quite accurate in that they
ascribe to the content itself an attribute which, strictly speaking, belongs
to it only under a certain form–a certain way of analysing it into subject
and predicate. (Frege 1892b, PW pg. 107-08)
In the sentence ‘There is at least one square root of 4’ we assert that
the first level concept square root of 4 falls under a concept of second
level, whereas in the sentence ‘The concept square root of 4 is realized’
we assert that the object the concept square root of 4 falls under the first
level concept concept that is realized. We do indeed have the same thought
in the two concepts, [sic.] but this, being analysed differently, is construed
in a different way. (ibid PW pg. 110)
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In the sentence ‘there is at least one square root of 4’, we have an
assertion, not about (say) the definite number 2, nor about −2, but about
a concept, square root of 4 ; viz. that it is not empty. But if I express
the same thought thus: ‘The concept square root of 4 is realized’, then
the first six words form the proper name of an object, and it is about
this object that something is asserted. But notice carefully that what is
asserted here is not the same thing as was asserted about the concept.
This will be surprising only to somebody who fails to see that a thought
can be split up in many ways, so that now one thing, now another, appears
as subject or predicate. The thought itself does not yet determine what is
to be regarded as the subject. If we say ‘the subject of this judgment’, we
do not designate anything definite unless at the same time we indicate a
definite kind of analysis; as a rule, we do this in connexion with a definite
wording. But we must never forget that different sentences may express
the same thought. For example, the thought we are considering could also
be taken as saying something about the number 4: ‘The number 4 has the
property that there is something of which it is the square’. (Frege 1892c,
pg. 199/107)62
If we expressed this thought in the way that we gave above, we should
have [Frege’s notation for the function x2 = 1 having the same course-
of-values as the function (x + 1)2 = 2(x + 1)—NB]. What we have here
is that second level relation which corresponds to, but should not be
confused with, equality (complete coincidence) between objects. If we
write [Frege’s notation for the value of the function x2 = 1 being identical
to the value of the function (x + 1)2 = 2(x + 1) on any argument—NB],
we have expressed what is essentially the same thought, construed as an
equation between values of functions that holds generally. We have here
the same second level relation; we have in addition the sign of equality,
but this does not suffice on its own to designate this relation: it has to be
used in combination with the sign for generality: in the first line we have
a general statement but not an equation. (Frege 1892-95, PW pg. 121)
If I assert that the sum of 2 and 3 is 5, then I thereby assert that
it is true that 2 and 3 make 5. So I assert that it is true that my idea
of Cologne Cathedral agrees with reality, if I assert that it agrees with
reality. (Frege 1897, PW pg. 129)
62Given that ‘square root of 4’ in the first sentence refers to a concept and ‘the concept square root
of 4’ in the second sentence refers to an object, and given that concepts are not objects, it follows
from these two sentences expressing the same thought that this thought must be decomposable into
senses in different ways, each resulting in distinct senses as “parts” of the thought.
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The distinction between the active and passive voice belongs here too.
The sentences ‘M gave document A to N’, ‘Document A was given by
N [to] M’, ‘N received document A from M’ express exactly the same
thought; we learn not a whit more or less from any one of these sentences
than we do from the others. Hence it is impossible that one of them
should be true whilst another is false. It is the very same thing that is
here capable of being true or false. (ibid PW pg. 141)
Again in the two sentences ‘Frederick the Great won the battle of Ross-
bach’ and ‘It is true that Frederick the Great won the battle of Rossbach’,
we have, as we said earlier, the same thought in a different verbal form.
(ibid PW pg. 141)
From the linguistic point of view, what is to be considered the subject
is determined by the form of the [sentence]. The situation is different
when considered from the logical point of view. We may decompose the
[sentence] ‘8 = 23’ either into ‘8’ and “is the third power of 2,” or into ‘2’
and “is something whose third power is 8,” or into ‘3’ and “is something
which, when the power of 2, yields 8.” (Frege 1903b, pg. 372 fn. 12/281
fn. 13)
A sentence such as ‘Two is a prime’ can be analysed into two essentially
different component parts: into ‘two’ and ‘is a prime’...In the sentence
‘Two is a prime’ we find a relation designated: that of subsumption. We
may also say the object falls under the concept prime, but if we do so,
we must not forget the imprecision of linguistic expression we have just
mentioned. (Frege 1906a, PW pg. 177-8)
We may speak of the negation of a thought before we have made any
distinction of parts within it...We may, metaphorically speaking, regard
the predicative component of a thought as a covering for the subject-
component. If further coverings are added, these automatically become
one with those already there. (Frege 1906b, PW pg. 185)
We should mention that, strictly speaking, it is not in itself that a
thought is singular, but only with respect to a possible way of analysing
it. It is possible for the same thought, with respect to a different analysis,
to appear as particular. (ibid PW pg. 187)
Now if the same proper name occurs in both consequent and an-
tecedent, we may regard the hypothetical thought as singular if we think
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of it as being analysed into the complete part that corresponds to the
proper name and the unsaturated part left over. (ibid PW pg. 188)
So we are assuming that we have a hypothetical thought–one which
can at the same time be construed as a singular thought–from which we, as
was said above, always obtain a true thought by keeping the unsaturated
part fixed, whatever complete part we saturate it with. (ibid PW pg. 189)
If several proper names occur in a sentence, the corresponding thought
can be analysed into a complete and unsaturated part in different ways.
The sense of each of these proper names can be set up as the complete
part over against the rest of the thought as the unsaturated part. (ibid
PW pg. 192)
In fact at bottom the sentence ‘it is true that 2 is prime’ says no more
than the sentence ‘2 is prime’. (ibid PW pg. 194)
Let us now go further and split the proper name ‘3 − 2’ up into the
proper name ‘2’ and the unsaturated part ‘3 − ’. Now we may also split
the original sentence ‘3 − 2 > 0’ up into the proper name ‘2’ and the
unsaturated part ‘3 − > 0’. The [referent] of this is the concept of
something that yields a positive number when subtracted from 3. (ibid
PW pg. 195)
We must notice, however, that one and the same thought can be split
up in different ways and so can be seen as put together out of parts in
different ways. The word ‘singular’ does not apply to the thought in itself
but only with respect to a particular way of splitting it up. Each of the
sentence-parts ‘1 is greater than 2’ and ‘12 is greater than 2’ can also be
seen as put together out of the proper name ‘1’ and an unsaturated part.
The corresponding holds for the related thoughts. (Frege 1906c, PW pg.
201-02)
It seems to me that an objective criterion is necessary for recognizing
a thought again as the same, for without it logical analysis is impossible.
Now it seems to me that the only possible means of deciding whether
[sentence] A expresses the same thought as [sentence] B is the following,
and here I assume that neither of the two [sentences] contains a logically
self-evident component part in its sense. If both the assumption that the
content of A is false and that of B true and the assumption that the
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content of A is true and that of B false lead to a logical contradiction,
and if this can be established without knowing whether the content of A
or B is true or false, and without requiring other than purely logical laws
for this purpose, then nothing can belong to the content of A as far as
it is capable of being judged true or false, which does not also belong to
the content of B; for there would be no reason at all for any such surplus
in the content of B, and according to the presupposition above, such a
surplus would not be logically self-evident either. In the same way, given
our supposition, nothing can belong to the content of B, as far as it is
capable of being judged true or false, except what also belongs to the
content of A. Thus what is capable of being judged true or false in the
contents of A and B is identical, and this alone is of concern to logic, and
this is what I call the thought expressed by both A and B. (Frege, Letter
to Husserl 12/9/1906, PMC pg. 70-1)
23 = 8 can be decomposed in different ways into a saturated and
unsaturated part. (Carnap’s Student Notes, Winter Semester 1910-11,
in: Awodey, Reck, and Gabriel 2004, pg. 19/67)63
If the definiens occurs in a sentence and we replace it by the definien-
dum, this does not affect the thought at all. It is true that we get a
different sentence if we do this, but we do not get a different thought.
(Frege 1914, PW pg. 208)
Whenever a proper name occurs in an assertoric sentence, we can
regard the remaining part as a concept-sign. (ibid PW pg. 229)
‘The thought that 3 > 2 is true’ can be more simply said by the
sentence ‘3 is greater than 2’. (ibid PW pg. 233)
For the same reason as before I put this also in the dependent form
‘that it is true that sea-water is salt[y]’. The thought expressed in these
words coincides with the sense of the sentence ‘that sea-water is salt[y]’.
So the sense of the word ‘true’ is such that it does not make any essential
contribution to the thought. If I assert ‘it is true that sea-water is salt[y]’,
I assert the same thing as if I assert ‘sea-water is salt[y]’. (Frege 1915,
PW pg. 251)
63Carnap also included a diagram of such decompositions on page 27/75.
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It is also worth noticing that the sentence ‘I smell the scent of violets’
has just the same content as the sentence ‘It is true that I smell the scent
of violets’. (Frege 1918-19a, pg. 61/354)
If someone wants to say today what he expressed yesterday using the
word ‘today’, he will replace this word with ‘yesterday’. Although the
thought is the same its verbal expression must be different in order that
the change of sense which would otherwise be effected by the differing
times of utterance may be cancelled out. The case is the same with words
like ‘here’ or ‘there’. (ibid pg. 64/358)
Such a designation [‘the negation of the negation of A’—NB] is to be
regarded as directly composed of the parts: ‘the negation of —’ and ‘the
negation of A’. But it may also be regarded as made up of the parts: ‘the
negation of the negation of —’ and: ‘A’. (Frege 1918-19b, pg. 156/387)
I compare that which needs completion to a wrapping, e.g. a coat,
which cannot stand upright by itself; in order to do that, it must be
wrapped round somebody. The man whom it is wrapped round may put
on another wrapping, e.g. a cloak. The two wrappings unite to form
a single wrapping. There are thus two possible ways of looking at the
matter; we may say either that a man who already wore a coat was now
dressed up in a second wrapping, a cloak, or, that his clothing consists of
two wrappings – coat and cloak. (ibid pg. 157/388)
So I do not begin with concepts and put them together to form a
thought or judgement; I come by the parts of a thought by analysing the
thought. (Frege 1919, PW pg. 253)
A saturated part obtained by analysing a thought can sometimes itself
be split up in the same way into a part in need of supplementation and
a saturated part. The sentence ‘The capital of Sweden is situated at the
mouth of Lake Ma¨lar’ can be split up into a part in need of supplemen-
tation and the saturated part ‘the capital of Sweden’. This can further
be split up into the part ‘the capital of’, which stands in need of sup-
plementation, and the saturated part ‘Sweden’. Splitting up the thought
expressed by a sentence corresponds to such a splitting up of the sentence.
(ibid PW pg. 255)
If a thought is an equation, this does not exclude its also being a
subsumption. The [sentence] ‘Napoleon is the loser of Waterloo’ can be
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changed into ‘Napoleon is identical with the loser of Waterloo’; and here
Napoleon is subsumed, not indeed under the loser of Waterloo, but under
the concept ‘identical with the loser of Waterloo’. (Frege, Letter to Linke
8/24/1919, PMC pg. 98)
That ‘B and A’ has the same sense as ‘A and B’ we may see without
proof by merely being aware of the sense. (Frege 1923-26, pg. 39/393)
Another case of the sort is that ‘A and A’ has the same sense as ‘A’.
(ibid pg. 39 fn. 5/393 fn. 21)
If, therefore, ‘not [A and B]’ expresses a compound thought, then ‘not
[B and A]’ express the same compound of the same thoughts. (ibid pg.
40/394)
Compound thoughts of the first four kinds have this in common, that
their component thoughts may be interchanged. (ibid pg. 43/397)
But since ‘not (not B)’ has the same sense as ‘B’... (ibid pg. 44/399)
But the sense of ‘A and (not B)’ is the same as that of ‘(not B) and
A’... (ibid pg. 48/403)
For any ‘A’ that is a sentence proper, ‘A and A’ expresses the same
thought as ‘A’; the former says no more and no less than the latter. (ibid
pg. 49/404)
We can also render this compound thought [expressed by ‘not [(not
A) and A]’—NB] verbally by the expression ‘If A, then A’... (ibid pg.
50/405)
Thus, the compound expressed by ‘(A and B) and C’ is composed of
the thoughts expressed by ‘A and B’ and ‘C’. But we can also treat it







When I make a typical assertion while speaking or writing, whether my assertion is
true or false will depend upon which entities I’m referring to and whether or not they
actually bear the properties and relations I’m ascribing to them. When I say “John
has brown hair”, for example, whether my assertion is true or false will depend upon
whether the person referred to by the name ‘John’ has the property referred to by
the predicate ‘has brown hair’ at the time at which I make the assertion. In fact, its
truth-value seems to be a function of the referent of the proper name, the referent of
the predicate, and the time of utterance; no further information about the utterance
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is needed in order to determine the truth-value of the assertion.1 In particular, the
truth-value would have remained the same even if I had used another expression with
the same referent as ‘John’ when making my assertion. Similar remarks apply to a
relational claim such as “John loves Mary.”
However intuitive such a Fregean approach to giving the truth-conditions of an
assertion may seem in the case of uttering such a simple tensed subject-predicate
sentence, things get quite a bit more complicated when we start considering cases in
which I ascribe a belief to someone. When I say “Mary believes that John has brown
hair”, for example, I may say something true even though if I had substituted the
expression ‘John’ with ‘the man sitting in the corner’ I would have said something
false, even if John is in fact the man sitting in the corner. Mary might not realize that
John is the man sitting in the corner, having just dyed his hair blonde earlier today.2
When I ascribe a belief to someone in an act of assertion, whether my assertion is
true or false seems to depend on that person’s way of thinking of the entities their
belief is about rather than merely the entities themselves.
1We may suppose that the predicate refers to a property, namely, having brown hair, although
this assumption can of course be disputed. The important point for present purposes is that the
truth-value of the assertion seems to depend upon the referent of the predicate as opposed to its
sense, syntactic structure, etc. If I had used another predicate that picks out the property of having
brown hair in a different way, the truth-value of my assertion would have been the same. If one
thinks that predicates refer to extensions, one can accept the same point with respect to distinct
predicates having the same extension. So we needn’t get too caught up in debates about the nature
of predicates or properties (or Frege’s saturated/unsaturated distinction) for now.
2To remove some of the artificiality of the example, let’s suppose that Mary has just gone to the
bar to get a drink, and I’m pointing out to my friend that Mary hasn’t yet realized that the blonde
man sitting in the corner, who we were all just discussing, is actually our good friend John. I hope
that this clarifies the intuition that if I had instead asserted “Mary believes that the man sitting
in the corner has brown hair”, I would have said something false (in this context, both assertions
would be intended with a de dicto rather than a de re reading (on which more later), and hence the
former could be true while the latter is false). Mary is well aware that the man sitting in the corner
has blonde hair; we were just discussing him a few minutes ago.
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Gottlob Frege himself thought it obvious that when I make an assertion ascribing
a belief to someone, by uttering “Copernicus believed that the planetary orbits are
circles”, for example, expressions such as ‘the planetary orbits’ refer to the senses or
modes of presentation they ordinarily express rather than the entities they ordinarily
refer to: “It is quite clear that in this way of speaking words do not have their
customary [reference] but designate what is usually their sense.” (1892a, pg. 28/159)
Indeed, if we accept that belief is a relation between a person and a proposition,
where a proposition is the representational content or Fregean thought expressed by
an utterance of a sentence in an act of assertion,3 and a proposition is composed
of concepts or ways of thinking of objects, properties, and relations, then Frege’s
position can seem quite plausible.4 When I made that assertion about Copernicus, I
asserted that he bore the belief relation to the proposition that the planetary orbits
are circles. Hence, it seems natural to say that the expression ‘Copernicus’ referred to
Copernicus, the expression ‘believed’ referred to the belief relation, and the expression
‘that the planetary orbits are circles’ referred to that proposition, the very proposition
3By the representational content of an assertion I mean the sort of content relevant to determin-
ing whether the assertion is true or false. This is the sense in which I intend to use both ‘proposition’
and ‘thought’ in this chapter. Compare Frege: “So one has to separate off from the content of a
sentence the part that alone can be accepted as true or rejected as false. I call this part the thought
expressed by the sentence.” (1906c, PW pg. 197-8)
Note that there are many conceptions of ‘proposition’ in the literature and we needn’t take a
stance on whether any of these is the proposition expressed in an assertion. I will be assuming, in
line with the discussion above about belief ascriptions needing to take the ascribee’s ways of thinking
into account, that belief is a relation to a content from which a thought can be abstracted.
4Here I am using ‘concept’ in the sense used by many contemporary philosophers of mind (as
roughly equivalent to Frege’s use of ‘Sinn’ (‘sense’) rather than Frege’s use of ‘Begriff’ (‘concept’)),
and will continue to do so throughout this dissertation. Cf. Peacocke (2008) or Burge (2010), for
example. Peacocke in particular uses ‘sense’ and ‘concept’ interchangeably, as does Kripke in his
essay on Frege (2008, pg. 259 fn. 16 in the 2011 reprint), and I will follow this practice here. Once
again, I will not be following Frege’s own usage of ‘concept’ for the rest of this dissertation, and will
instead follow the contemporary usage to avoid confusion.
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that I would have expressed and asserted to be true if I had instead uttered “The
planetary orbits are circles”. Given that that proposition is composed of senses,
it seems natural to further say that the expressions ‘the planetary orbits’ and ‘are
circles’ referred to the senses ordinarily expressed by them.
This position on belief ascription allowed Frege to continue to treat the truth-
value of such an assertion as a function of the referents of the expressions uttered.5
Since expressions refer to their ordinary senses in the context of belief ascriptions, the
truth-value of such an assertion can depend upon the ascribee’s way of thinking of
the entities the belief ascribed to them is about and still be a function of the referents
of the uttered expressions. According to Frege, in such a context the expressions used
have indirect reference and express indirect senses, which can be described as modes
of presentation of modes of presentation (1892a, pg. 28/159).
Furthermore, since I can embed a belief ascription within another belief ascription,
by asserting “Frege believed that Copernicus believed that the planetary orbits are
circles”, for example, it seems that in such contexts expressions will express doubly
indirect senses in order to refer to their doubly indirect referents, the latter being
their (singly) indirect senses.6 Given that I can in principle continue embedding
belief ascriptions within other belief ascriptions to any finite level of depth, this
Fregean picture seems to be committed to every expression that expresses a sense in an
unembedded context also potentially expressing an infinite number of distinct senses,
5It may also depend upon various contextual factors such as the time of utterance. We will
discuss such complications in the next chapter.
6Frege considers expressions having doubly indirect reference (“indirect reference of the second
degree”) explicitly in his (Letter to Russell 12/28/1902, PMC pg. 154).
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with the particular sense expressed depending upon the number of embeddings. This
is Frege’s infinite hierarchy of senses.
Donald Davidson famously complained that if a natural language really attached
infinitely many possible senses to the same expression in the manner suggested, it
would be unlearnable since “there is no rule that gives the reference in more com-
plex contexts on the basis of the reference in simpler ones.” (1968, pg. 99 in the
1984 reprint)7 In the same essay, Davidson claimed that “If we could recover our
pre-Fregean semantic innocence, I think it would seem to us plainly incredible that
the words ‘The earth moves’, uttered after the words ‘Galileo said that’, mean any-
thing different, or refer to anything else, than is their wont when they come in other
environments.” (ibid, pg. 108)8
I already gave some reasons above for thinking that if so, our pre-Fregean selves
would be mistaken. And yet, when we consider cases like my asserting “Mary believes
that John has brown hair, but he actually doesn’t”, the most natural treatment of
the anaphoric reference of the expression ‘he’ seems to be that it inherits its reference
from the expression ‘John’, but this can’t be right if the expression ‘John’ refers
to its ordinary sense (senses don’t have hair).9 On the other hand, if I had asserted
7See also his (1965, pg. 14-5 in the 1984 reprint), where he makes the unlearnability point
explicitly. All of the approaches to the hierarchy we’ll consider below attempt to address this
objection directly by specifying a recursive reference rule.
8Burge (2005, pg. 170ff) and Kripke (2008, pg. 267) both point out that the hierarchy of indirect
senses has an analogue in direct quotation (e.g. the word ‘John’ refers to John, the expression ‘
‘John’ ’ refers to the word ‘John’, etc.), and both suggest that consideration of the analogous direct
quotation hierarchy ought to have removed some of the force of the unlearnability objection. I
would add that in ordinary speech, speakers often use an expression to refer to itself rather than
its ordinary referent in a way that listeners must determine from the context. Compare the two
verbal utterances “John only has one child” and “John only has one syllable”. This puts pressure
on Davidson’s “semantic innocence” objection as well.
9I may owe this point to Gary Ostertag.
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“Mary believes that the man sitting in the corner is suspicious, but she doesn’t realize
that he is John”, I couldn’t have simply replaced ‘he’ by ‘John’ while preserving the
truth-value, since Mary is well aware that John is John. Setting delicate issues about
anaphora aside, it still seems that in making such an assertion, I am thinking about
both Mary’s way of thinking about John and John himself, and this latter fact is
what allows me to immediately and effortlessly transition to other thoughts about
John. If we want to hold onto our Fregean view, we’re going to need a more complex
account of reference in such cases; losing our semantic innocence certainly comes with
a cost.10
We seem to run into similar issues once we start considering inferences. Suppose
I think to myself, “Frege believed that Copernicus believed that the planetary orbits
are circles, but it’s false that the planetary orbits are circles; hence some proposition
that Frege believed that Copernicus believed is false.” This seems like a valid infer-
ence, and yet if the expression ‘that the planetary orbits are circles’ in the second
premise refers to the proposition that the planetary orbits are circles, while that same
expression in first premise refers to a way of thinking of that proposition rather than
the proposition itself, then how could this inference be valid?11 Replacing the second
10With that said, this paper is not an attempt to treat the semantics of natural language, including
rules governing anaphoric reference. As I suggested (following Frege) in footnote 3 above, I’m
interested in the sort of content relevant to determining truth, not ordinary linguistic meaning.
Senses are components of such content, and I would further suggest that a sense is the aspect of
the content of an expression in virtue of which it contributes to the truth-conditions of complete
declarative sentences which contain it. These cases are merely meant to suggest that even in the
context of a belief ascription, reflection on the reference of expressions gives us some reason to think
that customary senses are expressed in addition to indirect senses. I give further reasons in what
immediately follows.
11This is a modification of an example from Peacocke (1996, pg. 143), who has revised his views
on the hierarchy since that publication. We’ll consider his more recent views when we discuss his
(2008) below.
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premise by the more natural-sounding ‘but the planetary orbits aren’t circles’ seems
to make the problem even worse, since this expression expresses the negation of that
proposition and doesn’t seem to refer to a proposition at all, although perhaps the
intuition that we have an instance of a valid argument-form without the need for
additional premises is weaker in this case.12
Furthermore, many transitions in thought beyond deductive inference seem to
involve thinking about the customary referents of expressions (i.e. their referents
in direct contexts) rather than their indirect referents, even when those expressions
occur embedded in belief ascriptions. When I think to myself “Mary believes that
John has brown hair”, this seems to immediately make salient transitions to various
other thoughts about John, with no need for me to first think about a reference-
relation holding between Mary’s way of thinking of John (the purported referent of the
previous use of the expression ‘John’) and John himself. Furthermore, it doesn’t seem
like someone could understand the proposition expressed by that sentence without
also understanding the proposition that John has brown hair.13 Since this isn’t true of
other expressions that might refer to that very same proposition, e.g. ‘Bob’s favorite
proposition’ or ‘the proposition expressed by the sentence written on the blackboard in
room 314’, the indirect sense of ‘John has brown hair’ had better present its referent,
12More carefully: replacing the second premise in this way results in the following on the Fregean
view we’re considering: ‘the planetary orbits are circles’ in premise 1 expresses its doubly indirect
sense and refers to its indirect sense. However, ‘the planetary orbits aren’t circles’ in premise 2
expresses the negation of the former expression’s customary sense (i.e. the proposition that the
planetary orbits are circles) and refers to a truth-value (well, at the very least, it doesn’t seem to
refer to the proposition it is the negation of). Finally, in the conclusion we’ve existentially quantified
over the customary sense of ‘the planetary orbits are circles’, which (as we’ve just pointed out) isn’t
referred to in either premise. So we seem forced to conclude we’ve engaged in an especially egregious
fallacy of equivocation. And yet, the argument still seems intuitively valid as it stands.
13As we’ll see below, the latter intuition is shared by Burge, Peacocke, and Kripke.
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the customary sense of that same sentence, in a very “transparent” or “revelatory”
way.14
All of these examples suggest that in the context of a belief ascription, both the
indirect sense of an expression and its customary sense are somehow expressed in a
way that both reveals their special connection and makes either available for use in
various transitions in thought. In this chapter, I will attempt to explain how that
could be, and how such seemingly-technical issues might relate to substantive issues
concerning the role of meta-representation in both perceptual experience and more
abstract thought.
To accomplish this, I will develop a theory of the structure of senses relevant to
the hierarchy, grounded in my interpretation of Frege. In order to do so, I will begin
by discussing what Frege actually says about the hierarchy of senses in “On Sense and
Reference” (1892a), understood in the light of Frege’s commitment to the Multiple
Decompositions Thesis as defended in Chapter 1. I will then give a more careful
formulation of Frege’s actual views on the hierarchy. In the following section, I will
consider other recent approaches to the hierarchy due to Tyler Burge, Christopher
Peacocke, and Saul Kripke. In the final section I will turn toward more general
reasons for thinking of senses as having the sort of structure I’ve argued for, including
giving various reasons why one might expect such an account given the role of meta-
representation in first-person judgments and inferences and the phenomenology of
conscious perceptual experience.
14I owe this point to (Kripke 2008), which we’ll discuss below.
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2.2 Frege’s Hierarchy of Senses
Many philosophers writing about Frege complain that when he introduces indirect
senses in “On Sense and Reference” (1892a)—to account for shifts in the reference
of expressions in belief ascriptions and other indirect contexts—he never tells us
what those indirect senses actually are. Michael Dummett wrote, “What, then, is
the indirect sense of an expression? Frege has told us what its indirect referent is,
namely its ordinary sense; but that is not enough to determine what its indirect sense
is to be.” (1981, pg. 267) In particular, there are presumably infinitely many senses
referring to the ordinary sense of an expression ‘A’ (e.g. the sense expressed by ‘the
sense of the expression ‘A’ ’, the sense expressed by ‘Bob’s favorite sense’, etc.); which
of these will be the indirect sense expressed by that expression in an indirect context,
and referred to by that expression in a doubly indirect context?
Actually, Frege does give us some idea of what the indirect sense of a complete
sentence is supposed to be: “So here [the case of indirect quotation—NB], the subor-
dinate clause has for its [referent] a thought, not a truth-value and for its sense not a
thought, but the sense of the words ‘the thought that (etc.)’, which is only a part of
the thought in the entire complex sentence.” (1892a, pg. 37/166)15 Here Frege quite
explicitly asserts that the indirect sense of an assertoric sentence ‘p’ is the customary
sense of the expression ‘the thought that p’.16 In his illuminating essay on Frege,
Saul Kripke acknowledges this while adding “Well of course this is Frege’s view; but
15Recall that for Frege the customary referent of an assertoric sentence is its truth-value: the
True or the False.
16Here I am using ‘p’ as a schematic letter, meant to be replaced by an assertoric sentence in a
particular case, and will continue to do so.
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it says nothing as to what the indirect senses of the significant parts of the sentence
are, nor how they combine to give the sense of the whole.” (2008, pg. 259)
Furthermore, it isn’t yet clear what sort of relation the indirect sense has to the
customary sense beyond simply referring to it. Is the customary sense a part of the
indirect sense? This might explain the intuition that one can’t grasp the indirect
sense without grasping the customary sense, but it quickly leads to problems.17 In
particular, the most natural way for Frege to treat the customary sense of a sentence
as a part of its indirect sense is to treat the sense of ‘the thought that ( )’ (where,
just as Frege used it above, this incomplete expression is meant to be completed by
an assertoric sentence) as a function from thoughts to indirect senses, much like he
treats the sense of a predicate as a function from the sense of a singular term to
a thought, that is, the thought expressed by the sentence resulting from composing
that predicate with that singular term.18 But this simply won’t work, since then the
expression ‘the thought that ( )’ would have to refer to a function from truth-values
to thoughts, and yet as soon as we apply that expression to two sentences expressing
distinct thoughts with the same truth-value, this “function” won’t be well-defined,
since it would thereby have to map that truth-value to both thoughts.19 This had
17This idea about the structure of senses is also naturally suggested by several popular nota-
tions (such as that used by (Burge 2005) and (Peacocke 2008), as we’ll discuss below) in which an
expression expressing the indirect sense of another expression includes the latter expression as a
component: e.g. ‘<e>’ expresses the indirect sense of the expression ‘e’ and refers to its customary
sense.
18This interpretation has been controversial. I defended it in the previous chapter and will discuss
it further immediately below.
19More carefully: if ‘the thought that ( )’ expresses a function-sense that is itself a function from
thoughts to the indirect senses referring to those thoughts, then it refers to a “function” from truth-
values to thoughts, since on such a Fregean view thoughts refer to truth-values and the indirect
senses in question (the outputs of the purported sense of ‘the thought that ( )’) refer to thoughts
(namely, the corresponding inputs). But consider e.g. ‘the thought that snow is white’ and ‘the
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better not be what Frege had in mind.
Why think that Frege held that the sense of a predicate is itself a function from
a sense to a complete thought containing both senses as parts? I defended this inter-
pretation in the previous chapter and will repeat that defense here. On Frege’s view,
when I assert the sentence ‘Copernicus believed that the planetary orbits are circles’,
the expressions ‘the planetary orbits’ and ‘are circles’ refer to their customary senses,
and the complete expression ‘the planetary orbits are circles’ refers to the proposition
customarily expressed by it. Hence, the referent of this complete expression ought to
be a function of the referents of ‘the planetary orbits’ and ‘are circles’, and since the
former expression is complete while the latter is unsaturated, the latter must to refer
to a function on Frege’s view, in particular, a function mapping the referent of the
former to the complete thought. Hence, the customary sense of ‘are circles’ not only
refers to a function; it is a function from senses to thoughts. In this case, it maps
the customary sense of ‘the planetary orbits’ to the complete thought expressed by
‘the planetary orbits are circles’, a thought which contains both senses as parts.
In my view, much of the resistance to treating the sense of a predicate as a function
from senses to thoughts while at the same time being a part of the thoughts it maps to
comes from various prejudices concerning functions that have little to do with Frege’s
conception of them. In Frege’s “Function and Concept” (1891, pg. 7/141), he uses
the following analogy to explain the sense in which functions are unsaturated while
objects are not: Consider a line divided by a single point. Now treat the line as divided
thought that grass is green’. Both ‘snow is white’ and ‘grass is green’ are true, hence this “function”
will have to map the True to both the thought that snow is white and the thought that grass is
green. But these are distinct thoughts. Hence our “function” isn’t well-defined.
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into two segments, one which includes the point and one which doesn’t. The segment
which doesn’t include the point is supposed to be analogous to a function while the
other segment, being “complete in itself”, is analogous to the object. Referring to
the former, Frege says, “Only by completing it with this endpoint, or with a line that
has two endpoints, do we get from it something entire.” (loc. cit.) Extending Frege’s
analogy, what does this function map the other line-segment to? The whole line, of
course. And yet at the same time, this function is a part of that line. More generally,
it combines its arguments with itself in order to form a longer line-segment.
I think that this is a perfectly acceptable notion of “function”, and find it plausible
that this is how Frege was thinking of the unsaturated senses of predicates as both
functions from complete senses to thoughts and parts of those thoughts. This is not
to say that all functions map their arguments to values which include those very
functions and arguments as parts, which Frege rejected explicitly in his (1919, PW
pg. 255), nor is this meant to somehow fully explain the nature of understanding a
predicate. The point is merely that nothing in Frege’s conception of functions implies
that a predicative sense can’t both be a part of its value (given a complete sense as
argument) and count as a function.20
With that said, it had better not have also been Frege’s view that the sense of
‘the thought that ( )’ maps thoughts to their indirect senses, for the reasons we gave
above. Indeed, it wasn’t. In the last chapter I defended the view that Frege did not
think that a thought has a unique decomposition into senses, but rather the same
20In fact, prior to making his sense/reference distinction, Frege seemed to hold this view of con-
ceptual contents carved into arguments and functions. Cf. his (1880-81, PW pg. 16) in combination
with Section 9 of his (1879).
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thought can be decomposed into senses in a variety of distinct ways. More specifically,
grasping a thought in a particular way makes salient a variety of possible inferences
to other thoughts while masking others. Now we can put that interpretation to work.
2.3 Interpreting Frege
Let’s consider one of the most puzzling cases in which Frege claims that two distinct
sentences express the same thought. There are many places in his writings in which
Frege says that any assertoric sentence ‘p’ expresses the very same thought as the
sentence ‘the thought that p is true’ or ‘it is true that p’. He does so in “On Sense
and Reference”, for example: “...even the sentence ‘The thought that 5 is a prime
number is true’ contains only a thought, and indeed the same thought as the simple
‘5 is a prime number’.” (1892a, pg. 34/164)21 Note that the expression ‘the thought
that p’ refers to, well, the thought that p, and hence if ‘p’ and ‘the thought that p
is true’ always express the same thought, then on Frege’s view, any thought can be
decomposed into a complete sense referring to that whole thought and a predicative
sense (expressed by ‘is true’) mapping that complete sense to its referent, also the
whole thought. Any thought can be grasped as including a sense referring to that
thought as a part.22
21There are many other examples throughout his later work. Cf. (1897, PW pg. 141), (1906b,
PW pg. 194), (1914, PW pg. 233), (1915, PW pg. 251), and (1918-19a, pg. 61/354).
22The reader may feel that this structure is somehow circular. As a useful analogy (first suggested
to me by Sidney Felder in a general discussion of self-reference), consider a map of a region located
within that very region (e.g. a map inside a shopping mall labeled “you are here”). The region
includes a representation of itself as a part. One can easily imagine someone first designing the map
and then placing it within the region, with no circularity involved, even if the map has enough detail
to represent its own location as occupied by itself. We will discuss this structure further in the final
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Could Frege simply have been a bit sloppy in making this claim? This seems
difficult to believe, given the number of times he said this over the course of nearly 30
years (see footnote 21). Notice also that Frege never says that a sentence ‘p’ expresses
the same thought as ‘the sentence ‘p’ is true’. This would require the thought that
p to contain a part referring to a sentence expressing it (since the expression ‘the
sentence ‘p’ ’ refers to ‘p’, obviously), and given that any thought can be expressed
by indefinitely many distinct sentences, the thought that p would have to include
distinct senses as parts referring to each possible vehicle for expressing it. This was
obviously not Frege’s view, and hence it is no surprise that he carefully avoided
asserting it, even though he recognized that we often ascribe truth to sentences.23
Furthermore, as I pointed out above, in the same essay in which Frege first makes
this claim, he uses the expression ‘the thought that p’ explicitly to refer to the thought
customarily expressed by ‘p’ while expressing the indirect sense of ‘p’ (1892a, pg.
37/166), making it very unlikely that he intended this expression to refer to anything
other than the thought that p (or to express a sense distinct from the indirect sense
of ‘p’) in the context of a sentence of the form ‘the thought that p is true’. I think
the evidence strongly supports our taking Frege at his word, which implies that the
predicative sense of ‘is true’ maps the sense of ‘the thought that p’ to the thought
that p.24
section.
The reader may have also noticed that this example makes essential use of the truth predicate.
We will discuss Frege’s views on truth immediately below.
23Burge mistakenly ascribes this view to Frege in his “Postscript to “Frege on Truth”” (2005,
pg. 144), in part (I suspect) because he does not recognize Frege’s commitment to the Multiple
Decompositions Thesis.
24This is also supported by Frege’s claim that when I assert that the thought that p is true,
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Why might Frege have said this? Every time he makes this claim, it is in the con-
text of arguing that the sense of the predicate ‘is true’ doesn’t seem to add anything
to the thought expressed, and yet he often also suggests that the word ‘true’ reveals
the essence of logic. This is especially clear in his unpublished “My Basic Logical
Insights” (1915, PW pg. 251-2):
If I assert ‘it is true that sea-water is salt[y]’, I assert the same thing
as if I assert ‘sea-water is salt[y]’. This enables us to recognize that the
assertion is not to be found in the word ‘true’, but in the assertoric force
with which the sentence is uttered...So the word ‘true’ seems to make
the impossible possible: it allows what corresponds to the assertoric force
to assume the form of a contribution to the thought...‘true’ only makes
an abortive attempt to indicate the essence of logic, since what logic is
really concerned with is not contained in the word ‘true’ at all but in the
assertoric force with which a sentence is uttered.
As Frege often points out, even though uttering the word ‘true’ might seem to
indicate that one is asserting something (imagine uttering “It is true that John is
our prime suspect”), an actor on a stage could utter the very same words without
actually asserting them.
And just how does the word ‘true’ do this? For Frege, to make an assertion is to
express or communicate a judgment, and a judgment is a transition from a thought
to a truth-value.25 And as I argued above, the sense of ‘is true’ in the context
I’m asserting that the relation between the sense of a sign and its referent holds as opposed to
the subsumption relation between an object and a property: “If we say ‘the thought is true’, we
seem to be ascribing truth to the thought as a property. If that were so, we should have a case of
subsumption. The thought as an object would be subsumed under the concept of the true. But
here we are misled by language. We don’t have the relation of an object to a property, but that
of the sense of a sign to its [referent].” (1906b, PW pg. 194) Once again, this is a straightforward
consequence of my interpretation, under which the predicative sense of ‘is true’ maps the sense of
‘the thought that p’ to the thought that p, and thus refers to a function from the thought that p to
its referent.
25Cf. (Letter to Husserl 5/24/1891, PMC pg. 63) and (1892a, pg. 34-5/164-5).
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of a sentence of the form ‘the thought that p is true’ must map the sense of ‘the
thought that p’ to the thought that p, since this sentence expresses the very same
thought as ‘p’ itself, carved in a different way. Hence, it refers to a function from
thoughts to their truth-values. This is the sense in which the word ‘true’ “makes an
abortive attempt to indicate the essence of logic”: when attached to a sentence, it
represents the transition from the expressed thought to its truth-value characteristic
of a judgment without actually bringing about that transition. When applying the
sense of ‘is true’, we remain at the level of thoughts, just as Frege said, rather than
passing to the level of reference. More specifically, we pass from the second level of
the hierarchy of senses to the first.
As is probably clear by now, I claim that Frege held the following thesis:
The indirect sense of a sentence ‘p’ is the customary sense of the ex-
pression ‘the thought that p’, where the customary sense of the latter ex-
pression is a part of the thought customarily expressed by ‘p’ made salient
via carving that thought in the manner suggested by the sentence ‘the
thought that p is true’.26
Because this indirect sense is a part of that thought first grasped by carving it in
this way, Frege can thereby explain the intuition that one can’t grasp the indirect sense
of a sentence without also grasping the thought it refers to. Furthermore, there is
nothing to stop him (or us) from treating e.g. the predicative sense of the expression
‘Copernicus believes’ as a function from the thought that the planetary orbits are
circles (as well as the indirect sense referring to that thought) to the thought that
Copernicus believes that the planetary orbits are circles, and hence he can further
26“Carving a thought” is of course a metaphor meant to correspond to grasping that thought as
decomposed into senses in a particular way (compare (Frege 1884, pg. 74-5)).
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explain the intuition that in indirect contexts both the customary sense and the
indirect sense are expressed in a way that makes either available for use in judgment
and inference.27
What of Kripke’s complaint that Frege hasn’t told us what the indirect senses of
significant parts of the sentence are, nor how they are combined to give the indirect
sense of the whole sentence? By an argument analogous to the one I gave at the end
of the previous section, Frege is committed to the indirect sense of a sentence being a
function of the indirect senses of its parts, and in a way that suggests how he might
have answered Kripke: Consider again the sentence “Frege believed that Copernicus
believed that the planetary orbits are circles.” In this context, the sentence ‘the
planetary orbits are circles’ refers to its indirect sense and expresses its doubly indirect
sense. Hence, on Frege’s view its referent ought to be a function of the referents of
its parts. Since ‘the planetary orbits’ is a complete expression while ‘are circles’ is
an unsaturated expression, the latter must refer to a function on Frege’s view, and
in particular a function from the referent of the former to the referent of the whole.
Hence, the indirect sense of ‘are circles’ is itself a function from the indirect sense
of ‘the planetary orbits’ to the indirect sense of ‘the planetary orbits are circles’. In
this way, the structure of the indirect sense of a sentence mirrors the structure of the
thought that indirect sense refers to, and parts of the indirect sense correspond to
the significant parts of the sentence expressing it.
Furthermore, since the structure of the indirect sense of a sentence mirrors the
27We will discuss this issue in more detail after first considering other recent approaches to the
hierarchy.
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structure of the thought it refers to, one might expect the doubly indirect sense of a
sentence customarily expressing that thought to itself be a part of the (singly) indirect
sense of that sentence. Consider again a sentence of the form ‘the thought that p is
true’, which Frege claimed expresses the same thought as ‘p’. Since this is also an
assertoric sentence, it ought to express the same thought as ‘the thought that the
thought that p is true is true’. Hence, in this context ‘the thought that the thought
that p is true’ ought to express the same sense as is customarily expressed by ‘the
thought that p’, since the sense it expresses will be mapped by the customary sense
of ‘is true’ to the thought customarily expressed by ‘p’. Might the customary sense
of that expression contain the doubly indirect sense of ‘p’ as a part?
Note that the expression ‘the thought that’ creates an indirect context in which
the expressions within its scope refer to the senses they would have expressed if that
expression hadn’t been attached to them. But the customary sense of ‘the thought
that p’ is, as Frege said, the indirect sense of ‘p’. Hence, in the context of the
expression ‘the thought that the thought that p is true’, the expression ‘the thought
that p’ refers to the indirect sense of ‘p’, the very same sense that is expressed by
the complete expression. Hence, in that context, the expression ‘the thought that p’
expresses a sense that is mapped by the indirect sense of ‘is true’ to the customary
sense of ‘the thought that p’, which is itself the indirect sense of ‘p’. By identifying
this sense (the indirect sense of ‘the thought that p’) with the doubly indirect sense
of ‘p’ we ensure that the structure of the indirect sense of a sentence mirrors the
structure of the thought it refers to, and in particular the doubly indirect sense of
that sentence is a part of its (singly) indirect sense, a part which is mapped by the
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indirect sense of ‘is true’ to the (singly) indirect sense of that sentence, as desired.
By repeating this procedure, we can ascend up the hierarchy as high as we like.
Hence, Frege has in fact told us enough about the hierarchy of senses to determine
quite a bit of its structure, given Frege’s other commitments regarding the structure
of thoughts and the nature of judgment and truth. Still, one is left with the feeling
that a significant part of the story is missing. Why might Frege have held that any
thought can be carved in such a way that it includes a sense as a part referring to that
whole thought? Can we motivate such a view independently of both the role it plays
in Frege’s conception of judgment and truth and its ability to resolve more technical
issues involving the hierarchy of indirect senses? These questions will occupy us for
the remainder of this chapter. In order to make progress on this front, let’s turn to
three other recent approaches to Frege’s hierarchy of senses, all of which emphasize
connections to broader philosophical issues.
2.4 Recent Approaches to the Hierarchy
In his “Postscript to “Frege and the Hierarchy”” (2005, pg. 167-210), Tyler Burge
defends Frege’s infinite hierarchy of senses against a variety of objections. He points
out that when I use a that-clause to make a belief ascription, I rely on my under-
standing of the customary senses of the expressions within the that-clause in order
to fix those senses as the referents of those expressions, and in grasping their indirect
senses I have little else to go on than that understanding of the customary senses.
(ibid pg. 170) He suggests that recognizing this is part of the key to understanding
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what indirect senses are.
Burge claims that there is a function from the customary sense of a sentence to
the canonical sense that determines that customary sense, where this canonical sense
is expressed by a canonical name of that customary sense. In English, this canonical
name will be a that-clause formed by attaching the expression ‘that’ to the sentence
in question. Understanding the indirect sense of a sentence (the canonical sense that
determines its customary sense) requires no more than understanding its customary
sense and knowing how to use a that-clause-forming expression. Hence, the indirect
sense of a sentence is uniquely fixed by its customary sense, the doubly indirect sense
is uniquely fixed by its (singly) indirect sense, etc., and Burge concludes that there is
no particular problem with learning such an infinite hierarchy. (ibid pg. 172) Contra
Davidson, one doesn’t need to grasp infinitely many primitive senses in order to learn
such a language; the hierarchy can be recursively specified via such a canonical sense
function.
Note that Burge uses the expression ‘determines’ to refer to the relation between
the sense of an expression and its referent (or denotation, as Burge prefers) in order
to distinguish it from the relation between the expression itself and its referent, while
I used ‘refers’ above to refer to both. If the reader feels that these relations ought to
be distinguished, I trust that they can determine which relation ought to be referred
to via the context.
Frege himself considered the relation between sense and referent more fundamen-
tal than that between expression and referent. (Cf. his (1892a, pg. 27/159), and
recall his oft-repeated claim that it is really thoughts that have truth-values rather
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than sentences, e.g. (1918-19a, pg. 60/353).) The expression refers in virtue of its
sense rather than vice versa.
Burge accepts the following Principle for Canonical Names of Senses : The canon-
ical name of a sense can be understood only if the sense that it names is understood.
(ibid pg. 174)
With respect to “relevant” canonical names, he also accepts a Stronger Principle
for Canonical Names of Senses : To think the sense of a canonical name of a sense,
one must simultaneously think the lowest-level (ultimately, customary) sense in the
downward hierarchy associated with the canonical name. (ibid pg. 174)
Burge states these principles without argument. They are meant to elucidate how
he is thinking of his canonical sense function, denoted by a functional expression
‘C’ in his sketch of a formal language. Note that in Burge’s formal language, he
takes a first level of canonical names of customary senses as primitive, later following
the convention of letting an expression of the form ‘<e>’ be the canonical name of
the customary sense expressed by the expression ‘e’. Given such a canonical name
‘<e>’ of the customary sense of an expression ‘e’, one can construct a canonical
name of the canonical sense expressed by ‘<e>’ using the functional expression ‘C’
(namely: ‘C(<e>)’), and continue applying this functional expression to ascend up
the hierarchy, with each iteration expressing the canonical sense that determines the
sense expressed by the previous iteration.
One does not apply the functional expression ‘C’ to produce the canonical name
at the first level, however. In particular, we can’t treat the sense of ‘C’ as a function
from arbitrary senses to canonical senses of those senses, since the “function” referred
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to by ‘C’ would consequently not be well-defined for the same reasons I gave above
when discussing a possible Fregean treatment of the sense of ‘the thought that ( )’
(consider what would happen if you were to apply ‘C’ to two expressions with the
same reference but distinct senses). This may be why Burge takes the first level of
canonical names as primitive, and furthermore why he explains the sense he intends
‘C’ to express by appealing to various principles as opposed to specifying its structure
more directly.
However, this leaves it somewhat mysterious how Burge’s formal language is sup-
posed to correspond to his account of the hierarchy. One might have thought that
since ‘C(<Igor>)’, for example, expresses a sense that is composed of the sense of
‘C’ and the sense of ‘<Igor>’, one can’t grasp this sense (the canonical sense of the
sense of ‘<Igor>’) without also simultaneously grasping the sense of ‘<Igor>’ (the
canonical sense of the sense of ‘Igor’), thus reflecting Burge’s commitment to the
Stronger Principle for Canonical Names of Senses. But what about the sense of
‘<Igor>’, or any canonical sense of a sense at the first level of the hierarchy? Since
this expression is taken as primitive, one shouldn’t think of it as expressing a sense
composed of the sense of ‘< >’ and the sense of ‘Igor’. Indeed, it isn’t clear how this
could work anyway, since ‘< >’ can’t refer to a function from objects to senses for the
reasons I just gave above. One wishes that Burge had said a bit more about how his
formal language is meant to be understood. Why can’t I grasp the canonical sense of
a sense without also grasping the sense it determines? Is this somehow reflected in
the structure of the senses themselves?28 Not if we take Burge’s formal language at
28Burge seems to suggest this in his more recent work: “In propositional cases, the lower-level
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face-value, since the first level of canonical names of senses are (appearances to the
contrary) primitive expressions.29
Burge also points out that although a thinker’s being capable of grasping canon-
ical senses of customary senses requires grasping the customary senses determined
by them, it also involves a higher level of intellectual sophistication: “It is one thing
to be able to think a thought and another to be able to attribute the thought to
someone else, or to oneself.” (ibid pg. 175) This point is surely correct. Indirect
senses, on Burge’s view, mark this additional attributive capacity. Burge later states
that this additional layer of intellectual capacity is constituted by the sort of un-
derstanding involved in comprehending attributions of ways of thinking expressed
in natural language, an understanding partially dependent on grasping those ways
of thinking themselves. He goes on to claim that the senses of the initial layer of
canonical names cannot be explained in any further way, and in fact such further
explanation is unnecessary. (ibid pg. 177)
However, it is difficult to see this as much of an explanation at all, as opposed to a
restatement of the standard Fregean view of the senses expressed in indirect contexts,
thought content is always preserved in the meta-representational thought by being used—thought—
in the canonical name for the content.” (2011, pg. 208 in the 2013 reprint)
29Not that Burge really suggests otherwise, although he could easily be misread as such. He
initially uses the unstructured term ‘s’ as a canonical name of a customary sense (2005, pg. 174),
only later adopting the bracket-notation convention (ibid pg. 178), which he follows for the rest of
the essay.
Notice that the view I argued above was Frege’s own won’t have this problem, since the indirect
sense determining a particular thought will be a part of that thought rather than vice versa, with
parts of the indirect sense corresponding to (and determining) parts of the thought it determines.
In particular, since the indirect sense itself is a part of the thought it determines, it will include a
part (the doubly indirect sense) corresponding to (and determining) the (singly) indirect sense itself.
This nested pattern repeats up the hierarchy of senses, with each sense at level n (for n > 1) being a
part of the sense at the previous level n−1. We will discuss why senses ought to have this structure
in the next section.
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coupled with Burge’s brief remarks about grasping such senses requiring a capacity
to attribute thoughts grounded on a capacity to think those thoughts. Furthermore,
it seems quite implausible that no further explanation can be given. Burge has said
very little about the additional intellectual capacity needed to think about one’s own
thoughts or the thoughts of others.30 But note that such a capacity must play a central
role in reflective judgment, for example. It is one thing to represent an object. It is
quite another to reflectively consider whether a particular representation of an object
is veridical for the purposes of making a judgment about it. The latter presupposes
that I am capable of representing that representation, and furthermore representing
it in such a way that reveals the way in which that representation is representing
its object. I must represent that representation as having the sort of content that
can be assessed as veridical or non-veridical. It seems clear that such a capacity for
meta-representation of one’s own representations as expressing such contents is the
key to understanding the sorts of capacities we are presupposing thinkers to have
when we judge them capable of grasping indirect senses.31
Christopher Peacocke, in his Truly Understood (2008), gives a more robust account
30Burge may have since recognized this need, since he does attempt to say more in more recent
work. For example, in (Burge 2009) he ties our knowledge of our own thought contents to “reflexive,
meta-representational specification of what we discursively understand” (ibid pg. 316), where such
discursive understanding gives us a way of referring to those contents de re (ibid pg. 314-6). In the
Dewey Lectures that I cited above, he also treats our meta-representational capacities as constitutive
of being a critical reasoner. (2011, pg. 178ff) So, in his more recent work, Burge seems sympathetic
to a position broadly in line with the one I defend below, although perhaps not its details.
31For example, when I reflectively consider whether I’m perceiving an object veridically, I’m
relying on an ability to represent my perception as distinct from the object it is a perception of,
and furthermore to represent it in a way that allows me to assess what sorts of properties and
relations that perception is representing its object as possessing. Otherwise, I wouldn’t be able to
make sense of a perceptual illusion, for example, or even consider whether the world is as it appears
to be. Comparing a representation with what it is purportedly a representation of is constitutive
of reflective judgment, and my ability to do so relies upon an ability to form representations of
representations.
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of the capacities involved in grasping indirect senses. Peacocke’s account is part of
a more general theory of senses (or concepts) developed and defended throughout
the book. According to Peacocke, concepts are individuated by their Fundamental
Reference Rules, where a Fundamental Reference Rule (FRR) for a concept is “the
rule that specifies what makes something the reference of the concept.” (ibid pg. 56)
For example, the FRR for the first-person concept I is the following: “what makes
someone the reference of the first-person concept I in a thinking is that he or she is
the thinker (the producer of that thinking).” (ibid pg. 56) That is, what makes the
first-person concept the concept it is is that in order for someone to be its referent
when it is employed by a thinker at a time, that person has to be the thinker of that
thought at that time. The nature of the concept is given by its FRR. Furthermore,
grasping a concept consists in having tacit knowledge of its FRR.32
This position allows Peacocke to give an elegant treatment of canonical concepts
of concepts (i.e. indirect senses) in the final chapter of the book: since the essence
of a concept is given by its FRR, what makes a concept the same concept as e.g.
the concept F is, ultimately, having the same FRR as F. Hence, the FRR of the
canonical concept of the concept F ought to be something like the following: what
makes an arbitrary concept C the referent of the canonical concept of the concept
F is having the very same FRR as F. This concept is arguably canonical since it is
individuated in terms of the very FRR that individuates F itself. As Peacocke puts
32Regarding tacit knowledge, compare the tacit knowledge a young child has of a basic grammati-
cal rule, knowledge which allows the child to distinguish grammatical from ungrammatical sentences
without being able to articulate the rule itself. Peacocke intends to use tacit knowledge of FRRs
analogously to explain a thinker’s intuitions about particular cases of an object’s falling under or
not falling under a concept, and in such a way that can explain the rationality of the thinker’s
corresponding judgments.
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it (with ‘can(F)’ referring to the canonical concept of F): “For an arbitrary concept
C to fall under can(F) is for the fundamental condition for something to fall under C
to be the same as the fundamental condition for something to fall under the concept
F.” (ibid pg. 291)33
Peacocke notes that one can ascend to the next level of the hierarchy using an
FRR of the same general form: simply replace ‘F’ by ‘can(F)’ throughout. This
suggests a generating principle for uniquely determining the canonical concept of a
concept from that concept itself, and Peacocke claims, pace Davidson, “Tacit grasp
of this generating principle will allow thinkers to understand arbitrary embeddings
of propositional attitude-verbs.” (ibid pg. 297)
What about the problematic inferences I mentioned in the Introduction, examples
of which were discussed in Peacocke’s earlier work (1996, pg. 143) as part of an argu-
ment against the infinite hierarchy? Peacocke points out that one could simply add
premises stating reference-relations between e.g. canonical concepts of propositions
and those propositions themselves, but it seems that natural language and natural
inference simply don’t work this way. As he puts it, “the language behaves as if “that
p” refers to the same thing, however embedded, functioning as a complex term for
the same Thought wherever it occurs.” (2008, pg. 299)34
33Peacocke adds a few qualifications to address both someone’s failing to know which concept
F is (which shouldn’t be possible if that person is thinking of it via its canonical concept) and
partial understanding of F (which is perfectly possible), but we needn’t worry too much about those
qualifications here. In effect, on Peacocke’s full account a thinker possessing the canonical concept
of F must have tacit knowledge of both the quoted condition and “enough” of the actual FRR of
the concept F to be capable of propositional attitudes with contents containing F.
34Peacocke capitalizes ‘Thought’ in order to make it clear that he is referring to a Fregean thought,
a “propositional conceptual intentional content”, rather than a particular mental event of thinking.
(ibid pg. 284) As I stated in the Introduction, for the purposes of this chapter I’m using ‘proposition’
in this sense as well. See footnote 3 and the discussion immediately surrounding it.
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Peacocke’s response to his earlier self is to claim that in the case of concepts s of
abstract objects x that are determined by what individuates x, if someone believes
e.g. F(s), then she believes of the object x that it is F. Since canonical concepts of
Thoughts are determined in this way on Peacocke’s account, if e.g. a believes that
John believes that p, then it follows that concerning the Thought p: a believes John
believes it. With a nod to Quine (1956), Peacocke calls this “exportation of concept”.
(ibid pg. 299-300) This allows him to (semi)-formalize the problematic inferences in
a way that makes their validity explicit without adding additional premises. For
example, the premise “John believes that Karl believes that Bush is powerful” be-
comes “Concerning the Thought <p>, namely <Bush>∧<is powerful>, Bel(John,
<Bel>∧<Karl>∧<p>)”, and various seemingly-problematic inferences from it can
then be (semi)-formalized in the obvious way. (ibid pg. 304-5)35
This response is a bit problematic, however. Most obviously, accepting it commits
one to a strong metaphysical position on the nature of concepts of certain abstract
objects, in addition to a strong position on the quite thorny issues of exportation and
relational belief (and related issues involving de re attitudes). The reader is welcome
to make of that what they will. More importantly, it seems insufficiently general.
35Like Burge, Peacocke uses bracket notation in his semi-formal language, where e.g. the ex-
pression ‘<p>’ refers to the Thought that p and expresses the canonical concept of this Thought.
Also, ‘Bel’ stands for the relevant belief relation and ‘∧’ stands for “predicational combination of
concepts”. (ibid pg. 284)
I should also note that in the example Peacocke is still treating John as thinking of this Thought
under its canonical concept, even though this isn’t reflected in the notation. It is instead a conse-
quence of a further background assumption that having a de re attitude about a Thought is only
possible if the thinker is thinking about it under its canonical concept. He points out that if we
don’t want to make this assumption, we can still capture John’s way of thinking of this Thought
while maintaining this position on exportation via a more complex notational scheme. (ibid pg.
305-7)
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As I argued in the Introduction, it isn’t merely expressions of the form ‘that p’ that
behave as if they refer to the same thing even when embedded in indirect contexts;
expressions such as ‘John’ exhibit similar behavior.
For example, consider the following inference: “Mary believes that John has brown
hair. John is a good friend of mine. Hence, John is both believed by Mary to have
brown hair and a good friend of mine.” Here again we have a case in which the
language behaves as if ‘John’ refers to the same thing throughout the inference.36
However, adopting Peacocke’s strategy in such cases would amount to allowing for
unrestricted exportation, something that he wants to avoid (as do I).37 It would be
preferable to have a more general account.38
Unlike Burge or Peacocke, Saul Kripke does not explicitly endorse Frege’s hierar-
chy of senses in his essay “Frege’s Theory of Sense and Reference: Some Exegetical
36One could attempt to capture this inference in classical logic by “cheating”, since one could
represent the conclusion as the conjunction of two sentences, one in which the indirect sense of ‘John’
is expressed (the first premise) and the other in which the customary sense is expressed (the second
premise). But (1) it seems obvious that the conclusion is ascribing two relations to John himself,
and that reference to John is preserved from the two premises. And (2) it’s implicit in the conclusion
that we’re using the same name twice, which couldn’t be done on this suggested formalization in
classical logic. That’s why it’s cheating. I am grateful to Achille Varzi for helpful discussion of this
case.
37Kripke gives various arguments against unrestricted exportation and in defense of the intuitive
distinction between de re and de dicto belief (or, if one prefers: between relational and notional
belief) in his “Unrestricted Exportation and Some Morals for the Philosophy of Language” (2011,
pg. 322-50). In particular, Kripke argues (via a cleverly-designed definite description) that if we
allow for unrestricted exportation, so long as someone has a single false belief, it will be true of that
person that they believe e.g. of the Eiffel Tower that it has all sorts of ridiculous properties. (ibid
pg. 328-30)
38It is also worth noting that Peacocke does not commit himself to Burge’s principle that one
can’t think a canonical concept of a concept without also simultaneously thinking that concept,
stating instead the weaker thesis that one can’t possess a canonical concept of a concept without
also possessing the latter concept. (2008, pg. 301) Relatedly, it is unclear whether he would think of
a canonical concept of a concept as structured in such a way that it contains the concept it refers to
(and is individuated in terms of) as a component, although his choice of notation might suggest this.
Furthermore, unlike Frege, Peacocke does not treat predicative concepts as functions from concepts
to Thoughts, and remains non-committal regarding how to think of “predicational combination of
concepts”.
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Notes” (2008). Instead, he is primarily interested in explicating Frege’s position and
defending it against various objections. One of Kripke’s main points is that what-
ever indirect senses are, they must be revelatory of their referents, where “a sense is
revelatory of its referent if one can figure out from the sense alone what the referent
is.” (ibid pg. 259)
In support of this, Kripke notes that the indirect sense of e.g. ‘the planetary
orbits are circular’ can’t be the customary sense of the expression ‘the sense of ‘the
planetary orbits are circular’ ’, since then someone could understand the sentence
‘Copernicus believed that the planetary orbits are circular’ without having any idea
what ‘the planetary orbits are circular’ means, so long as they could recognize indirect
quotation contexts in English and knew that in them words have indirect senses.
According to Kripke, “this consequence is plainly absurd.” (ibid pg. 258-9) One
shouldn’t be able to understand an indirect sense without also immediately knowing
which sense it refers to.39
In response to worries about the hierarchy due to Davidson and others, and with
several nods to Kaplan (1968) and (1989), Kripke points out various analogies with
direct quotation (which I mentioned above but am omitting here), in addition to
stating the standard Fregean rule for determining reference in indirect contexts:
(β): When words appear in indirect contexts, that is, “says that”,
“believes that”, and so on, they refer to their senses in the clause following
the “that”. (ibid pg. 268)
39Kripke defines a sense as immediately revelatory if “anyone who understands it must immedi-
ately know its referent”, and he is in fact arguing that indirect senses must be immediately revelatory.
(ibid pg. 261) Compare Burge’s principle that one must simultaneously think a concept whenever
one is thinking its canonical concept, and my arguments in the Introduction that both the customary
sense and the indirect sense of a sentence are expressed in an indirect context.
109
Kripke emphasizes that this rule is to be understood iteratively, so that the ref-
erence can be determined recursively when we are dealing with iterative indirect
quotations. This rule, applied in the simple uniterated case, gives us the indirect ref-
erences of the words (their ordinary senses). So what are the indirect senses? Kripke
continues, “Here we should surely say that the rule (β) itself, applied to each indirect
case, gives the indirect sense. For we have conceded that it determines the reference
in each particular case, and whatever determines a reference is a Fregean sense. This
consideration can be applied iteratively, and we appear to have a theory of the entire
hierarchy.” (ibid pg. 268-9)40
So, for Kripke, the rule (β) itself, each time it is used to specify a reference,
implicitly gives the indirect sense, which can then be specified as a reference by
another recursive application of the rule. Thus the infinite hierarchy of senses is
determined by an explicit recursive rule.41
But how will an individual speaker actually apply rule (β) in an iterated case?
Yes, applying the rule to determine indirect reference also determines an indirect
sense, but how will the speaker actually know what this indirect sense is, as would be
needed in order to apply the rule again and refer to it? Kripke considers the analogous
40While it is true on Frege’s view that “once one has specified the reference one has specified
the sense...because the sense is the way the reference or Bedeutung is specified” (ibid pg. 255), I do
not think Frege would have agreed that whatever determines a reference is a Fregean sense. Senses
are abstract objects, while reference can be determined by quite concrete actions such as gestures
(that is, in conjunction with some sort of conventions for interpreting the gestures in the appropriate
way). Such actions will determine a sense, but shouldn’t be identified with that sense. So, I would
amend Kripke’s point and instead say that whatever determines a reference gives a Fregean sense.
This doesn’t seem to affect his following points, and may have been a minor slip.
41Kripke follows this discussion by mistakenly attributing the unique decomposition thesis to
Frege, albeit with some hesitancy. (ibid pg. 270-1, 277) I will address this in the next chapter when
I discuss Kripke’s interpretation of Frege’s treatment of contextual factors.
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direct quotation rule (α), according to which quoted words refer autonymously to
themselves.42 We know which words are referred to because in a particular case of
writing or a particular utterance we see or hear (or produce) the token-words that
make up the entire sentence-token, and are aware of the corresponding types as a
result. Kripke compares this awareness of the types to Russellian acquaintance. (ibid
pg. 271) I would add that we perceive the tokens as instances of their corresponding
types.
Analogously, “Every time we determine a referent, we are introspectively ac-
quainted with how the referent is determined, and that is the corresponding sense.
And our introspective acquaintance with this sense gives us a way of determining it,
and of referring to it, and this is the indirect sense...Each level of the hierarchy is
the acquaintance-sense of the previous level.” (ibid pg. 271-2) For Kripke, this also
explains why the indirect sense is immediately revelatory: it determines its referent
by acquaintance, and hence no calculation is required to determine what the referent
is. (ibid pg. 272)
Kripke goes on to bolster his argument that Frege was committed to what he calls
“acquaintance-senses” by considering Frege’s treatment of indexicals, demonstratives,
and the like, which we will discuss in the next chapter. Having now considered the
other major approaches to the hierarchy of senses, let’s finally reconsider the account
I defended in the last section as Frege’s own, paying careful attention to the variety
42There is some controversy regarding whether this was actually Frege’s view, as Kripke admits,
and he is hesitant to fully endorse it as the proper interpretation. (ibid pg. 265-7) Whatever Frege’s
actual view, I think it is clear that he should have adopted the view Kripke ascribes to him, but
this isn’t the place to go into the matter.
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of broader philosophical issues that have arisen in the course of our discussion.
2.5 Meta-Representation, Consciousness, and
Judgment
Let’s return to Frege’s own account. Recall that on Frege’s view, the indirect sense
of an assertoric sentence ‘p’ is both the customary sense of ‘the thought that p’ and
a part of the thought customarily expressed by ‘p’, a part mapped by the sense of
‘is true’ to that same thought. Recall also that the structure of this indirect sense
mirrors the structure of the thought it refers to (and is a part of), and I argued that
one can maintain this mirroring structure up the hierarchy of senses by identifying
the doubly indirect sense of ‘p’ with the indirect sense of ‘the thought that p’, which
will itself be mapped by the indirect sense of ‘is true’ to the indirect sense of ‘p’. That
is, one ought to identify the doubly indirect sense of ‘p’ with the part of the singly
indirect sense that corresponds to itself in the thought it refers to, much like how a
highly detailed map of a region, within which that very map is located, might include
a representation of itself as occupying a part of that region. This is the natural
extension of Frege’s view, and iterating it gives us an account of the structure of the
infinite hierarchy of senses, as desired.43
43One might suspect that some circularity appears once we iterate this procedure up the entire
infinite hierarchy, since how could the map contain a representation of itself so highly detailed
that it contains a representation of itself which itself contains a representation of itself which...etc.?
No such map could ever be constructed, one might think, even in principle! But note once again
that thoughts aren’t the results of temporal processes; they are abstract and atemporal. And it is
important to recognize, as I argued in the last chapter, that complete thoughts are metaphysically
prior to their parts on Frege’s view. Thoughts have a unity and completeness that is metaphysically
more fundamental than that of their parts (compare the unity of the real number line). This connects
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Note that this structural account is compatible with various treatments of the
recursion inherent in the hierarchy, including those of Peacocke and Kripke discussed
above. One should also note the following: in Section 2 above we defined the indirect
sense of a sentence ‘p’ as the customary sense of the expression ‘the thought that p’.
As discussed in Section 3, we can then characterize the doubly indirect sense of ‘p’
as the part of the customary sense of ‘the thought that the thought that p is true’
that refers to the indirect sense of ‘p’, and so on. An arbitrary indirect sense can be
characterized as the part of the customary sense of an appropriate expression (i.e. an
expression that expresses a sense containing that sense as a part) that refers to the
relevant sense at the previous level of the hierarchy.
For example, the indirect sense of ‘is tall’ could be characterized as the part of the
customary sense of ‘the thought that John is tall’ that refers to the customary sense
of ‘is tall’ (which is assumed to already be understood), the doubly indirect sense
could be characterized as the part of the customary sense of ‘the thought that the
thought that John is tall is true’ that refers to the just-characterized singly indirect
sense, etc. So, we precede from an already-understood customary sense and isolate
a part of it via its structure and the structure of its referent, the relevant parts of
which are also assumed to be understood.44
But why hold such a view of the structure of thoughts? On this view, one could
say that every thought represents itself as true, a conclusion Frege seemed happy to
with old debates about the unity of the proposition (not to mention lines in geometric space, or
geometric space itself) that are beyond the intended scope of this chapter, so I’ll leave it at that for
now.
44I am grateful to Anubav Vasudevan for pressing me to say more here.
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accept. Note that this doesn’t imply that any subject capable of thinking a thought is
also capable of thinking about that thought, which we agreed with Burge above is far
too strong. Some carvings of a thought a thinker grasps may be unavailable to that
particular thinker (e.g. a young child) without further intellectual development and
sophistication. For example, if a young child still lacks the concept “property”, they
may be unable to grasp the thought that John has brown hair in the way suggested
by the sentence “The property of having brown hair is instantiated by John”, even
though (as I suggested in the last chapter) this sentence expresses that very same
thought. Thinking about thoughts simply provides another example of this same
phenomenon.
Let’s move away from abstract thinking for a moment and consider an intimately
connected domain: conscious experience. Much like you (I imagine), I am presently
perceiving a region of physical space as occupied by various objects, including my
own body. While typing that sentence, I considered that conscious perception itself
as distinct from the region of physical space it is a perception of. I believe it is correct
to conclude that my conscious experience just included a part representing that entire
conscious perception.45
More broadly, whenever I think about all of the representations that make up a
part of my present conscious experience, simply by virtue of doing so I’m ensuring
that one of those very representations will represent that whole “space” of conscious
representations. Hence, meta-level reflection on my own conscious representational
experience has precisely the structure of Frege’s treatment of canonical concepts of
45We will discuss perception further in the next chapter.
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thoughts, according to my interpretation.46 Furthermore, we shouldn’t be surprised
by structural connections between conscious perceptual experience and more abstract
thinking. Surely the latter in some sense developed out of the former.47
I think we can make further progress by asking the following question: why is
it cognitively useful for me to be able to represent my own conscious experience
as structured in various ways? And the answer suggests itself: to aid in conscious
decision-making leading to various actions I can perform, including mental actions
such as making judgments, forming intentions, and the like.48
More specifically, by representing my conscious experience as structured in such a
way that aspects of it represent various objects as instantiating properties and bearing
relations to each other, I can compare how things appear to be with various other
sources of information I have on how they actually are for the purposes of making a
46That is not to say, of course, that Frege ever considered this connection. In fact, Frege said little
about the structure of self-consciousness. If Frege did notice this connection, why would he stay
silent about it? This is admittedly very conjectural, but it may have been because (1) Frege wanted
to sharply distinguish his position from the Kantians, and discussing a connection with the structure
of self-consciousness might be seen as too much of a concession, and (2) Frege rarely discussed the
structure of thoughts in detail, probably because he never developed a theory of thoughts (including
their identity-conditions) to his own satisfaction. In any case, nothing I’m discussing here really
hinges on whether Frege himself made the connection to self-consciousness I’m suggesting. I am
grateful to Achille Varzi for pressing me to address this point.
47In fact, a similar structure will exist at the level of reference, provided one is willing to treat
one’s conscious perceptual experience as having a location in physical space along with one’s body.
I am currently perceiving my own body as located within the region of physical space that I’m also
perceiving, and to the extent that it makes sense to think of my conscious experience as having a
physical location (at the egocentric origin of my perspective, for example), my perceptual experience
will also represent a whole of which its own location is a part. Perhaps this will be easier to accept
if one accepts the following (still controversial) position: my conscious experience is a part of me,
and I’m currently perceiving myself as located in physical space. If we treat the True as the actual
world (broadly construed to include abstract objects as parts), which I’ll defend in Chapter 4, the
same structure will exist with respect to the relation between a true thought and its referent (the
True), making it even less surprising that this structure is found in indirect senses as well. In any
case, nothing that follows hinges on these issues.
48I’m tempted to add: why would conscious experience evolve with such a rich structure unless
it was useful for the purposes of helping the agent make decisions leading to various actions, actions
which will have consequences for the agent’s bodily survival, reproduction, etc?
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judgment regarding whether the appearances match reality. For the same reason, I
need to be capable of representing my own beliefs as expressing various propositions
in order to be capable of rationally assessing them as correct or incorrect. Without
such an ability, reflective judgment would be impossible.49
Hence, the thought expressed by my thinking e.g. “I believe that John has brown
hair” ought to not only represent my relation to the thought that John has brown
hair; it ought to also represent the relation of that latter thought to what it is about.
The point of such a meta-level reflection is to compare the latter thought to the
world, to rationally assess my own beliefs as correctly or incorrectly representing the
world by virtue of expressing such thoughts. That is why both customary senses and
indirect senses are expressed in indirect contexts.
Turning now to another aspect of Frege’s account, let’s ask the following ques-
tion: what is it to represent an object (or system of objects) as structured? It is to
represent aspects of that object (or system of objects) as capable of in-principle vari-
ation relative to other aspects held fixed. What I mean by “in-principle variation” is
that the fixed structure determines a class of possible objects (or systems of objects),
each of which corresponds to a possible variation of the variable aspects. The object
needn’t be capable of actually varying in this way.
49Recall Kripke’s claim that Frege was committed to an agent’s being introspectively acquainted
with a sense every time they determine a referent, a sense corresponding to how the referent was
determined, and the sense expressed by this acquaintance is the indirect (canonical) sense of the
original sense. One can now generalize this position: every time my mind constructs a conscious rep-
resentation, I have a conscious awareness of that representation as expressing a sense, an awareness
that can itself be formed into a representation of that sense that will express the canonical sense
of that sense. Compare again (my extension of) Kripke’s point about direct quotation contexts:
I have an awareness of a word-token as being an instance of its corresponding type, an awareness
that can be formed into a representation of that type that will express the sense of that word in an
unembedded direct quotation context (in which the word-type refers to itself).
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I believe that this notion of structure is at the heart of Frege’s use of the ob-
ject/function distinction to elucidate the structure of thoughts, and this is why we
should hold onto this distinction. Frege had good reason to treat the sense of a predi-
cate as a function from the sense of a term to the sense of the sentence resulting from
their composition, a sense containing both as parts united into a complete thought.
The thought contains a fixed aspect (the predicative sense), variation relative to which
defines a class of thoughts with a structural identity (e.g. the thoughts expressed by
‘John has brown hair’, ‘Jim has brown hair’, ‘Fred has brown hair’, etc.). Frege’s use
of the object/function distinction makes this structure explicit.
This point about structure gives us another reason for preferring Frege’s account:
as I argued above, one can’t hold onto both Frege’s use of the object/function dis-
tinction to elucidate the structure of thoughts and treat indirect senses as structured
in such a way that they contain their referents as parts. One can, however, treat
their referents as structured in such a way that they contain their canonical senses
as parts, and this is precisely what Frege did.50
With these points in mind, let’s modify the notation for senses used by Burge
and Peacocke by making the object/function distinction explicit: expressions for
function-senses will have the form ‘<f>( )’, while expressions for object-senses will
retain the form ‘<o>’. So, the thought that John has brown hair can be denoted by
the expression ‘<has brown hair>(<John>)’ in addition to the expression ‘<John has
50Recall that this may have been what forced Burge to treat his first level of canonical names
of senses as primitive rather than as composed from his term for the canonical sense function and
ordinary terms, leading to an undesirable lack of unity in his formal language, along with a lack
of unity between his language and his principles governing canonical senses. Neither Peacocke nor
Kripke gave us enough information about the structure of senses to determine their own views on
the matter, although Peacocke’s choice of notation might suggest a position similar to that of Burge.
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brown hair>’, and both expressions express the canonical concept of that thought,
grasped as the result of applying a predicative sense to a complete sense in the former
case and as unstructured in the latter. Frege’s theory then becomes: for any assertoric
sentence ‘p’, <p> = <is true>(<<p>>). Our extension to the second level of the
hierarchy becomes: for any thought <p>, <<p>> = <<is true>>(<<<p>>>).51
I trust the reader can iterate this notational procedure in the obvious way.
What about indirect contexts? As I argued above, in such contexts both the
canonical concept of a thought and the thought itself are expressed, and expressed
in a way that makes their connection salient. This modification of Frege’s view
results in the following: ‘Mary believes that John has brown hair’ expresses the
thought <Bel>(<Mary>,<<John has brown hair>>,<is true>(<<John has brown
hair>>)). Recall that <is true>(<<John has brown hair>>) = <John has brown
hair>. So, ‘S believes that p’ expresses the thought <Bel>(<S>,<<p>>,<is
true>(<<p>>)), where<is true>(<<p>>) =<p>. One can make analogous moves
to handle other sorts of indirect contexts (e.g. expressions of thinking, judging, con-
sidering, etc.).
Hence, modifying Frege’s view in this way allows both the canonical concept of
this thought and the thought itself to be expressed, where the latter is expressed in a
way that makes salient its relation to the former. Iterating this procedure will respect
Burge’s principles since at each level of embedding, the lowest-level thought will still
be expressed. This also supports Kripke’s position that canonical senses of thoughts
51Although I’ve adopted and slightly modified a popular notation, I trust the reader won’t read
the wrong mereological structure into it: <<p>> is a part of <p> rather than vice versa.
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are immediately revelatory: I can’t grasp a canonical sense of a thought without also
grasping that thought, and grasping it in a way that makes its being the referent of
its canonical sense salient.52
The reader may have noticed that throughout the text I’ve been discussing canon-
ical senses of thoughts rather than the more general case of canonical senses of senses.
In fact, we are already committed to a view of the more general case: the canonical
sense <<s>> of a sense <s> is the part of the canonical sense <<p>> of a thought
<p> containing <s> which refers to <s>. Such a part will always exist (and be
unique) by our arguments at the end of the third section concerning the structure of
indirect senses.53
With that said, we can modify Frege’s view again in order to give a more general re-
sponse to Peacocke’s worries about inferences than his own: let’s introduce an expres-
sion ‘refo( )’ that refers to the reference function from an object-sense to its referent,
and an expression ‘reff ( )’ that refers to the reference function from a function-sense
to its referent. In English, these expressions correspond to the phrase ‘the referent
of ( )’. Then, we can generalize Frege’s view by insisting that for object-senses <s>
other than thoughts, <s> = <refo>(<<s>>), and analogously for function-senses
<g>( ), <g>( ) = <reff>(<<g>>)( ).
54
52Hence I hold the further view that whenever a thought is grasped as including a canonical sense
of a sense as a part, the latter sense must be grasped as a part of that thought as well. In a formal
system, this could easily be axiomatized.
53In the case of a function-sense <g>( ), I’m adopting the convention of denoting its canonical
sense with the expression ‘<<g>>( )’. Note that the empty parentheses remain outside the scope
of the brackets.
54Note that for ease of readability (and to avoid a formal mess), I’ve adopted the convention of
moving the empty parentheses after <<g>> outside of the scope of <reff>( ).
Frege himself would be unhappy with my use of identity between functions. This isn’t the place
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With this modification, a thought such as that expressed by ‘Mary believes that
John has brown hair’ can be grasped in such a way that it includes both <<John>>
and <John> as parts, and furthermore in a way that makes their reference-relation
salient, since <<John has brown hair>> = <<has brown hair>>(<<John>>)
and (thanks to our modification) <John has brown hair> = <reff>(<<has brown
hair>>)(<John>) = <reff>(<<has brown hair>>)(<refo>(<<John>>)).
55 Thus,
we now have an account under which both indirect senses and customary senses can
be expressed in indirect contexts, as desired.
The reader may have noticed that although my initial example of a problematic
inference included the expression ‘is false’, I’ve so far failed to discuss this expres-
sion. On the view I’ve been developing, ‘is false’ ought to refer to a function from a
thought to the truth-value of its negation, and it ought to express a sense mapping
the canonical sense of a thought to the negation of that thought. Hence, for any
thought <p>, <p> = <is false>(<<¬p>>).56 This allows us to capture the initial
to discuss his infamous concept horse problem, but I trust the reader bothered by such an identity
can modify my notation in the appropriate way (e.g. state the condition on function-senses with
empty spaces filled in). Note that I have made a slight concession to Frege’s position by specifying
two reference-functions rather than one. The reader bothered by this concession is welcome to unite
them.
55More specifically, this thought can be denoted by the rather complex ex-
pression ‘<Bel>(<Mary>,<<has brown hair>>(<<John>>), <reff>(<<has brown
hair>>)(<refo>(<<John>>)))’, and grasping this thought in the way suggested by this expression
immediately makes salient transitions to other thoughts about John (since <refo>(<<John>>) =
<John> by our modification), as desired. In line with my example above, it may make salient a
transition to the thought that John is a good friend of mine, a thought which we could formalize in
such a way that it includes <refo>(<<John>>) as a part, thus allowing us to easily demonstrate
that my example was a valid inference. For the same reason, grasping the original thought in this
way also immediately makes salient transitions to other thoughts about having brown hair.
As we discussed in the previous chapter, thoughts can be grasped in ways that don’t make such
transitions salient as well. Properly capturing a particular inference forces the thoughts involved to
be represented as decomposed into senses in particular ways.
56Recall from the last chapter that for any thought <p>, <p> = <¬¬p>.
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problematic inference I discussed in the Introduction without the need for additional
premises, and in a way that neither the system of Peacocke nor of Burge can express,
since on their accounts thoughts do not include parts referring to their negations or
to themselves.57
For us, the thought expressed by ‘But the planetary orbits aren’t circles’ can be
denoted by the expression ‘<is false>(<<the planetary orbits are circles>>)’, and
since <<the planetary orbits are circles>> refers to the negation of this thought,
that negation can be existentially quantified over in our formal system in precisely
the manner needed to demonstrate that the inference is valid.58
We have thus seen the many benefits, both formal and philosophical, of adopting
Frege’s own account of the structure of senses relevant to his hierarchy. We have also
seen how to generalize his account to widen the range of transitions in thought it can
be brought to bear on. We have also discussed the elegant connections between Frege’s
account and the structure of conscious perceptual experience, as well as the role of
57Why should a thought include a part referring to its negation? I’ll let Frege answer this question:
“We grasp the content of a truth before we recognize it as true, but we grasp not only this; we grasp
the opposite as well. In asking a question we are poised between opposite sentences. Although it is
usually only one side that is expressed when we speak, the other is still always implied; for the sense
of the question remains the same if we add ‘or not?’.” (between 1879 and 1891, PW pg. 7-8) Also:
“When it is a question of whether some thought is true, we are poised between opposite thoughts,
and the same act which recognizes one of them as true recognizes the other as false.” (1897, PW
pg. 149)
58Recall that the problematic inference was the following: “Frege believed that Copernicus be-
lieved that the planetary orbits are circles. But the planetary orbits aren’t circles. Hence, some
proposition that Frege believed that Copernicus believed is false.” I leave expressing this inference
in our sketch of a formal system in a way that makes it trivially valid as an exercise for the reader.
Note that extending this account to a formal system would involve axiomatizing various principles
that ought to govern the hierarchy. For example, I shouldn’t be able to apply existential introduction
to a sense without also applying it to its canonical sense (and vice versa), assuming that its canonical
sense was also expressed. For example, in inferring “Mary believes that someone has brown hair”
from “Mary believes that John has brown hair”, I have abstracted away from both the customary
sense and the indirect sense of ‘John’; I couldn’t have abstracted away from one without the other.
One may want to design an alternative notation to reflect this.
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meta-representation in reflective judgment. I think it is clear that these considerations






The content of an assertion will often depend upon the context in which it is made.1
When I assert “It is raining here now”, whether my assertion is true or false will
depend upon whether it is in fact raining at the place and time of my utterance.2 If
I assert “It is raining here now” at a different location or at a different time, whether
1As in previous chapters, I am here using content as an intuitive notion from which more
technical notions can be isolated. Once again, a thought is an abstraction from the full content of
an assertion to the sort of content relevant to determining whether the assertion is true or false, and
thoughts will be our primary concern in this chapter.
2There are unusual cases in which the place or time relevant to determining the truth-value
of the assertion might be different than the spatiotemporal location of the utterance. Perhaps the
speaker knows that the utterance will be heard one day later than it is made, and also believes that
it will rain the next day. In such a case, they may still utter “It is raining here now”, so long as the
hearer can be expected to recognize that the speaker was referring to the time the utterance would
be heard rather than the time at which it was made. One might think that in such a case, one is
using the sentence in a nonstandard way in order to express a content analogous to that ordinarily
expressed by “It will be raining here tomorrow”. However, the speaker might not even know when
the utterance will be heard; they may simply know that whenever the utterance will be heard, it
will be raining at the location at which the utterance was made (e.g. perhaps the advent of rain
would cause the hearer to hear the utterance previously made; less exotic examples involve written
text: “it is raining here now” could be written on the wall of a shelter from the rain). See (Gaifman
2008) for a treatment of these and related issues.
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my assertion is true or false will depend upon whether it is raining at that location
or that time. This suggests that even if we wish to isolate the sort of content relevant
to determining truth-conditions, we will often need to take context into account.
Left at such a high level of abstraction, this may seem uncontroversial. Trouble
arises when we attempt to give a systematic account of how contextual factors con-
tribute to the truth-conditions of assertions. A natural first step is to suggest that
when making a normal assertion of “It is raining here now”, the expressions ‘here’
and ‘now’ denote the place and time of utterance, respectively (but see footnote 2
regarding abnormal assertions). Furthermore, as we shall see, it seems natural to
insist that ‘here’ and ‘now’ express senses that present their referents in particular
ways. That is to say, the expressions ‘here’ and ‘now’ contribute more than merely
their referents to the truth-conditions of assertions.
For example, ‘now’ when uttered by me and ‘noon’ when uttered by me may refer
to the same time,3 and yet if I have lost track of the time, I may believe that it
is raining here now without believing that it is raining here at noon. Furthermore,
given that the two sentences ‘It is raining here now’ and ‘It is raining here at noon’
can differ in truth-value even while the context remains fixed (e.g. if it is not in fact
3One might think that I can’t utter ‘now’ and ‘noon’ at the same time, since utterances take
time, so it might be better to say that if I had uttered ‘noon’ instead of ‘now’, it would have referred
to the same time as ‘now’ actually refers to. But note that ‘now’ doesn’t really refer to a precise
point in time (where we think of a timeline as having the topological structure of the real line); it
seems to refer to a short duration of time with vague boundaries (or to vaguely refer, if one prefers),
where the length of this duration is also sensitive to context. Treating ‘now’ as if it refers to a precise
point in time is a useful idealization. Similar remarks apply to ‘here’.
I make no attempt to present a systematic theory of vagueness in this chapter, although I will
address various issues as they arise. For an elegant treatment of vagueness I refer the reader to
(Gaifman 2010). Note that I speak of entities such as times of utterance as if they themselves have
vague boundaries. If the reader is unhappy with this, I trust that they can translate my claims in
accordance with their preferred treatment of vagueness.
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noon), they must have distinct truth-conditions, from which it follows that ‘now’ and
‘noon’ make distinct contributions to the truth-conditions of assertions. So, at least,
goes the natural Fregean story.4
So, ‘now’ seems to contribute more than its referent to the truth-conditions of an
assertion. Roughly, it expresses a sense that presents its referent as the time of the
utterance rather than as noon, as the time I am writing this chapter, etc.5 Similarly,
‘today’ expresses a sense that presents its referent as the day containing the time of
the utterance (i.e. the day containing now), while ‘yesterday’ expresses a sense that
presents its referent as the day prior to today. Similar remarks seem to apply to other
indexicals.
And yet, now one might worry that our account of Fregean thoughts has grown
too fine-grained. There is a natural sense in which “Today it is raining here” says
the same thing as “Yesterday it was raining here” uttered the next day (assuming
the location of utterance remains constant).
4Here is a potential problem with this sort of argument that has been widely discussed: Someone
might not realize that ‘doctor’ and ‘physician’ express the same sense, and hence it seems that their
two utterances ‘I believe that all doctors are doctors’ and ‘I believe that all doctors are physicians’
could differ in truth-value, even though ‘doctors’ and ‘physicians’ make the same contribution to
truth-conditions by assumption. Extending this example would seem to lead to the unfortunate
conclusion that no two distinct words can ever express the same sense, and perhaps even that no
two distinct tokens of the same word can ever express the same sense either.
In response, note that when making this sort of argument we must assume that the agent is
an idealized linguistically competent speaker, otherwise they may think that a sentence expresses
different truth-conditions than it actually does. In such a case, the agent might not realize that they
in fact bear a particular relation (such as a belief relation) to the thought in question, since they
don’t recognize which thought is being expressed by a particular sentence.
In effect, we are abstracting from the ordinary notion of belief to a relation that holds between
an agent and a thought (rather than a sort of content more fine-grained than a thought). So, the
agent in the purported counterexample in fact believes that all doctors are physicians; they merely
fail to recognize that the corresponding sentence expresses the same thought as the sentence ‘All
doctors are doctors’, and hence may be unwilling to assert the former sentence.
5That isn’t to say that the sense of ‘now’ is equivalent to that of a description such as ‘the time
of this very utterance’. We’ll discuss these issues in further detail later.
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And yet how could these two utterances express the same thought, when the
thought expressed by the former contains the sense of ‘today’ while the thought
expressed by the latter contains the obviously distinct sense of ‘yesterday’? In fact,
how could anyone ever grasp the thought expressed by ‘Today it is raining here’ on
any day but the day on which it was originally expressed?6 Given our discussion of
Frege puzzles above, the thought expressed by e.g. ‘On November 30th, 2017, it was
raining here’ is a distinct thought.
Once it is no longer the day in which ‘Today it was raining here’ was originally
uttered, it seems that a thinker can no longer grasp a sense referring to that day in the
way the sense of ‘today’ referred to it (as the day containing the time of utterance),
and hence the thought originally expressed by ‘Today it is raining here’ can never
be grasped again. Any other expression referring to that day will express a sense
representing it in a different way.
The reader may not be bothered by such failures of thought preservation. If I read
‘Today it will rain’ in yesterday’s local newspaper, I may not be able to grasp the
thought originally expressed by that sentence, but I can at least refer to it and grasp
a related thought, e.g. the thought that yesterday it rained.7 Perhaps this is all that
is required for understanding the sentence. But let’s consider additional examples.
When I assert “John is wearing a brown hat”, the truth-value of my assertion depends
upon the time of utterance (sometimes John wears hats; sometimes he doesn’t). It
6I owe this point to (Kripke 2008), which we’ll discuss below.
7This is Kripke’s (2008) response on behalf of Frege. Haim Gaifman has pointed out to me that
at one point Bertrand Russell made a similar move, namely: we can describe a proposition that we
are not acquainted with. This is discussed in his “Knowledge by Acquaintance and Knowledge by
Description” (1910-11).
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seems natural to conclude that the assertion included an implicit reference to the
time of utterance. Hence, the thought expressed included a sense as a component
that refers to that time.
But then how could I possibly express the same thought at a distinct time? My
second utterance would express a thought including a sense as a component that
refers to the time of that utterance. At the very least, I can no longer refer to the
previous time of utterance in the same way, since it is no longer the time of my current
utterance. This issue becomes pervasive once one notices that the vast majority of
our thoughts and utterances are tensed. Surely I can say the same thing at more
than one time!8 How can a Fregean theory account for this?
Now, there are certainly cases in which it can be cognitively significant that John
is still wearing a brown hat after a few seconds have passed. In such cases, it does
seem that a pair of utterances of “John is wearing a brown hat” several seconds apart
ought to express distinct thoughts. But there are other cases in which it seems the
two utterances ought to express the same thought.
For example, consider a conversation between two people: “John is wearing a
brown hat.” “I agree. John is wearing a brown hat.” Here the second speaker
intends to repeat the claim made by the first. In order for this to be possible on the
view we’re considering, this must be a context in which the time of utterance is the
same for both utterances, and hence its duration is longer than a few seconds.
8But note that the “time of utterance” has vague boundaries and its duration is sensitive to
context, as we discussed in footnote 3. The point remains, however, that once it is no longer the
time of the original utterance, it seems that the original thought can’t be expressed. Indeed, it can’t
even be grasped.
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But suppose that I say “John is wearing a brown hat” and few seconds later,
John removes his hat. Someone else says to me, “What you said was false! John isn’t
wearing a brown hat!” Clearly something has gone wrong; the second person has
ascribed the wrong truth-conditions to my original utterance. I wasn’t committed to
John’s wearing a brown hat for an extended length of time; I was only committed to
John’s wearing a brown hat at the time of my utterance, and hence in this context
the time of my utterance must be less than a few seconds. Otherwise, I would have
said something like “John will be wearing a brown hat for the next few seconds.”
Here the duration of the time of utterance would need to be determined by features
of the context after the utterance is actually made.9
As another example, consider the case of belief ascriptions, which we discussed
in detail in the last chapter. If Mary says “John is wearing a brown hat”, it seems
natural to report her belief via an utterance like “Mary believes that John is wearing a
brown hat”. On a Fregean view, this belief report expresses a thought that represents
Mary as bearing the belief relation to the thought that John is wearing a brown hat.10
But which thought is that? Given that Mary made her utterance at a different time
than mine, which thought am I reporting her as believing: the thought that Mary
expressed at the time she made her utterance, or the thought that I would express if I
9This clearly raises various issues regarding the way the context determines the relevant duration
of the time of utterance, but discussing these issues further would go beyond the intended scope of
this chapter.
10I defended the view in the last chapter that belief is actually a three-place relation (in order
to account for the expression of both indirect and customary senses in indirect contexts), but I’m
suppressing that complication here. Incidentally, when combined with the position on truth-values
defended in the next chapter I am committed to belief being a three-place relation between subject,
thought, and world.
128
had instead uttered “John is wearing a brown hat”? These thoughts refer to different
times.
But note once again that on this view I can no longer grasp such a thought once
the time it was originally uttered has passed. This implies that I couldn’t be reporting
Mary as believing the thought that she originally expressed, since (as we saw in the
last chapter) when making such a belief report I am expressing the canonical sense of
that thought, and I can’t grasp this canonical sense without also grasping the thought
it refers to.
Hence I am not reporting the thought that Mary originally expressed, but rather
the thought I believe she currently bears the belief relation to, which is the same
thought I would have expressed if I had uttered “John is wearing a brown hat” at the
time I instead made the belief report. This implies that Mary is constantly updating
her beliefs, bearing the belief relation to a new class of thoughts at every moment.
Again, this isn’t necessarily an objection to the position we’re considering, but it is
worth noting. It seems to go against intuitions about the preservation of beliefs over
time, even when we’re abstracting from the content of beliefs to the sort of content
relevant to determining truth-conditions.
But there is a more serious objection. Suppose later that day I utter “Mary
believed that John was wearing a brown hat.” Obviously, Mary may no longer believe
this, and I’m clearly not ascribing the current belief that John is wearing a brown
hat to her. I’m not ascribing the belief that John was wearing a brown hat to her
either, since she may have given up that belief in light of new information. Instead,
I’m asserting that Mary did believe that John was wearing a brown hat.
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But on the view we’re considering, I can’t actually grasp the thought I’m attempt-
ing to assert. This is because that thought includes a canonical sense referring to the
thought Mary originally believed, and yet I can no longer grasp that thought, and
hence (as we saw in the last chapter) I can’t grasp (or even express) its canonical
sense either.
Again, the problem is that indirect senses are transparent or revelatory of their
referents, and hence one cannot grasp an indirect sense without also grasping the sense
it refers to. This implies that I can’t ascribe a belief to someone without grasping the
thought I’m ascribing. But this simply cannot be done on the view we’re considering
in a wide variety of cases. In order to make sense of such belief reports, I had better
be able to grasp tensed thoughts at later times, and yet that simply cannot be done
on this view of the structure of thought.
Such considerations can pull one in the direction of a treatment of thoughts under
which all that matters is preservation of the appropriate referent, so that “Today it
is raining” and “Yesterday it was raining” can express the same thought so long as
‘Today’ and ‘Yesterday’ refer to the same day in their respective utterances. But
then we seem to have no answer to the Frege puzzles that pushed us in the direction
of a Fregean treatment of truth-conditions in the first place. The Fregean account of
truth-conditional content we’ve been considering seems too fine-grained, while this
non-Fregean account seems too coarse-grained.
There is another set of famous objections to a Fregean account of indexicals and
demonstratives, stemming from the work of (Kripke 1980) and (Kaplan 1989). While
the status of these objections is controversial (and there are various Fregean re-
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sponses), this won’t matter for our purposes. I will sketch an objection here and later
argue that Frege himself had a natural response.
Let’s first discuss demonstratives. When used in a particular context, a demon-
strative such as ‘that’ often has to be supplemented by an action (e.g. an act of
pointing) in order to determine a unique referent. When I utter “That is my cell
phone” while pointing at an object, the truth-value of my assertion depends upon
which object I pointed at. This suggests that the act of pointing contributes to the
expression of the thought. One might say that the demonstrative ‘that’, in combina-
tion with the act of pointing, expresses a sense that refers to my cell phone (we’ll see
below that this was Frege’s actual view). Importantly, the very same utterance of
‘that’ accompanied by the very same act of pointing might have referred to a different
object (e.g. the items on my desk might have been arranged differently).11
Here is an argument in the spirit of Kaplan (1989, pg. 516ff): Consider my
assertion “That is my cell phone, but that might have belonged to someone else”,
where both uses of ‘that’ are meant to be accompanied by the same act of pointing
(to my actual cell phone, let’s assume). Both uses of ‘that’ are also meant to express
the same sense (or close enough to the same sense, if identity is impossible). When
I make this assertion, I am not claiming that someone’s else’s cell phone might have
been the object pointed at by my action; I am instead making the claim that my cell
phone might have belonged to someone else.12
11Here it is being assumed that such acts are not individuated in terms of the objects being
pointed at.
12There may be unusual contexts in which I could make the former claim (or the claim that
someone else’s object might have been at that location) with that utterance (perhaps in a discussion
about how pointing works), but let’s suppose this isn’t one of them. The Fregean is still obligated
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Here is one way to evaluate this case: when evaluating the truth-value of this
utterance, it seems I will need to consider other possible states of the world, but
while doing so the object relevant to determining the truth-value remains fixed as
my actual cell phone.13 The fact that I might have pointed at a different object is
irrelevant to determining whether my cell phone might have belonged to someone
else. Hence, when considering other possible states of the world, I needn’t consider
other objects that I may have pointed at. Instead, I should continue considering the
object that I in fact pointed at in the actual state of the world.
This suggests that such a use of ‘that’ (in conjunction with an act of pointing)
functions as a rigid designator, designating the same object even when evaluated
relative to a different possible state of the world.14 But then the sense expressed
by (this use of) ‘that’ and my act of pointing cannot be a sense that represents its
object as whatever object I am pointing at (if any) in other possible states of the
world, since this gives the wrong truth-conditions of the assertion.15 But what else
to give the truth-conditions of the utterance I actually made.
13Note that I am not committed to the position that a possible worlds semantics is the correct
treatment of modality. Here I merely discuss the objection in its most natural form.
14Compare a standard utterance of “It is not raining here, but it might have been.” The location
relevant to determining the truth-value remains fixed as the actual location of the utterance even
while I’m considering other possible states of the world. The fact that it might have been raining at
a different location where I might have uttered that sentence is irrelevant to determining its actual
truth-value. This suggests that words like ‘here’ are also rigid designators.
15For example, this would seem to be the sense expressed on a view where the sense is given by
the following Kaplan-style rule for determining the reference (examples of which are given in (Kripke
2008)): when someone uses the word ‘that’ demonstratively, they refer to the demonstrandum of
the relevant demonstration.
Could one insist that a sense maintains fixed reference to its actual referent even when evaluated
relative to other possible states of the world? Frege did in fact hold that senses have the same
reference even when the context varies (change in reference entails change in sense), and extending
this view to the modal case may seem natural. However, consider the following: “The first Post-
master General of the United States might not have been the inventor of bifocals.” That utterance
is true, and yet it seems false that Benjamin Franklin might not have been Benjamin Franklin. As
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could the sense possibly be?
In this chapter, I’ll attempt to sketch a Fregean treatment of demonstratives and
indexicals that addresses these arguments. I’ll begin by looking carefully at what
Gottlob Frege actually said about such cases, followed by discussing how his account
should be modified. As in the last chapter, I’ll bolster the case for my account
by considering relevant aspects of conscious experience, perception, and reflective
judgment.
3.2 Frege on Demonstratives and Indexicals
In the last chapter we discussed Saul Kripke’s paper on Frege: “Frege’s Theory of
Sense and Reference: Some Exegetical Notes” (2008). Besides discussing Frege’s
account of the hierarchy of senses, Kripke also gives an interpretation of Frege’s brief
remarks on demonstratives and indexicals, primarily in “Thoughts” (Frege 1918-19a).
In this section I will defend various aspects of Kripke’s interpretation as correct and
then develop it further in light of Frege’s commitment to the Multiple Decompositions
Thesis. We’ll consider objections in the next two sections.
First, some context. Kripke is partially responding to (Burge 1979), in which
Burge accused Kripke of mistakenly equating sense with meaning in (Kripke 1980).
Burge supported his alternative position by arguing that for Frege the sense associated
the reader probably knows, this style of argument is due to (Kripke 1980).
Perhaps the defender of such a strong fixed-reference view could insist that ‘the inventor of
bifocals’ is not a referring expression in that utterance, but is instead an inseparable component of
the predicate ‘( ) might not have been the inventor of bifocals’. This seems very strained, and it
leaves one unable to explain why the expression ‘the inventor of bifocals’ can be replaced by other
expressions in a way that systematically changes the sense expressed by the predicate.
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with an indexical like ‘today’ must shift from context to context, since its referent
shifts. However, the meaning of an indexical like ‘today’ remains constant throughout
contexts, and hence senses aren’t meanings. (Burge 1979, pg. 214-15 in the 2005
reprint) Kripke responds by defending an interpretation of Frege where the sense of
an indexical doesn’t shift from context to context.
Throughout this dissertation, I’ve made it clear that senses should not be identi-
fied with linguistic meanings, for the thought expressed by an assertion (for example)
is an abstraction from the full content expressed by the assertion to the sort of con-
tent relevant to determining whether the assertion is true or false. Frege’s primary
interest was the sort of content relevant to logic, not just any content expressed by
a sentence in natural language.16 Hence, I agree with Burge that senses shouldn’t
be identified with full linguistic meanings, although they can be thought of as one
aspect of meaning. What about Burge’s argument? Let’s consider Kripke’s response.
Burge and Kripke both base their accounts primarily on the following quotation:
(1) If a time-indication is conveyed by the present tense one must know
when the sentence was uttered in order to grasp the thought correctly.
Therefore the time of utterance is part of the expression of the thought.
If someone wants to say today what he expressed yesterday using the
word ‘today’, he will replace this word with ‘yesterday’. Although the
thought is the same its verbal expression must be different in order that
the change of sense which would otherwise be effected by the differing
16Here’s the most relevant quote again: “So one has to separate off from the content of a sentence
the part that alone can be accepted as true or rejected as false. I call this part the thought expressed
by the sentence.” (Frege 1906c, PW pg. 197-8)
Kripke complains that if Frege didn’t identify sense with meaning, then why didn’t he ever use
a technical term for ordinary meaning? (Kripke 2008, pg. 273 in the 2011 reprint) For one, I don’t
think Frege had any need for such a term, since ordinary meaning was not his primary interest. In
any case, a plausible candidate term is ‘content’ (‘Inhalt’).
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times of utterance may be cancelled out.17 The case is the same with
words like ‘here’ and ‘there’. In all such cases the mere wording, as it can
be preserved in writing, is not the complete expression of the thought;
the knowledge of certain conditions accompanying the utterance, which
are used as means of expressing the thought, is needed for us to grasp the
thought correctly. Pointing the finger, hand gestures, glances may belong
here too. The same utterance containing the word ‘I’ in the mouths of
different men will express different thoughts of which some may be true,
others false. (Frege 1918-19a, pg. 64/358)
While Burge interprets this passage as implying that e.g. the sense of ‘today’ will
vary from day to day (Burge 1979, pg. 214-5), Kripke points out the following: Frege
says the time of utterance is part of the expression of the thought. This suggests
the time of utterance itself expresses a sense that is part of the thought expressed;
the utterance by itself fails to express a complete sense. What does the expressed
sense refer to? The time of utterance. Hence, the time of utterance is being used
autonymously, as an expression that refers to itself. (Kripke 2008, pg. 274)18 In
further support of this, note that at the end of the passage Frege says that certain
conditions accompanying the utterance are used as means of expressing the thought
(not our knowledge of certain conditions, but the conditions themselves).
Later in the same paper, Frege says “The words ‘This tree is covered with green
leaves’ are not sufficient by themselves to constitute the expression of the thought,
for the time of utterance is involved as well. Without the time-specification thus
given we have not a complete thought, i.e. we have no thought at all.” (1918-19a,
17Here we see that Frege wanted various tensed thoughts to be preservable over time, and we can
also see his suggestion for how to do so (which should come as no surprise to readers of the first two
chapters of this dissertation), which we’ll discuss further below.
18Note that Kripke’s interpretative point does not hold in general: the letters that make up a
word may be part of the expression of a thought, but they do not thereby express senses that are
parts of that thought. I will argue in the next section that Kripke’s interpretative point is correct
when applied to this particular case.
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pg. 76/370) This again suggests that the time of utterance itself expresses a sense
which is part of the complete thought expressed, and by virtue of doing so it specifies
(refers to) a time (itself). When discussing the first person pronoun ‘I’, Frege again
makes such a remark: “...by doing this he makes the conditions accompanying his
utterance serve towards the expression of a thought.” (ibid pg. 66/360)
So, if I utter “It is raining in Brooklyn”, the thought expressed by the utterance
is incomplete, and must be completed by a sense referring to the time of utterance.19
This sense is provided by the time of utterance itself, where that time is used as an
expression which refers to itself. According to Kripke, the reason a speaker can refer
to the time of utterance in this way is because they are acquainted with it, presumably
in virtue of its currently being that time. (2008, pg. 275) I am acquainted with the
time it actually is, and this allows me to refer to it in a special way. Similarly, I am
acquainted with the place I’m actually located at, and I am acquainted with myself.20
Kripke generalizes this interpretation to other indexicals and demonstratives. For
example, the sense expressed by ‘here’ (used non-demonstratively) must be saturated
by the sense expressed by the location of utterance used as a name of itself, the sense
expressed by ‘I’ must be saturated by the sense expressed by the speaker/thinker
used as a name of herself, etc. However, the sense expressed by a demonstrative such
19As Kripke points out (2008, pg. 275 fn. 63), the complete expression would have the form
‘F(t)’, where ‘F( )’ is the unsaturated utterance and ‘t’ is the completing time of utterance, treated
as an expression. ‘F( )’ itself refers to a function from times to truth-values.
20Kripke is using “acquaintance” in roughly the sense of Russell. I have a special sort of epistemic
access to the time it actually is. Compare the access I have to an utterance by virtue of being the
one who made it: this epistemic access allows me to represent that utterance as a token instance of
the relevant utterance-type, as is needed in Frege’s account of direct quotation (a context in which
the words refer to themselves, each expressing a sense of autonymous designation).
I don’t think that acquaintance is necessary for treating an object as a name of itself (any prior
representation of the object will do), but I mention Kripke’s position here for completeness.
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as ‘that’ won’t be saturated by the sense expressed by the object demonstrated used
autonymously, but rather by the sense expressed by the act of demonstration. This
does seem to have been Frege’s view (see the end of the quotation above), although
it prima facie gets the truth-conditions of various utterances wrong, as I pointed
out in the Introduction. There I discussed an argument that ‘that’ is often used
as a rigid designator, and does not co-refer with the description ‘the object of this
demonstration’ when evaluated with respect to various possible states of the world.
That might not have been the object of this demonstration, but it seems absurd to
say that might not have been that (compare footnote 15). We will discuss whether
an account of senses can be given that avoids this objection in a later section.
Recall Frege’s treatment of direct and indirect quotation. In an indirect context,
words refer to the senses they would express outside of that context. In a direct
quotation context, words refer to themselves. Furthermore, as I argued in the last
chapter, every thought contains a sense as a part (the canonical sense of that thought)
that refers to the whole thought. Frege was no stranger to self-reference.
So, when I utter “Today it is raining in Brooklyn”, the sense expressed by the
utterance must be completed by a sense referring to the time of utterance. In par-
ticular, the sense of ‘Today’ is incomplete, and refers to a function from a time to
the day containing it. (2008, pg. 276)21 Thus Kripke can argue, against Burge, that
21In Frege’s earlier work he made this point more explicitly: “Words like ‘here’ and ‘now’ only
acquire their full sense through the circumstances in which they are used. If someone says ‘it
is raining’ the time and place of utterance has to be supplied...So the explanation for all these
apparent exceptions is that the same sentence does not always express the same thought, because
the words need to be supplemented in order to get a complete sense, and how this is done can vary
according to the circumstances.” (1897, PW pg. 135)
However, this quotation should be taken with a grain of salt; Frege doesn’t explicitly state here
that the circumstances themselves are being used to express thoughts, and hence could have easily
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indexicals and demonstratives express the same sense in all contexts. What shifts
with context are the senses expressed by contextual factors themselves treated as
referring expressions.
What about Frege’s remarks about expressing the same thought at two different
times by e.g. exchanging ‘yesterday’ for ‘today’? Kripke considers this bizarre,
given that the two expressions seem to clearly present the same day in two different
ways, and thus express distinct senses. Kripke goes on to conclude that the thought
expressed by e.g. “It is raining today” can never be grasped again once the day has
passed, and to say otherwise would be to reject Frege’s basic principles. (Kripke 2008,
pg. 277-8) I, of course, disagree, as does Gareth Evans (1981).
According to Evans, changing epistemic circumstances “force us to change in order
to keep hold of a constant reference and a constant thought—we must run to keep
still.” (Evans 1981, pg. 308 in the 1985 reprint) An utterance like “Yesterday it was
raining” can manifest the persistence of a belief that was expressed yesterday with the
utterance “Today it is raining.” (ibid pg. 309) Furthermore, we shouldn’t prescribe a
belief of the form “It is now ψ” to someone if they don’t have the propensity as time
goes on to form beliefs of the form “It was just ψ a moment ago”, “It was ψ earlier
this morning”, etc.22 A capacity to keep track of time is a precondition of temporal
thought. (ibid pg. 309)
changed his mind in the following twenty years before “Thoughts” (1918-19a) was published. Still,
it seems clear that Kripke’s account is the natural way to make Frege’s updated view more explicit:
e.g. ‘Today’ refers to a function from a time to the day containing it, and expresses an incomplete
sense that must be completed by a sense referring to the time of utterance.
22Evans’s position might be better served by insisting that the subject is merely preserving their
belief rather than forming new beliefs.
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The point being, in such a context these different expressions are expressions
of the same persistent belief state. Intuitively, it is the same belief that is being
preserved over time that must be expressed in distinct ways due to the passage of
time. Hence, it is plausible that Frege wanted this belief to be a relation to the same
thought over time. And as I pointed out above, it is clear from passage (1) how
Frege wanted to accomplish this: by insisting that there are multiple decompositions
of the same temporal thought (e.g. the thought expressed by “Today it is raining”
uttered in a particular context), some of which include e.g. the sense of ‘yesterday’
as a component while others include the sense of ‘today’ as a component.
Given Frege’s more general account of multiple decompositions of thought, such
a move may seem like a natural way to account for the intuition that one can express
the same tensed thought more than once. But it isn’t so clear how the details of such
an account should be spelled out. Take the thought expressed by “Today it is raining
here”, uttered at a particular place and time. According to the interpretation we’ve
adopted, ‘here’ expresses a function-sense from the sense expressed by the location
of utterance to a sense s1 denoting that location, while ‘today’ expresses a function-
sense from the sense expressed by the time of utterance to a sense s2 denoting the day
containing that time. Furthermore, ‘( ) it is raining ( )’ expresses a function-sense
mapping the senses s1 and s2 to the complete thought, and it denotes a function from
places and times that maps them to the True if it is in fact raining at that place and
that time and the False otherwise.23
23Actually, it may denote a function from the place referred to by ‘here’, the duration of time
referred to by ‘today’, and the time of utterance to a truth-value, since if I had said “Today it is
raining here” when it had been raining earlier in the day but had stopped recently, it seems that I
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But what about “Yesterday it was raining here”, uttered the next day at the same
place? ‘Yesterday’ expresses a function-sense from the sense expressed by the new
time of utterance to a sense s3 denoting the day prior to the day containing that
time. But the combination of ‘here’ and the location of utterance expresses the same
sense as before by assumption. Furthermore, any difference in sense between ‘( ) it is
raining ( )’ uttered yesterday and ‘( ) it was raining ( )’ uttered today does not affect
the part of the thought denoting a duration of time.24 So in order for the second
utterance to express the same thought as the first, it seems that s2 will have to be
identical to s3. But how could that be, given that they seem to present the same day
in two different ways: as the day containing now in the former case and as the day
prior to the day containing now in the latter case?
Actually, it is the sense of ‘today’ and the sense of ‘yesterday’ that differ, and
hence we can still capture the intuition that the same day is being presented in two
different ways while insisting that the combination of the sense of ‘today’ and the
sense expressed by the time of the first utterance is the same as the combination of
the sense of ‘yesterday’ and the sense expressed by the time of the second utterance.
So perhaps we can identify s2 and s3 after all.
However, since it was clearly Frege’s view that this same thought could be ex-
would have said something false. I should have used the past tense and said “Today it was raining
here” instead.
24Doesn’t the change in tense change the sense expressed? Yes, but it doesn’t change the part
of the thought that refers to a duration of time, and hence we can ignore this shift here. The shift
in contribution to truth-conditions made by this shift in tense is the following: in the former case
it must be raining at the time of utterance for the utterance to be true, while in the latter case it
must have rained at a time prior to the time of utterance for the utterance to be true (where which
prior times are relevant is further constrained by other expressions such as ‘yesterday’).
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pressed at many different times (presumably in a different way each time), s2 is going
to have to include parts referring to arbitrary times of utterance, and it is going to
have to be decomposable into pairs of parts in arbitrarily many ways, with one part
referring to a time and the other referring to a function from that time to the relevant
day. Otherwise, this sense wouldn’t be expressible at various other times; its being
so expressible implies that it contains components referring to every distinct time at
which it could be expressed. That is to say, this sense is going to have to have the
structure of a timeline, with any point along the timeline denoting a particular time
relative to the rest of the timeline denoting the relevant function.
Compare again Frege’s use of a line divided by a point to illustrate the func-
tion/object distinction, which I argued in the previous two chapters reveals much
about Frege’s conception of the structure of thought. Here, the point corresponds to
a sense denoting a time while the rest of the line corresponds to a function-sense map-
ping that point to the complete line, which in this case is a complete sense denoting
the relevant day.
One might think of the sense as a timeline with a particular interval emphasized
(the interval corresponding to the day denoted by the timeline). Any point on the line
corresponds to the sense that would be expressed by that time of utterance treated as
a name of itself, while the rest of the line (with that point removed) corresponds to a
function-sense mapping that point to the complete line, a line which always denotes
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the same day (corresponding to the emphasized interval).25 26 For similar reasons,
the sense expressed by e.g. the combination of the location of utterance and ‘here’ is
going to have to have the structure of a space. Can such a view really be defended?27
I’ll attempt to do so in a later section, but let’s first turn to various objections to the
aspects of Kripke’s interpretation we’ve been relying upon. The next section isn’t
essential to my overall position, but I consider the objections worth discussing.
3.3 Objections to Kripke’s Interpretation
Kripke’s interpretation has been criticized by Wolfgang Ku¨nne (2010) and Tyler
Burge (2012). Ku¨nne agrees with Kripke (and has argued independently) that on
Frege’s view persons, times, etc. can be part of the expression of a thought. How-
ever, Ku¨nne doesn’t agree that e.g. times of utterance must express independent
25This analogy isn’t perfect since e.g. any point in the interval would have to be mapped by the
same function-sense expressed by ‘today’ to the same complete sense. It might be better to think of
the function-sense expressed by ‘today’ itself as a timeline with an interval emphasized, where the
timeline must be “anchored” (saturated) by a sense denoting a time in order to refer to a specific
day (the day containing that time) as opposed to an arbitrary day. Note that senses denoting any
time within that day are part of the complete sense, and any of them could saturate the sense of
‘today’ in a way that results in that same complete sense. That is, here we must say that a change
in sense doesn’t necessarily need to be “cancelled out”.
Furthermore, recall that treating a time of utterance as a point on a line is an idealization. In
reality, a time of utterance has a duration with vague boundaries whose length is determined by the
context. Hence, it is actually a sense denoting such a duration that will be mapped by the sense of
‘today’ to the sense denoting the day in question.
26To express this sense on the day it denotes, one would use an expression like ‘today’, but to
express this sense on a different day, one must use a different expression, since the sense of ‘today’ is
a function-sense from a sense denoting a time to a sense denoting the day containing that time, and
hence to express this same sense on a different day one needs to use an expression that expresses a
function-sense from a sense denoting a time to a sense denoting a day other than the day containing
that time.
27I doubt that Frege ever considered this in detail, but it does seem to be a consequence of his
views on thought-preservation and the structure of thought. That is to say, he seems to have been
committed to this position whether or not he ever actually considered it.
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senses and have referents, for times are not the sorts of things that are understood.
(Ku¨nne 2010, pg. 541-2)28 But this begs the question against Kripke. Understanding
an expression consists partially in knowing how it is used and how it contributes to
the truth-conditions of complete sentences.29 If a time of utterance is being used as
an expression for itself, then it is the sort of thing that can be understood in this
sense: it is used to refer to itself and expresses a sense that presents itself as itself:
the time of utterance.30
On Ku¨nne’s view, in a case like ‘It is raining in Brooklyn’, it is the combination
of the time of utterance and the present-tense inflection of the verb that expresses a
sense, where neither expresses a sense independently. He compares this to cases like
the contribution of ‘is’ and ‘raining’ to expressing the sense of ‘is raining’, claiming
that neither expresses a sense on its own on Frege’s view.31 Since the present-tense
inflection is linguistic, it is the sort of thing that can be understood, and that’s why
the combination can express a sense that refers to the time of utterance. (ibid pg.
544)
28In support of this, Ku¨nne claims that the predicate ‘is true’ for Frege can be part of the expres-
sion of a thought without contributing a sense to that thought, and furthermore lacks a referent.
(ibid pg. 541, 543) I demonstrated in the last chapter that this is based on a misunderstanding of
Frege’s actual view: ‘is true’ expresses a function-sense that maps the canonical sense of a thought
to the thought itself, and thus refers to a function from a thought to its truth-value.
29Such knowledge may be (I would say usually is) tacit.
30That is not to say that the view isn’t strange. We will discuss broader reasons for accepting it
in later sections.
31Actually this isn’t at all clear. Frege does speak of an expression such as ‘a horse’ as having a
reference independently of the copula (e.g. 1892b, PW pg. 99), which implies that it expresses an
independent sense as well. Furthermore, the ‘is’ of identity clearly expresses a sense (referring to
the identity relation), and even the ‘is’ of predication can be seen as expressing a sense that refers
to the relation between an object and a property it instantiates (Frege seems to assert this in (Frege
1906a, PW pg. 178)). However, there are other linguistic cases that support Ku¨nne’s point: e.g. a
proper name made up of multiple nonsense words.
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But what contribution does the time of utterance make? At the least, it must
contribute itself as the referent of the expressed sense. If I read ‘It is raining in Brook-
lyn’ without knowing when it was written, then I can’t recognize which thought was
originally expressed, even though I perfectly understand the present-tense inflection
of the verb. What I fail to understand is when the sentence was written, and this
is what’s preventing me from recognizing which thought was originally expressed by
it.32
The point being, the time of utterance makes an independent contribution to the
expression of the thought. By holding the utterance ‘It is raining in Brooklyn’ fixed
while varying the time of utterance, we vary the thought expressed in a systematic
way. Similarly, by holding the time of utterance fixed while varying the tense, we
also vary the thought expressed in a systematic way (‘it was raining’; ‘it will rain’).
The time of utterance makes its own contribution to truth-conditions independently
of the present tense (assuming, with Frege, that it itself makes a contribution as
opposed to a distinct expression for it making a contribution). Hence, it expresses a
sense independently as well. In fact, it is hard to see what else could be needed to
conclude that something expresses an independent sense.33 Thus, I see no reason to
reject Kripke’s interpretation. One shouldn’t conclude that Frege didn’t hold a view
just because one personally finds it strange.
Let’s turn to (Burge 2012). In that paper, Burge makes various arguments against
32Whether this thought can be grasped at another time will be discussed in the next section.
33Wouldn’t this argument also show that ‘a horse’ expresses a distinct sense from ‘is’ in an
expression like ‘is a horse’? Indeed it would, and as I pointed out in footnote 31, Frege’s actual view
was that concept-words refer to concepts independently of the copula. (Here I use Frege’s sense of
‘concept’ (‘Begriff’); the point may be clearer if you replace this term by ‘property’.)
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Kripke’s interpretation. He claims that on Frege’s view, when I say “Today it is
raining” on one day and “Yesterday it was raining” the next, ‘Today’ and ‘Yesterday’
express the same sense. (ibid pg. 558 in the 2013 reprint) But let’s return to passage
(1) above. Here Frege does say that if someone wants to express the same thought
today that they expressed yesterday by saying e.g. “Today it is raining”, they must
instead say “Yesterday it was raining.” Frege claims that the verbal expression must
be different in order to cancel out the change in sense that would otherwise be brought
about by the change in time of utterance.
Note that he never says that ‘today’ and ‘yesterday’ express the same sense.
Indeed, he seems to say that they express distinct senses that combine with the
senses expressed by the distinct times of utterance to express the same thought. This
is yet another example of Frege’s account of multiple decompositions of thought that
I heavily emphasized in Chapter 1, an account under which there are many distinct
ways to form the same thought out of component senses.34 On such a view, one would
naturally expect that varying one component of a thought while holding the rest of
the thought fixed results in a distinct thought, and hence in order to preserve the
thought one has to vary another component as well in order to cancel out the change.
And this seems to be exactly Frege’s point.35
34Both Burge and Kripke mistakenly attribute the unique decomposition view to Frege, Burge
in (ibid pg. 560) and Kripke in (2008, pg. 270).
35Note, however, that we gave this intuition up in the last section. See footnote 25. In fact, any
conception of the sense of ‘Today’ under which it is a function that can map distinct senses denoting
times to the same sense denoting the day containing those times would require giving this up. I
suspect Frege didn’t consider a case in which I utter ‘Today it was raining’ multiple times on the
same day, since it seems clear that he’d want there to be cases in which these utterances can express
the same thought.
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Burge also points out an earlier passage from Frege: “Words like ‘here’ and ‘now’
only acquire their full sense through the circumstances in which they are used.” (Frege
1897, PW pg. 135) Burge reads this passage as implying that e.g. ‘today’ cannot
express a sense that denotes a function from a time to the day containing it, since it
would then express its full sense in all circumstances. (Burge 2012, pg. 560-1, 590)
But Frege could just as easily be read as implying that words like ‘today’ express
incomplete senses that need to be saturated in order to refer to a duration of time.
They may still express the same incomplete sense in all contexts. Furthermore, this
passage was written twenty years before “Thoughts”. (1918-19a) Hence, Frege could
have easily changed his mind in the interim.
Finally, Burge resists Kripke’s conclusion that for Frege times of utterance are used
as part of the expression of the thought, i.e. they are used as names of themselves.
While he admits that passage (1) can be naturally read in this way, he argues that
the surrounding context suggests a different interpretation. (Burge 2012, pg. 591)
Burge points out that at the beginning of passage (1) Frege speaks of a time-
indication being conveyed by the present tense. He interprets this as implying that in
an utterance of “Today it is raining”, the present tense refers to the time of utterance.
Burge then wonders why Frege would also need the time of utterance to refer to itself,
since it is already denoted by the present tense. (ibid pg. 591) Note however that
even on Burge’s view in an utterance like “It is raining now” there are two denotations
of the time of utterance (the present tense and ‘now’). Furthermore, it isn’t clear
that Frege meant that the present tense denotes the time of utterance; it may merely
indicate that a time of utterance needs to be supplied in order for a complete thought
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to be expressed. Compare the past or future tense, neither of which denote particular
times (at least in normal cases). In any case, this isn’t a very strong objection to
Kripke’s interpretation.
Burge suggests an alternative interpretation: “The time of utterance would be
‘part of the thought expression’ only in the loose sense that it is specified (hence
denoted) by the thinker’s use of contextual circumstances to express a mode of pre-
sentation that appropriately determines the time.” (ibid pg. 592) This is a difficult
reading to maintain. If the time of utterance doesn’t contribute to the expression of
the thought, then why did Frege say that it is part of the expression of the thought?
Also, what “contextual circumstances” could Burge have in mind here that could be
used to express a sense that denotes the time of utterance (other than the time of
utterance itself)? Surely pointing at the time with one’s finger isn’t what Frege had
in mind.
Burge also claims (ibid pg. 592) that in earlier work Frege said that the present
tense can denote the time of utterance, citing a passage from “On Sense and Ref-
erence” (Frege 1892a) as evidence. Actually, this is unclear. What Frege actually
says is “If an instant of time is to be indefinitely indicated in both the antecedent
and consequent clause, this is often achieved merely by using the present tense of the
verb, which in such a case however does not indicate the temporal present.” (ibid
pg. 43/171) His example is “When the Sun is in the tropic of Cancer, the longest
day in the northern hemisphere occurs.” Frege also says that we can’t express the
sense of the subordinate clause by simply saying “The Sun is in the tropic of Cancer”,
because “this would refer to our present time and thereby change the sense.” (ibid
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pg. 44/171) So, Frege says that the subordinate clause “When the Sun is in the tropic
of Cancer...” indefinitely indicates a time, and when we say “The Sun is in the tropic
of Cancer” we refer to our present time, but he doesn’t say that the present tense
itself refers to our present time. Furthermore, that paper was written 25 years before
“Thoughts”, and so Frege could have easily changed his mind about a few things.
More importantly, whether or not Burge is correct that for Frege the present
tense refers to the time of utterance, it is clear that Frege also held that the time of
utterance itself is part of the expression of the thought, for he says so explicitly in
several places. Furthermore, Burge’s move simply won’t work in the case of past-tense
or future-tense utterances: ‘Yesterday it was raining’ needs to be supplemented in
order to express a complete thought; the past tense does not refer to a definite time,
but instead indicates that the event in question took place prior to time of utterance.
On Frege’s actual view, the sense of ‘Yesterday’ is saturated by a sense expressed by
the time of utterance, and this is why the utterance refers to a particular day.
With that said, let’s turn to a general objection to any Fregean account under
which e.g. ‘Today it is raining’ and ‘Yesterday it was raining’ can express the same
thought.
3.4 Differing Conceptions of Sense
David Kaplan raised an objection to Frege’s position on thought-preservation. Some-
one could lose track of how many days have passed since the day in question, and as
a result they might not realize whether they are expressing the same thought with
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a new utterance. (1989, pg. 501 fn. 26) For example, suppose the person originally
uttered ‘Today it is raining here’, lost track of how many days have passed, and
then attempts to express the same thought by uttering ‘It was raining here the day
before yesterday’ after three days have in fact passed. But how could an individ-
ual fail to recognize whether two thoughts are distinct or identical? Shouldn’t the
identity-conditions of thoughts be transparent to a thinker of those thoughts?36
This might seem to be a general objection to any attempt to construct a Fregean
theory of senses that satisfies Frege’s desire for thought preservation across shifts in
context. However, whether it counts as an objection will depend upon the details
of one’s conception of sense in the first place. As Tyler Burge points out (2012, pg.
556-7), Frege himself wanted senses to play various roles in theorizing about language
and thought, and it isn’t clear that all of these roles can be played by the same notion.
When Frege introduced the notion of sense in “Function and Concept” (1891), he
argued that the expressions ‘Morning Star’ and ‘Evening Star’ must have different
senses although they have the same reference, since someone who didn’t know that
36Actually, Frege allowed for cases in mathematics in which senses are not fully transparent. His
“Logic in Mathematics” (1914) includes a detailed discussion of mathematical definition in which
Frege says, “The fact is that if we really do have a clear grasp of the sense of the simple sign, then
it cannot be doubtful whether it agrees with the sense of the complex expression. If this is open to
question although we can clearly recognize the sense of the complex expression from the way it is
put together, then the reason must lie in the fact that we do not have a clear grasp of the sense of
the simple sign, but that its outlines are confused as if we saw it through a mist.” (ibid pg. 211)
Indeed, Frege’s own project in the philosophy of mathematics consisted partially in elucidating
the senses of mathematical expressions, senses that mathematicians had grasped all along, albeit
unclearly. However, the examples discussed by Kaplan and others are importantly different. An
idealized thinker can be expected to recognize whether the sense of a simple mathematical expression
is identical to the sense of a complex mathematical expression, but they cannot be expected to
recognize whether two days have passed or three. In the latter sort of case, they are merely lacking
empirical information about the world, and this is not the sort of information that one should be
expected to have in order to clearly grasp a sense. And if an idealized thinker clearly grasps two
senses, how could they fail to recognize whether these senses are identical or distinct? So, at least,
goes the objection. I am grateful to Haim Gaifman for helpful discussion of these issues.
149
the Morning Star is the Evening Star could believe that the Evening Star is a planet
with a shorter period of revolution than the Earth without believing that the Morning
Star has the same property. (ibid pg. 14/145) Let’s call this the cognitive significance
conception of sense, with the suggestion being that two thoughts are distinct if it is
possible for an idealized thinker to believe the first thought as expressed by sentence
‘p’ without believing the second thought as expressed by sentence ‘q’.37
It is this conception of sense that most obviously falls prey to Kaplan’s scenarios.
For example, couldn’t a thinker believe the thought she expressed yesterday with
the utterance ‘Today it is raining here’ while failing to believe the thought expressed
today by ‘Yesterday it was raining here’, since she mistakenly thinks that two days
have passed? But then how could these two thoughts be identical?
Actually, this case is a bit more complicated. For one, the person in our ex-
ample still believes the thought originally expressed and has access to that thought
via preservative memory; she would merely fail to express it properly (her actual
utterance of ‘It was raining here the day before yesterday’ would express a distinct
thought, unbeknownst to her). In effect, the person would fail to say what she really
means. One might similarly argue that she does in fact believe the thought expressed
today by ‘Yesterday it was raining here’; she merely fails to recognize which thought
is expressed by that utterance, and hence she may be unwilling to assent to it. So,
a defender of this conception of sense may reply to the objection by admitting that
even an idealized thinker may not know whether two utterances express the same
37This is only meant to be a sufficient condition for distinctness. It may be impossible for an
idealized thinker to fail to believe a mathematical truth (depending on the details of our idealization),
but that wouldn’t mean that all mathematical truths are identical.
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thought, and furthermore may not know how to express a particular thought.
The reader may feel that this merely dodges the real issue. Surely if thoughts are
meant to capture something like cognitive significance, then it should be cognitively
transparent to an idealized thinker whether two utterances express the same thought
or two distinct thoughts. By assumption, an idealized thinker perfectly understands
both utterances (she is ideally linguistically competent), so how could she fail to
recognize the identity-conditions of the thoughts expressed by them? Then again, it
seems to be a necessary condition of understanding these sorts of utterances that one
knows various facts about the contexts in which they were made, and this knowledge
is precisely what is lacking in Kaplan’s examples.
I prefer a different response. Whatever Frege’s actual view on the matter, we
should not take the cognitive significance conception of sense as fundamental. The
most fundamental conception of sense is the truth-conditional conception specified
by Frege in Volume I of the Grundgesetze (1893, pg. 50-1) and in the passage I cited
in footnote 16.38 On this conception, the sense of an expression is determined by the
contribution that expression makes to determining the truth-conditions of complete
sentences in which it occurs (this includes the senses expressed by contextual factors),
and a thought is the sort of content relevant to determining whether an assertion is
true or false. This is the conception of sense most relevant to logic, and it is the
38The relevant Grundgesetze passage is the following: “Every such name of a truth-value expresses
a sense, a thought. For owing to our stipulations, it is determined under which conditions it refers
to the True. The sense of this name, the thought, is: that these conditions are fulfilled...Now, the
simple or complex names of which the name of a truth-value consists contribute to expressing the
thought, and this contribution of the individual name is its sense. If a name is part of the name
of a truth-value, then the sense of the former name is part of the thought expressed by the latter.”
(1893, pg. 50-1)
151
conception I have been working with throughout this dissertation.
Given the truth-conditional conception of sense, what should we conclude from
Kaplan’s examples? Kaplan’s examples show that the truth-conditions of an utter-
ance can depend upon external factors. In particular, they can depend upon features
of the context in which an utterance is made. For this reason, if a thinker lacks
information about the context of an utterance, she may fail to recognize which truth-
conditions are expressed by that utterance. In particular, she may fail to recognize
whether two utterances have the same truth-conditions. But this possibility is per-
fectly compatible with a truth-conditional conception of sense.
Indeed, on the Frege interpretation defended in the previous two sections, the time
and location of utterance themselves often make contributions to the truth-conditions
of an utterance. In order to understand a tensed utterance, for example, an agent
must be aware of the time of utterance. However, it doesn’t follow that the agent
must be able to locate that time along a timeline relative to other times. They may
merely be aware of the time of utterance as the time of utterance or as the time it
actually is rather than as e.g. ten minutes from the last utterance.39
Similarly, I may be aware of a day as the day it actually is, some time may pass,
and I may again be aware of a day as the day it actually is. Whether these senses
are the same or distinct depends upon how much time has passed. If I am unsure
how much time has passed, I may also be unsure whether these senses are the same,
although I may perfectly grasp both senses. I know precisely what contributions
39Again, I do not insist that the sense they grasp is equivalent to that of a description such as
‘the time of utterance’.
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the expression ‘the day it actually is’ and the time of utterance make to the truth-
conditions of complete declarative sentences. In order to avoid this, one would have
to hold the implausible view that ‘the day it actually is’ always expresses a distinct
sense when it is uttered at a distinct time.
This position is further supported if one accepts the view that the senses expressed
by places, times, and subjects are individuated in terms of the places, times, and
subjects themselves. In that case, if one is unable to compare two places to each
other, one will also be unable to compare the corresponding autonymous senses. In
particular, one will be unable to determine whether these senses are identical or
distinct. Compare a case in which each eye is presented with a distinct image, and
although the images are identical, one is unable to determine whether they present
distinct objects or the same object.
So, grasping the truth-conditions of a tensed utterance does not require being able
to locate the duration of time referred to along a timeline relative to other times.
Hence, grasping the truth-conditions of two tensed utterances does not require being
able to locate the durations of time referred to relative to each other. Hence, I may
be unable to recognize whether two utterances I perfectly understand in fact have
the same truth-conditions, since neither utterance refers to a duration of time in a
way that allows me to locate these two durations on a timeline relative to each other.
Being able to do so is unnecessary for understanding.
With that said, let’s return to considering the consequences of Frege’s own view.
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3.5 Spaces, Times, and Objectivity
What does it take to represent a time as a time? Note that there is a significant
difference between representing a time merely as an object (an unusual case to be
sure) and representing a time as a time.40 This difference ought to be reflected at the
level of sense.
In order to represent a time as a time and not merely as an object, one has to
represent it as part of a timeline. It is essential to being a time that it is part of
a timeline, and this ought to be reflected at the level of representation. Similarly,
in order to represent a place as a place one has to represent it as part of a larger
space.41 These points may already suggest that the senses expressed by expressions
denoting durations of time and regions of space ought to be structured like timelines
and spaces, respectively.42
In further support of this position, consider perceptual experience. I am currently
perceiving a region of physical space as occupied by myself and various other objects
40As an example of the former sort of case, one might know that Jim is thinking about something
without knowing what that thing is, even though it turns out that Jim is thinking about a particular
time. This knowledge would give one a way of thinking of the object of Jim’s thought that doesn’t
represent it as a time, but merely as an object.
41As Frege himself argued in Volume II of the Grundgesetze, similar remarks apply to magnitudes
in general: “A thing is a magnitude not in itself but only insofar as it belongs, with other objects,
to a class that is a domain of magnitudes.” (1903a, pg. 159) That is to say, in order for something
to be a magnitude, it has to be part of a class of magnitudes that can be added to each other,
subtracted from each other, etc. Representing a magnitude as a magnitude requires representing it
as part of a larger system of magnitudes.
One might make similar remarks about other systems such as the system of natural numbers.
Arguably, in order to represent the number three as the number three, I have to represent it as part
of a larger system of natural numbers. If I don’t have any grasp of this larger system, I can’t think
of the number three as the number it is.
42That is to say, one might think that in order for a sense to represent an object as part of a
larger whole, it must include components which represent the whole. I give further arguments for
this position below.
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bearing various spatial relations to each other. Notice that my perceptions not only
represent physical space as a space, they are also themselves located within a wider
perceptual space in which they bear various spatial relations to each other. That is
to say, my perceptual experience itself has spatial structure.43 Hence, it should be
no surprise that such structure is preserved in thought about durations of time and
regions of space.
Let’s return to the thought expressed by an utterance of ‘Today it is raining here’.
I argued above that one ought to be able to express this same thought at a later time,
and agreed with Gareth Evans that one could believe this same thought over a period
of time, any point at which it may have to be expressed in a different way (“we must
run to keep still”). In fact, we shouldn’t ascribe a belief with such content to people
if they aren’t capable of preserving this belief over time (although they may of course
choose to give it up). Beliefs aren’t the sorts of things that merely last for an instant.
Furthermore, I argued above that Frege himself wanted these sorts of thoughts
to be expressible at multiple times, and that he suggested using his treatment of
thoughts as having multiple decompositions in order to do so. Let’s consider further
what might be said in support of such a view.
When I assert that today it is raining here, I am committed to its still being true
that it rained here today when considered from the perspective of tomorrow. One
might say that the truth-conditions of my assertion do not depend on the temporal
43In support of this, note that it makes perfect sense to talk about the relative sizes of my visual
perceptions independently of the sizes of their objects. My perception of one tree might take up far
more space in my perceptual experience than my perception of a second tree, even though I know
that both trees are the same size (and am perceiving them as such). The former tree might be closer
to me.
155
perspective from which I am viewing the event in question. As time passes from today
to tomorrow, my temporal perspective on the event necessarily shifts. The Fregean
position is that I can still express the same thought with the same truth-conditions
even while my temporal perspective shifts; this thought is not perspective-dependent.
At the same time, any time I express this thought, a part of this thought will refer to
the time of utterance. So, the shift in temporal perspective is captured at the level of
thought, but this does not force a different thought to be expressed with every shift.
In many cases, the shift is cancelled out by other changes in expression.
So, given that the sense expressed by the combination of the time of utterance and
‘today’ has the structure of a timeline, each point along this timeline will correspond
to a particular temporal perspective on the event in question. A shift in this temporal
perspective from today to tomorrow does not affect the sense expressed because the
shift in temporal perspective is cancelled out by the transition from the sense of
‘today’ to the sense of ‘tomorrow’, each of which denotes a distinct function from
times to days (the former from a time to the day containing it; the latter from a time
to the day prior to the day containing it). The governing idea is that although one’s
temporal perspective has shifted, one is still thinking of the event in question in the
same way: as an event of raining that took place on a particular day at a particular
place.
Let’s continue by considering an elegant generalization of this account to cases in
perception. To do so, let’s briefly discuss perception in a bit more detail.44
44My discussion follows (Burge 2010), which includes a detailed discussion of the relevant litera-
ture in perceptual psychology.
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Perception
A perception is the paradigm case of a mental representation. A perception represents
an object as being a certain way, and hence may be regarded as having a represen-
tational content. This content can be assessed as accurate or inaccurate. However,
unlike judgments, perceptions are not the sorts of things that can be rational or irra-
tional. We are not epistemically responsible for our perceptions; they generally occur
automatically in response to sensory stimulation.
My current visual perception of an object as a coffee cup carries with it certain
expectations concerning how that object will appear from other angles, how that
object will behave if I interact with it, etc. These expectations plausibly operate at
the subpersonal level and influence my behavior. Note that these expectations can
be inaccurate: there are famous examples of objects that appear to be cubes from
one angle and spheres from another. Given that my initial perception of such an
object presented it as a cube, there is a natural sense of “contradiction” in which
my later perception of that object as a sphere contradicts my initial perception. One
may characterize the representational contents in such a way that the contradiction
becomes explicit.
Since perceptions always present their objects in particular ways, it is natural
to treat the representational contents of perceptions as the perceptual analogues
of senses. Indeed, many contemporary philosophers of mind such as Tyler Burge
and Christopher Peacocke extend their accounts of representational content to cover
both the perceptual and the linguistic cases. The natural way of accommodating
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perceptual representational contents on my view of senses is to characterize them via
their contributions to accuracy-conditions (as opposed to truth-conditions).
With that said, let’s shift our attention to the spatial case. What is the ana-
logue of a particular duration of time in the case of space? It is a particular region
of space having a particular three-dimensional geometric shape: the shift from a
one-dimensional length of time to a three-dimensional region of space is due to the
difference in our representations of the dimensionality of time and space.45
So, what is the analogue of the shift in temporal perspective on an event as
occurring over a particular duration of time? It is the shift in spatial perspective on
an object as having a particular geometric shape. A perception of an object as a cube
carries an expectation (or commitment) regarding how that object will look from a
different perspective. That is to say, if that perception is accurate, then so would be
a perception of that object that represents that object in the relevant way from a
distinct position in space (call this “accuracy-preservation”). If I shift my perspective
on that object and it suddenly appears to be a sphere, this new perception contradicts
my initial perception of it as a cube. My perception of the object as a cube is not
consistent with a perception of it as a sphere from a different angle.46 This is part of
what it is for my perception to be an objective representation, a representation of an
object as existing independently of my perspective on it.
45Note that the actual number of dimensions of physical space is irrelevant here: however many
dimensions space actually has, we clearly represent it as three-dimensional.
46This assumes the object didn’t change shape. The commitment carried by my perception might
be better expressed counterfactually: if I had been in that position instead of this one, I would have
still perceived the object as a cube, and furthermore its appearance as a cube would shift in a
systematic way (i.e. specifying the other position determines precisely how the appearance would
shift as well; e.g. moving closer to the cube shifts my perception of it in a determinate way).
158
An elegant way to capture this idea is to let the representational content of such
a perception have the structure of a space with the object in question as origin:
any point in the space corresponds to a particular perspective on that object from
which I would still perceive it as a cube (and furthermore perceive it as the same
size: change in apparent size is cancelled out by change in distance from the origin).
By perceiving the object as a cube, I am committed to its still appearing to be a
cube as my perspective on that object shifts. The representational content of my
perception (at the level of abstraction we’re considering) is perspective-independent;
I can perceive the object in the same way (as a cube) even as I shift my position
with respect to it, even though this shift in position corresponds to a shift in the
way the object appears. I am committed to its appearing in a particular way from a
different perspective by virtue of perceiving it as a cube in the first place. Treating
the representational content itself as spatially structured captures these commitments
in an elegant way.47 48
Furthermore, this treatment of the representational content of such a perception
allows one to explain why a distinct perceiver located at a distinct point in space
47I’m leaving out a detailed discussion of issues involving vagueness that arise in such cases. I take
it to be clear that there isn’t any exact region in space such that we perceive an object as located
precisely in that region. Hence, vagueness in represented position would need to be captured at the
level of representational content (and sense, in the case of thought). Formalizing a model like this
in something like Euclidean geometry would merely be a useful idealization. Strictly speaking, the
content-space is permeated by vagueness.
There is an additional level of idealization here. In many cases it can take genuine effort for a nor-
mal perceiver to mentally rotate an object that they are currently perceiving as having a particular
geometric shape. I take it that this would be unnecessary for an idealized thinker (otherwise, she
wouldn’t be perceiving it as having that shape in the first place). I am grateful to John Morrison
for pressing me to address this point.
48Haim Gaifman has pointed out to me that there are similar ideas in Bertrand Russell, e.g.
his “The Relation of Sense-data to Physics” (1914). Note that Russell is attempting to define a
physical thing as the class of its appearances (ibid pg. 129), while I am merely arguing for treating
the representational content of such a perception as a space of possible perspectives.
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while perceiving the same object can still perceive it in the same way as I do: we both
perceive the same object as a cube, and we are both committed to its appearing in a
particular way from the position of the other perceiver. The difference in perspective
is a result of our being located at different points in physical space, and this difference
in perspective is captured at the level of content by the corresponding points in the
content-space.49
The analogue of multiple decompositions in this case would be the following:
the representational content has the structure of a space centered around the object
in question, and the full content can be grasped as a function of any point in the
space, where that point corresponds to a particular position of the perceiver relative
to the object perceived (the space with that point removed is thus a function from
that point to the complete space). Although the position of the perceiver shifts the
same representational content is being expressed by each perception: the perception
remains a perception of the object as a cube.
Thought
The position we’re considering on the senses expressed by utterances of e.g. ‘today’
and ‘here’ is the natural extension of this position from the realm of perception to the
realm of thought. The sense of ‘here’ (in combination with the place of utterance) has
49If one really wanted to insist that by virtue of being located at different places, two people must
be perceiving the cube in different ways, what would prevent the analogous move with respect to
times (i.e. a difference in time implies a difference in way of perceiving)? It would then follow from
the fact that no two people are ever at the same place at the same time that no two people can ever
perceive the same object in the same way. Clearly there is a place in a theory of representational
content for a level of abstraction at which two people can perceive an object in the same way.
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the structure of a space where each point in this content-space corresponds to a per-
spective on the place referred to by ‘here’. The full sense is perspective-independent
(I could think of that place in the same way even if I were in a different position).
One can capture both the shift in perspective and the perspective-independence of
the sense via multiple decompositions: this very same sense can be grasped as a func-
tion of any point in the content-space. As I shift my position in physical space, my
perspective on the place referred to by my initial use of ‘here’ shifts, and hence I
grasp the sense expressed in a different way although it remains the same sense.
Furthermore, by virtue of making an assertion like “It is raining here”, I am
committed to its presently raining at that location when viewed from a different
position in space. For the same reason, someone else could make an assertion at the
same time and express the very same thought, even though they are located at a
different position in space. Letting the sense expressed by ‘here’ and the location of
utterance have the structure of a space allows us to respect both of these points, just
like in the perceptual case. Hence, our Fregean position appears defensible after all.
3.6 Modality and Self-Reference
In the last section we saw various reasons for accepting the Fregean position that
senses referring to durations of time and regions of space can themselves be struc-
tured like timelines and spaces, respectively, and how such a position gives an elegant
solution to some of the issues involving thought preservation that I raised in the Intro-
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duction.50 That wasn’t the only problem that a Fregean treatment of demonstratives
and indexicals had to overcome, however. There were also serious issues involving
modality.51
Recall that the problem was that many demonstratives and indexicals seem to
behave like rigid designators, designating the same entity even when evaluated with
respect to a different possible state of the world. It was unclear how to give an
account of senses that respects this point, since the senses of e.g. descriptions are
notoriously nonrigid (e.g. ‘the inventor of bifocals’ denotes Benjamin Franklin when
evaluated with respect to the actual state of the world, but may denote someone else
when evaluated with respect to a different possible state of the world).
Recall Frege’s actual treatment of contextual factors under the interpretation
defended above: e.g. in the context of an utterance of ‘Today it is raining here’, the
speaker uses both the time and place of utterance as expressions for themselves. By
virtue of doing so, these contextual factors express senses that present themselves as
themselves. This is yet another example of Frege’s use of self-reference in his theory of
truth-conditional content, of which the most obvious analogue is the sense expressed
by a word in a direct quotation context (e.g. ‘John said, “I am wearing a brown
hat”’), a sense which presents that word as itself (the word is thus self-referential).
Note the following interesting fact about the sense expressed by an entity when
that entity is used as a name of itself: this sense corresponds to a way of referring to
50We will go through these issues in more detail in the final section.
51As is well known, Frege himself was uninterested in modality. However, the modal objections
considered in the Introduction have been very influential and I personally consider them worth
taking seriously. Again, I make no commitment to a possible worlds semantics for modality, but we
will see that the objections can be answered even given such a framework.
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that entity that couldn’t possibly be achieved by any other entity. Only the object
itself can refer to itself in a self-referential way. Any other entity would necessarily
have to refer to that object in a different way. Furthermore, if an object is being used
to refer to itself in a self-referential way, then it cannot possibly refer to a distinct
object. This implies that a sense of autonymous designation maintains fixed reference
to its actual referent even when evaluated with respect to a distinct possible state of
the world. Autonymous senses are rigid designators.52
Furthermore, the senses expressed by ‘I’, ‘here’, and ‘now’ will be rigid designators,
since all three denote identity functions (from persons to persons, places to places, and
times to times, respectively). Hence the complete senses expressed by the combination
of ‘I’ and the speaker/thinker, ‘here’ and the place of utterance, and ‘now’ and the
time of utterance will also be rigid designators (e.g. the first always denotes the
result of applying the identity function to the actual speaker/thinker, since the sense
expressed by the speaker/thinker used self-referentially is a rigid designator, as we
just discussed).
What about other indexicals like ‘today’, ‘yesterday’, and ‘the day after tomor-
row’? The rigidity of ‘today’, ‘yesterday’, etc. will follow from the metaphysical
assumption that times and places have their locations essentially. A particular time
couldn’t possibly be located at a different place along the timeline (a time is the time
52But couldn’t a distinct entity refer in the same way by referring to itself? There is a sense
in which this is referring in the same way, but this notion of a way of referring doesn’t correspond
to Frege’s notion of “sense”. Note that I can always take two objects and use them as names of
themselves. By virtue of doing so they are expressing senses, and these senses must be distinct
because they have distinct referents. The sense in which the two objects are referring in the same
way can be captured by saying the two senses are instances of the same type; they have the same
structure.
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that it is, and not some other time), and a particular point in space couldn’t possibly
be located at a different point in space (it isn’t clear what that would even mean; in
any case it seems to contradict the necessity of identity). Hence, the duration referred
to by a use of ‘today’ is the same duration even when evaluated counterfactually, as
is the duration referred to by ‘yesterday’, etc.53 54
What about demonstratives like ‘this’ or ‘that’? I mentioned above that Frege’s
own view was that the combination of e.g. an utterance of ‘that’ and an act of
pointing expresses a sense that refers to the object pointed at. In isolation, ‘that’
refers to an identity function from objects to objects; its sense must be saturated by
a sense referring to an object (such as the sense expressed by an act of pointing) in
order to result in a complete sense. I pointed out that Frege’s view has been criticized
for getting the truth-conditions of various utterances wrong, since ‘that might not
have been the object I am pointing at’ can be true while ‘that might not have been
that’ is false. The point being, I could have pointed at a different object, and in
such a counterfactual situation the sense expressed by my act of pointing would have
53Our language doesn’t seem to include good spatial analogues of indexicals like ‘today’. ‘There’
functions more like a demonstrative, needing to be accompanied by an act of pointing (or the
salience of a location in the context of a conversation) in order to pick out a unique place. The
spatial analogue of an indexical like ‘today’ or ‘yesterday’ would be an expression that picks out a
particular region of space defined relative to the location of utterance (or another fixed location).
Perhaps expressions like ‘two meters to my left’ come close.
54There is a complication here. There is a use of ‘today’ under which it is true that today might
have been longer than it is: e.g. if the Earth rotated more slowly there might have been more hours
in a day. I’ve been treating ‘today’ as if it refers to a (roughly) 24-hour duration of time, whereas
one might insist that a day is defined as something like the amount of time it takes the Earth to
complete a rotation.
One can capture this sense by insisting that the day itself (picked out as the day containing
the time of utterance) is being used as a name of itself, thus expressing an autonymous, rigidly-
desiginating sense. The incomplete sense expressed by ‘today’ will refer to a function from days to
themselves, and it will need to be saturated by such an autonymous sense in order to refer to the
appropriate day. Similar remarks apply to other expressions denoting particular days, years, etc.
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referred to a distinct object, but ‘that’ seems to function as a rigid designator.
The reader may have already guessed my suggestion for fixing Frege’s view: simply
apply the same technique I described above, a technique that Frege himself used
in cases of subjects, places, and times. On this modified view, ‘that’ in isolation
still refers to an identity function from objects to objects, but its sense needs to be
saturated by an autonymous sense resulting from using the object in question as a
name of itself. One can use the object in this way because one is already representing
it in another way, e.g. via perception. On this account, demonstratives function as
rigid designators, as desired. Furthermore, someone else can point to the same object
while uttering ‘that’ and express the very same sense, since the sense expressed no
longer depends on the details of the act of pointing.55 56
This technique for ensuring rigid designation may seem like a mere technical trick.
First of all, how does one use an object as a representation of itself? Secondly, are
there any reasons for thinking that doing so has somehow been implicit in the way
we’ve been using demonstratives and indexicals all along?
55Consider the following conversation (where both speakers are pointing to the same object):
“That is a cube.” “I agree; that is a cube.” It seems plausible that the two speakers are expressing
the same thought. While this wouldn’t follow on a view under which the sense expressed depends
on the details of the act of pointing, it does follow on the view I just described. Hence, cases of
intuitive thought preservation across speakers provide further support for this view.
56Can one extend this account to proper names, thereby ensuring that the senses expressed are
rigid designators? One way of doing so would be to adopt the causal-historical framework described
in (Kripke 1980). The idea would be that in a naming baptism, an object is used as a name of
itself, where this object is first made available for thought by another representation of it (e.g. a
perception). One then introduces the name in a manner intended to express the autonymous sense
expressed by that object used as a name of itself, and this sense is preserved across transmissions of
the name from one speaker to another. Two proper names would express distinct senses exactly if
their corresponding naming baptisms were distinct (hence names in distinct languages could express
the same sense, and two tokens of the same name-type could express distinct senses).
However, proper names are not my concern in this dissertation, and I offer the preceding as merely
a sketch of what such an account might look like. I leave questions of its plausibility to the reader.
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Regarding the first question, any object can in principle be used as a represen-
tation of anything you like. A fortiori, any object can be used as a representation
of itself.57 Regarding the second question, I already pointed out that we often use
words as names of themselves (consider an utterance such as “John has four let-
ters”). As further support, I offer the following speculative remarks on some aspects
of self-consciousness.
A peculiar feature of conscious perception is that I can not only think about the
objects of my perceptions, I can also think about those perceptions themselves. In
the last chapter I stressed the importance of such a meta-representational ability
for reflective judgment: in order to reflectively judge whether my perceptions are
accurately representing reality, I need to be able to represent those perceptions as
distinct from the objects they are perceptions of, and furthermore I need to represent
those perceptions as expressing representational contents that I can compare with
additional evidence I have about the objects being perceived. Without such a meta-
representational capacity, I wouldn’t be able to judge whether reality is as it appears
to be.
Let me make the following observations: (1) Here is an especially simple way of
constructing a self-referential representation: simply combine a representation with
what it represents. Since the former was a representation of the latter, their combina-
tion now represents itself. (2) I can usually remember my just having had a particular
57Consider a case in which someone is using various models arranged on a table to represent larger
objects. They might want to represent a small object that is somehow relevant to the discussion,
and they can do so by placing that very object on the table along with the models. In such a case,
it seems natural to say that, since all the objects on the table are being used to represent an actual
situation, the object in question is being used as a representation of itself.
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conscious experience. Such a memory is a representation of that experience, and hence
my mind must be constantly constructing meta-representations of my present con-
scious experience. (3) Conscious perception has a peculiar phenomenology: thinking
about a present conscious perception doesn’t seem very different (phenomenologically
speaking) from having that perception (I encourage the reader to compare the two
experiences).58
Observation (3) might suggest that when thinking about a present conscious per-
ception, I am using that very perception as a representation of itself. Observations (1)
and (2) suggest a model under which this would be the case: my present conscious ex-
perience includes a meta-representation of that very experience, a meta-representation
that is combined with that experience in such a way that elements of that experience
represent themselves (in addition to whatever else they may represent). This cap-
tures the self-referential phenomenology of human consciousness (more broadly, of the
consciousness of beings with particular sorts of meta-representational capacities).59
Whatever one thinks of the suggested model, the more general point is that con-
scious perception has a peculiar phenomenology that seems well-explained by our
perceptions being used as representations of themselves in the context of meta-level
reflection on them.60 If that is in fact the case, then using an entity as a representation
58If the reader wears glasses, they can probably remember having thoughts of the form “My
perception of that object is very blurry”. Note that in such a context one is using one’s perception
(“that object”) and mentioning it (“my perception of”) at the same time. The transition from one
to the other doesn’t seem to make much of a phenomenological difference.
59I should mention that this model is heavily inspired by the A- and B-edition transcendental
deductions of Immanuel Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason (1781/1787). It should go without saying
that I make no attempt at Kant exegesis in this dissertation.
60Note that this explains why I never have this sort of meta-representation of a conscious percep-
tion without also having that conscious perception. If the perception itself is being used to represent
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of itself is ubiquitous in reflective judgment, and hence it should be no surprise that
the same structure is present in thought involving words, indexicals, demonstratives,
and (perhaps) proper names. Hence, there are in fact reasons for thinking that the
account I developed above is more than a mere technical trick. Hence, there does
seem to be a natural Fregean account of senses under which the senses of various
expressions are rigid designators, as desired.
3.7 Preservation of Thought
In the preceding sections I sketched a model of Fregean senses of demonstratives
and indexicals that avoids the modality objections and is grounded on Frege’s actual
view. I also discussed how this model handles some cases of thought preservation
in an intuitive way. Let’s discuss how this model handles thought preservation in
further detail. While this isn’t the last word on preservation of thought, I hope to
establish that we’ve made significant progress in addressing the issues I raised in the
Introduction.
I argued that ‘Today it is raining here’ uttered one day and ‘Yesterday it was
raining here’ uttered the next can express the same thought, given that the sense
denoting a duration of time is structured like a timeline that can be decomposed into
a sense denoting the time of utterance and a function-sense mapping that sense to
the complete timeline. Generalizing this picture, this thought can be expressed by
a utterance at a distinct time so long as the sense denoting the day in question is
itself, this sort of meta-representation can’t occur without its referent also occurring. It is immune
to various sorts of error, including failing to refer.
168
a function solely of the sense expressed by the time that utterance is made used as
a name of itself. So, ‘The day before yesterday it was raining here’ and ‘Tomorrow
it will be raining here’ could express the same thought while ‘On my birthday it
was raining here’ could not, since the sense of ‘my birthday’ is not a function of an
autonymous sense denoting the time of utterance.61 Analogously, a thought about a
particular region of space (picked out relative to the speaker’s own location) could
still be expressed after the speaker shifts their location in space.
I also argued above for a treatment of the sense of demonstratives where the sense
expressed doesn’t depend on the details of the act of demonstration. As a result,
multiple agents could point at the same object and utter ‘That is a cube’ while all
expressing the same thought. This required a modification of Frege’s view, since
according to Frege the combination of the sense of ‘that’ and the sense expressed by
the act of pointing refers to the object pointed at. I noted above that this seems
to get the truth-conditions of various utterances wrong since in such contexts ‘that’
seems to function as a rigid designator, and furthermore the multiple agents in my
example intuitively ought to be able to express the same thought even though they
are pointing at the object in different ways.
What about the thought expressed by an utterance of ‘John is wearing a brown
hat’? Given that the sense expressed by the combination of the time of utterance itself
and the implicit reference to the time of utterance (indicated by the present tense) has
the structure of a timeline, this same thought could be expressed by a later utterance
61Similarly, the sense of e.g. ‘On September 16th, 2018, it was raining here’ will not express the
same thought, since the relevant day is referred to via a calendar date rather than via a function of
an autonymous sense denoting the time of utterance.
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of ‘John was wearing a brown hat a moment ago’ or an earlier utterance of ‘John will
be wearing a brown hat a moment from now’. Similar remarks apply to analogous
cases of belief ascription and inference.
Hence, one can give a Fregean account of truth-conditional content that respects
various intuitions about thought preservation across contexts and speakers, and such
an account is roughly the account suggested by Frege in the first place (but missed
by various scholars). As we discovered in the last chapter, it seems that Frege himself





Inference is essential to rationality. An agent unable to draw conclusions is unable
to reason. Arguably the purest form of inference is deductive inference, in which
the truth of the premises guarantees the truth of the conclusion. More specifically,
if inference is a transition between thoughts, where a thought is the sort of content
relevant to determining whether an assertion is true or false, then the guarantee that
the conclusion is true given that the premises are true can be explained solely by
appeal to the structure of the thoughts making up the inference.1 Let’s begin by
looking at this conception of deductive inference in a bit more detail.
This conception of deductive inference reveals part of the value of a formal lan-
guage. Note the following: the sentences of the formal language correspond to
1I don’t mean to say that such an explanation can be given without (implicitly or explicitly)
appealing to various basic facts about truth, etc. The point is that nothing else about the thoughts
involved in the inference is needed for the explanation of guaranteed truth-preservation other than
basic facts about their structure.
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particular structures instantiated by thoughts (each such sentence corresponds to
a thought-type). Note that here I am using ‘structure’ in the sense of form, pattern,
or type rather than the sense used by logicians (i.e. as synonymous with ‘model’). I
will use ‘model’ for the latter notion. The relevant structures for present purposes
are those that correspond to sentences in possible formal languages that can express
the thoughts in question. For example, if the sentence ‘P (a)’ expresses a particular
thought once it is interpreted, that thought will instantiate a structure corresponding
to the syntactic structure of that sentence.2
Anyway, since the sentences of the formal language correspond to particular struc-
tures instantiated by thoughts, one can thereby constrain the semantics of the formal
language to only give an explanation of the truth-condition associated with a thought
by appealing to a structure instantiated by that thought. This implies that one can
only explain the guaranteed truth-preservation of an inferential transition from one
collection of thoughts to another by appealing to structures instantiated by those
thoughts, structures corresponding to sentences defined by the syntax of the formal
language.
Take classical first-order logic as an example. A standard first-order language L
will include sentences of the form ‘P (a)’, where ‘a’ is a constant symbol and ‘P ’ is a
one-place predicate symbol. According to the standard semantics of such a language,
this sentence counts as true in a model M of the language L exactly if M assigns
2Note that this doesn’t hold in general. Since a thought is an abstraction from the complete
content of a declarative sentence, not just any syntactic structure of a sentence in a natural language
will correspond to a structure instantiated by the thought expressed by that sentence. However, due
to our focus on truth-preservation, the formal languages we’re considering have truth-conditional
semantics. In effect, they are designed to express thoughts and make structural features of those
thoughts transparent. Additional content has already been abstracted away.
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‘a’ an object aM in its domain D and assigns ‘P ’ a set of objects PM that is a
subset of D such that aM is in fact an element of PM.3 Intuitively, this sentence
has been interpreted by the model in such a way that the object denoted by ‘a’ is an
element of the extension of the property denoted by ‘P ’, i.e. a instantiates P . This
determines a structural feature of the truth-condition associated with any thought
that instantiates the structure corresponding to ‘P (a)’.
Now, suppose I want to demonstrate that the inference from a thought instanti-
ating the structure corresponding to ‘P (a)’ to a thought instantiating the structure
corresponding to ‘∃xP (x)’ is truth-preserving. ‘∃xP (x)’ is true in a model M of
the language L exactly if there is an object o in the domain D of M such that o
is an element of PM. If ‘P (a)’ is true in M, then aM is an element of PM, and
hence ‘∃xP (x)’ is also true in M. Hence, I can explain the truth-preservation of the
inference from the former thought to the latter solely by appealing to structural fea-
tures of their corresponding truth-conditions, structural features that are themselves
determined by the structures corresponding to the two sentences of the language L .
Hence, if one can demonstrate using such a formal language that if a collection
of thoughts of specified types are all true, then another thought of a specified type
is guaranteed to be true, one can be confident that this explanation of the truth-
preservation of a corresponding deductive inference appeals solely to the structures
determined by the syntax of the formal language. Provided that one has selected an
appropriate formal language (on which more later), it follows that the inference is
truth-preserving solely in virtue of logical form.
3For an elegant introduction to contemporary mathematical logic, see (Ebbinghaus et. al. 1994).
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So, there is an intuitive sense in which deductive inference is guaranteed to be
truth-preserving in virtue of form, and this sense can be made more precise via
contemporary formal languages. But in order for an agent to actually make such an
inference, they must be grasping the respective thoughts in the appropriate way.
Recall the conclusion of Chapter 1: thoughts can be grasped in many ways, and
each way of grasping a thought makes various possible inferences salient while masking
others. For example, if I grasp the thought that John has brown hair as unstructured
(like an atomic sentence ‘p’ in propositional logic), I will be unable to recognize the
possible inference to the thought that someone has brown hair. However, if I grasp
the thought that John has brown hair as consisting of the function-sense <has brown
hair>( ) applied to the object-sense <John>, I will be capable of recognizing this
possible inference.
This particular structural feature, namely, being completely determined by a
function-sense applied to an object-sense, is precisely the structure that corresponds
to a sentence of the form ‘P (a)’ in a standard first-order language. And the corre-
sponding structural feature of the determined truth-condition is: that the referent of
the object-sense instantiates the referent of the function-sense.
Note that this characterization of deductive inference is available to us because
of our conception of thoughts as structured entities that determine truth-conditions:
on various other conceptions of “proposition” or “representational content” or what
have you, this characterization could not be given. That is not to say that there isn’t
room for other conceptions of content (there obviously is), but it does suggest that
the sort of content we’ve been focused on throughout this dissertation ought to have
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a special place in the philosophy of logic.
But which structural features of thoughts ought to be considered logical? Which
structural features are relevant to explaining what makes a particular inference a de-
ductive inference? By choosing a particular formal language with a particular syntax
and semantics to give an account of various deductive transitions between thoughts,
we are presupposing a particular answer to this question rather than providing one.
We are presupposing that the relevant structural features are precisely those that are
determined by the syntax of the language.
In this chapter, I will attempt to make progress in determining which structural
features of thoughts ought to count as logical. I will do so by considering various
presuppositions of inference (and rational agency more generally). As in previous
chapters, I will also consider connections to relevant aspects of perception and con-
scious experience.
4.2 A Fregean Conception of Truth
In Chapter 2 I argued that for Frege the sense of the predicate ‘is true’ is a function
mapping the canonical sense of a thought to the thought itself (i.e. the referent of
that canonical sense), which implies that it refers to a function from a thought to its
truth-value.4 I said little, however, about Frege’s famous conception of truth as an
object: the True.5
4Recall that I argued that for Frege the thought expressed by ‘the thought that p is true’ is
identical to the thought that p. Importantly, this is not the same thought as would be expressed by
‘the sentence ‘p’ is true’.
5See for example (Frege 1891, pg. 13/144).
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Part of the reason Frege treated truth as an object was mathematical elegance:
Frege wanted the referent of a complete expression to be a function of the referents
of its significant parts. So for example the referent of ‘the capital of Germany’ is
a function of the referent of ‘Germany’ and the referent of ‘the capital of ( )’; in
particular, the function referred to by ‘the capital of ( )’ maps Germany to Berlin.
Hence, Frege also wanted the referent of a sentence to be a function of the referents
of its significant parts. Furthermore, by letting sentences refer to truth-values, one
can reduce several compositionality principles to a single principle, namely: if in a
proper name, a component, which is a proper name, is substituted by a co-referential
name, the reference of the whole name remains the same.6 Importantly, even if we
treat complete sentences as having referents, we must still distinguish sentences from
names in general. As Frege pointed out, only complete sentences can be asserted.
Frege also argued that (1) we are only interested in the referents of parts of a
sentence when we are interested in its truth-value,7 and (2) the truth-value of a
sentence does in fact functionally depend upon the referents of its parts (e.g. replace
a significant expression in a sentence by a distinct expression with the same referent:
the thought expressed may change but the truth-value will not).
In further support of (2), note that when we consider a thought <p ∧ q>, we
6Otherwise, one would need four principles: one governing the reference of proper names con-
taining other proper names, one governing the reference of proper names containing sentences, one
governing the truth-value of sentences containing sentences, and one governing the truth-value of
sentences containing proper names. I am grateful to Haim Gaifman for making these points.
7Frege’s example in “On Sense and Reference” is “Odysseus was set ashore at Ithaca while sound
asleep.” If we read this sentence as part of a work of fiction, we don’t care whether ‘Odysseus’
actually has a referent; we only care about the thought expressed. As soon as we are interested
in the truth or falsity of the sentence, we are interested in whether ‘Odysseus’ has a referent and
whether that referent was in fact set ashore at Ithaca while sound asleep. (1892a, pg. 32-3/162-3)
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can replace the thought <p> by any other thought <r> with the same truth-value
while preserving the truth-value of the whole thought. While the thought <r> may
drastically differ from the thought <p> in other ways, so long as its truth-value
remains the same, so will the truth-value of the whole thought.8 Furthermore, the
truth-value of a sentence expressing a complete thought is going to be an object for
Frege because an object is “anything that is not a function, so that an expression for
it does not contain any empty place.” (1891, pg. 18/147) Since a complete sentence
does not contain an empty place, its referent is an object.
In further support of Frege’s position, one might point to the overwhelming use-
fulness of truth-functions in the practice of logic, mathematics, computer science, etc.
A truth-function maps truth-values to truth-values. Hence, it seems to treat truth
and falsity as objects.
The reader may find these arguments unconvincing. Appeals to mathematical
elegance and usefulness to mathematical practice may not be enough to conclude
that sentences are the sorts of things that have referents at all, much less that they
refer to the True and the False.9
To make further progress on these issues, let’s step back and consider why it is
so useful to represent something as an object. What role is the notion of an object
8There are additional well-known Slingshot arguments that if sentences have reference, all true
sentences must have the same referent and all false sentences must have the same referent. See
(Church 1956) for a classic example.
9In fairness to Frege, and as Tyler Burge points out (1986, pg. 86 in the 2005 reprint), ‘reference’
is really a term of art for Frege. As Burge puts it, “ ‘The denotation’ of a sentence is whatever
is most fruitfully seen as functionally dependent on the denotations of its parts.” (loc. cit.) Still,
Frege’s case would be strengthened by an argument that sentences have referents even under an
intuitive notion of “reference”.
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playing in our cognitive lives?
Recall in the last chapter I argued that the representational content of a perception
of an object as having a particular geometric shape can be elegantly modeled as a
space of possible perceptions of that object from various angles. This is partially
because my perception of an object as a cube (for example) carries commitments to
how that object would appear from various other positions in space. That perception
is not consistent with a perception of that same object as a sphere from a different
angle. This is part of what it is for my perception to be an objective representation,
a representation of something as existing independently of my perspective on it.
Note that this space of possible perceptions has quite a bit of structure to it. For
example, by perceiving an object as a cube I am committed to its appearance shifting
in a determinate way as I shift my position in space. For this reason, I can expect
that as I move closer to the object, its appearance will increase in size (i.e. take up
more of my visual field).
I claim that this is part of the cognitive value of representing something as an
object: this gives me a way of linking various representations in accordance with
particular rules, representations linked as being of the same thing. It is in virtue of
perceiving the cube as an object that I can expect it to appear a particular way as I
shift my position in space with respect to it. Otherwise, I’d have no reason to expect
a current region of my visual field to have anything in common with a region of my
visual field a few moments from now. My expectation is grounded on my representing
a thing out in the world that I’m shifting my perspective on.10
10I owe this point to Immanuel Kant. For example: “Suppose that we inquire what new character
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Object-representation also grounds my expectation that other perceivers will have
(or are having) similar experiences to my own. If I wasn’t perceiving that cube as a
thing out in the world, then how could I expect someone else in the same room to
have an experience at all similar to mine? If I found out that I was hallucinating, for
example, I’d have no reason to expect you to have a similar experience to my own.
As another example, I’m currently perceiving my coffee cup. It is by virtue of
representing it as an object that I can expect to have various types of experiences
as I pick up the coffee cup, throw it against the wall, etc. I have a general idea of
how much my coffee cup weighs and how much force it would take to break it. That
is to say, object-representation also grounds my expectations that various potential
actions of mine will have particular consequences.
Returning to the issue at hand, in what sense can an assertion be usefully thought
of as referring to an object? Not only that, but given that the True is meant to be
the intended referent of our assertions (it is the aim of judgment), in what sense can
all of our assertions be usefully thought of as intending to refer to the same object?
When I make a sincere assertion, I am attempting to describe the world as it
actually is. If I were instead reading a work of fiction aloud (and this was known
is given to our presentations by the reference to an object, and what is the dignity that they thereby
obtain. We then find that this reference does nothing beyond making necessary the presentations’
being combined in a certain way and being subjected to a rule; and we find, conversely, that
only through the necessity of a certain order in the time relation of our presentations is objective
signification conferred on them.” (1781/1787, B242-3)
Kant, of course, would not agree with many aspects of my position, and I make no attempt at a
general comparison here. As I mentioned in the last chapter, Haim Gaifman has pointed out to me
that there are similar ideas in Bertrand Russell, e.g. his “The Relation of Sense-data to Physics”
(1914). Note that Russell is attempting to define a physical thing as the class of its appearances
(ibid pg. 129), while I am merely arguing that the cognitive value of representing an object is that
it allows one to link various representations as of the same thing in accordance with particular rules.
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to my audience), I wouldn’t be attempting to describe the actual world. Similarly,
an actor on a stage usually isn’t attempting to describe the actual world with their
utterances.
This suggests treating the True as the actual world : the totality of that which
exists.11 The value of seeing the True as the same intended referent across various
assertions is that I am attempting to describe the very same world. It is by virtue
of representing the same world over time that I can expect my future experiences
to have anything in common with my past experiences, and furthermore that I can
expect your experiences to be anything like my own.
For example, suppose I think to myself “In the past, the sun has always risen.
Therefore, the sun will rise tomorrow.” The fact (let’s suppose) that this pattern
of inference is generally truth-preserving12 presupposes that the following day I ex-
perience the same world as I’ve been experiencing in the past. Otherwise, I’d have
no reason to expect my experiences the following day to be anything like my past
experiences. Seeing the world as lawlike presupposes that you’re continuing to see
the same world.
So, just like the more general case of objects, truth-preserving transitions between
thoughts will be grounded on rules that link those thoughts, and these links are
themselves grounded on treating those true thoughts as having the same referent.
That is to say, truth-preserving inference between thoughts maintains fixed reference
to the actual world while varying its representation in accordance with particular
11I am grateful to Anubav Vasudevan and Sidney Felder for first suggesting to me the idea of
treating the True as the actual world.
12This inference is not, of course, guaranteed to be truth-preserving.
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rules. In making such an inference, one is continuing to describe the world veridically,
and the rules governing such an inference are grounded on its being the same world
that one is continuing to represent.13
Note that Frege himself seemed to have held this view when he first introduced the
True as an object. Consider the following quotation from “On Sense and Reference”:
Judgements can be regarded as advances from a thought to a truth-
value. Naturally this cannot be a definition. Judgement is something
quite peculiar and incomparable. One might also say that judgements
are distinctions of parts within truth-values. Such distinction occurs by
a return to the thought. To every sense attaching to a truth-value would
correspond its own manner of analysis. However, I have here used the word
‘part’ in a special sense. I have in fact transferred the relation between
the parts and the whole of the sentence to its [referent], by calling the
[referent] of a word part of the [referent] of a sentence, if the word itself
is a part of the sentence. This way of speaking can certainly be attacked,
because the total [referent] and one part of it do not suffice to determine
the remainder, and because the word ‘part’ is already used of bodies in
another sense. A special term would need to be invented. (1892a, pg.
35-6/164-5)
If the referent of a word in a true sentence is always a part of the True, then the
True includes as parts the totality of that which can be referred to. While Frege does
say that this is a special use of the word ‘part’ (‘Teil’), the sense in which he says
that it is special is that a particular entity and the True as a whole do not suffice
to determine the remainder of the True, and furthermore that we already think of
bodies as having parts in a different sense than a particular entity can be considered
13Note that this would allow me to explain why inferences like the following are unsound: “Sir
Arthur Conan Doyle lived in England in the 19th century. Sherlock Holmes lived in England in the
19th century. Therefore both Sir Arthur Conan Doyle and Sherlock Holmes lived in England in the
19th century.” This inference is unsound because the first premise intends to describe the actual
world while the second premise does not (it might be said to describe a fictional world), and hence
reference is not being preserved from premises to conclusion.
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a part of the True. Neither point undermines this conception of the True, and the
fact that Frege used the word ‘part’ at all remains suggestive.
But didn’t Frege define the True in the Grundgesetze merely two years later as a
particular abstract object, namely, as the extension of his horizontal function,14 and
furthermore didn’t he say that this definition was nearly arbitrary? This is a common
misconception. In the Grundgesetze Frege actually treats the True as primitive and
defines functions such as the horizontal in terms of it (the horizontal maps the True
to the True and anything else to the False). The discussion of the extension of the
horizontal function is in the context of explaining what extensions (and value-ranges
more generally) are supposed to be. He is stipulating the definition of that extension
as the True rather than stipulating the definition of the True as that extension. His
point is that there are other extensions that we could have instead defined as the
True.
This is especially clear in a footnote near the end of that section, in which Frege
considers (and ultimately rejects) defining any object ∆ as the extension of the con-
cept “being identical to ∆”. Frege says, “Such a stipulation is possible for every
object that is given to us independently of value-ranges, for the same reason that we
have seen for truth-values.” (1893, pg. 18 fn. 1) Hence, for Frege the truth-values are
given independently of value-ranges and are being used to define a pair of value-ranges
rather than vice versa.
Still, if Frege did hold a conception of the True as something like the actual world,
14Recall that an extension is the value-range (or course-of-values) of a function that maps all of
its arguments to truth-values. Frege calls such a function a concept (1893, pg. 8), although I will
not follow this terminology.
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he seems to have given it up in his later work. For example, in “Thoughts” Frege says,
“So it seems likely that the content of the word ‘true’ is sui generis and indefinable.”
(1918-19a, pg. 60/353)15
What about the False? Given that the True is the intended referent of assertion,
the False corresponds to a particular sort of reference failure. In Frege’s system, for
example, an assertion will refer to the False when each of its significant components
succeeds in referring (names refer to objects, predicates refer to properties, etc.) but
the assertion fails to describe the way those referents are related in the actual world
(e.g. that object doesn’t actually instantiate that property). Hence, we can think of
the False as an abstract object introduced in order to capture this sort of failure to
refer to the actual world. Given that ‘John’ refers to John but John doesn’t actually
have brown hair, it isn’t actually necessary to treat ‘John has brown hair’ as having a
referent, although doing so can allow for a more elegant formal system. In particular,
it allows Frege to maintain his thesis that the reference of a complete expression (such
as a declarative sentence) depends on the reference of its significant parts.16
15Frege’s argument for this conclusion fails. Frege claims that any attempt to define truth will
have to specify certain characteristics, but in application the question would always arise whether
it were true that those characteristics were present, and hence we would be going around in a
circle. (loc. cit.) But the question would be whether those characteristics were present. If they
were, then we would have a truth, and otherwise we wouldn’t. It would also be true that those
characteristics were present, but we wouldn’t need to establish this before we could establish that
those characteristics were present. It would also be true that it was true that those characteristics
were present, but this wouldn’t need to be established first either. The order of explanation goes in
the other direction.
Perhaps Frege’s point could be better made by insisting that we must presuppose a notion of
truth in order for judgment to make sense. But this wouldn’t imply that truth is sui generis and
indefinable. Our presupposed notion of truth might have a determinate structure that we can
uncover; it would merely follow that our judgments about that structure themselves presuppose it.
16Unlike Frege, I’m happy to let only true thoughts have referents, strictly speaking. This would
lead to a more complex system, since (for example) a true thought could then include a thought as
a component that lacks a referent. The value of introducing the False in a formal system is obvious.
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Hence, there are reasons for accepting Frege’s position that all assertions have a
special object, the True, as their intended referent. By treating the True as the actual
world, we can explain what all sincere assertions have in common. Furthermore, our
assertions have the same intended referent because we’re trying to describe the same
world over time, as is presupposed by our expectation that our future experiences
will have anything in common with our past experiences or that your experiences will
have anything in common with mine.
4.3 Atomic Form
In the last section I argued that the cognitive value of our representing something
as an object is that it allows us to link various representations as being of the same
object, and in particular to link them in accordance with particular rules. This
grounds my expectations regarding my future experiences, and my expectations that
your experiences will be (or are) similar to mine.
The ability to link representations in this way is a necessary precondition of ra-
tional agency. If I couldn’t link my representations with representations of expected
future states of an entity or system in accordance with rules, I wouldn’t be able to
make a rational choice between options. I wouldn’t be able to reason about the con-
sequences of choosing one option rather than another. For example, my reasoning
about whether I’d prefer the consequences of pressing button A or button B on a
device presupposes an ability to predict the consequences of each choice (even if such
prediction is merely probabilisitic). One could of course also reason about differing
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states of a system, but note that in doing so one is treating the system itself as an
object.
Being able to learn from experience puts further constraints on the structure of
experience and thought. In order to learn from experience, I not only need to represent
particular things; I also need to represent patterns or structures that multiple things
can have in common. For example, in order to learn that strawberries are delicious, I
need to represent particular strawberries as instances of a more general pattern that I
can then recognize other particular things as instances of (in this case let’s summarize
this pattern as “being a strawberry”). If I didn’t represent a particular strawberry
as falling under a general, repeatable pattern, I would have no reason to expect a
distinct strawberry to also taste delicious. That is to say, I wouldn’t recognize the
next strawberry as having anything in common with the previous strawberry, and
hence would have no reason to conclude that it was probably also delicious.
Note that I’m not saying that this sort of knowledge (e.g. the deliciousness of
strawberries) couldn’t be “hard-wired” into the mind; I’m instead saying that if such
information is learned, then it is learned by virtue of representing particular things as
instantiating patterns. In fact, even if such information were “hard-wired”, in order
to apply that information I’d need to represent a particular thing as an instance of
the pattern that my information is about.
Similarly, being able to learn how systems of multiple objects are going to behave
depends upon being able to represent multiple objects as instantiating relational
patterns. For example, my learning how certain pairs of objects will behave after
colliding depends upon my representing those objects as instances of a relational
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pattern that I can then represent other pairs of objects as also instantiating. Consider
the classic case of learning to predict the behavior of billiard balls based on their
relative motion.
The point holds generally: in order to learn from experience, an agent must make
something like an object/property/relation distinction. Note that it follows that
this distinction is unlearnable: this distinction itself cannot be learned because any
learning already presupposes it. That is, this distinction is a priori in the Kantian
sense of arising from the mind itself.17
Is it possible for there to be a rational agent who doesn’t learn from experience,
and furthermore doesn’t need to make an object/property/relation distinction at all?
Note that such an “agent” would be unable to apply knowledge to experience either,
since this would also require recognizing particulars as instances of general patterns,
namely, the patterns of which the agent has knowledge. Note that both points apply
to the agent’s own “inner” experiences as well.
Furthermore, rational agency requires inferential transitions between thoughts
governed by particular rules. Even a “rational agent” bearing no rational connection
to their own experiences would have to treat thoughts as structured in order to make
rule-governed inferential transitions between them. Such rules apply at the level of
general patterns instantiated by particular thoughts (e.g. if a thought instantiating
pattern A is true, then so is the corresponding thought instantiating pattern B).
17Of course, this distinction could still have arisen as the result of natural selection stemming
from interaction with an external world. Furthermore, interaction with the external world (and
particular sorts of experiences) may be necessary for a child’s mind to develop in such a way that
this distinction is made. Compare Kant: “But even though all our cognition starts with experience,
that does not mean that all of it arises from experience.” (1781/1787, B1)
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But treating thoughts as structured in this way is making a distinction between
particulars and patterns instantiated by those particulars after all. So, something like
the object/property distinction is necessary for the possibility of rational agency.18
Let’s consider a potential counterexample.19 The lambda calculus doesn’t make
a distinction between terms and predicates, but rather treats every basic syntactic
unit as a term. One might think that one could learn to reason with the lambda
calculus in such a way that one’s reasoning isn’t relying on a distinction between
particulars and patterns instantiated by those particulars. More generally, one might
learn to reason with a radically nonstandard logic through experience with applying
particular syntactic rules for transitioning between expressions.
In response, note the distinction between reasoning within a formal system and
reasoning about a formal system. Even if the formal system I’ve adopted doesn’t
make something like a term/predicate distinction, I may still need to make such a
distinction when I reason about the expressions of that system. For in order to apply
a rule for transitioning between expressions, I need to recognize those expressions as
instances of general expression-types that the rule can be applied in virtue of. And
hence I’m making something like an object/property distinction at the meta-level
after all.
Even if I am able to reason within a formal system rather than merely about it (and
note that it isn’t at all obvious that one can in fact do so with a highly nonstandard
18Analogous points apply to relations. For example, one needs to relate thoughts as premises
and conclusion in order to make an inferential transition between them. The relevant relation is
specified by the particular inference rule.
19I am grateful to Haim Gaifman for pressing me to address this example.
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formal system), in order to apply inference rules I still need to distinguish particular
contents from general patterns or types those contents instantiate.20 Once again,
an inference rule must be applied to particular contents in virtue of patterns those
contents instantiate. Hence, something like an object/property/relation distinction
is unavoidable in reasoning.21
The point being, when reasoning about a formal system I must actually represent
something like an object/property/relation distinction, and when reasoning within a
formal system I must make inferential transitions in virtue of that distinction, and
hence in either case my mind must make the distinction.
I believe that we should conclude that this distinction is a logical distinction, and
the corresponding atomic form of a thought is a logical form. Given the centrality of
this distinction to reasoning, it should be unsurprising that thoughts are structured
in such a way that allows one to distinguish between and maintain fixed reference
to various objects, properties, and relations while making inferential transitions. In
effect, this distinction corresponds to a structure that one would have to put in
place if one were designing a rational mind, and in that sense can be thought of as
fundamental to the structure of thought. I think that such fundamental structure
deserves to be called logical structure.22
20Here I use ‘content’ as a generic expression meant to capture whatever corresponds at the level
of actual reasoning to the primary syntactic units (e.g. sentences) of the formal system.
21This argument may remind the reader of Quine’s classic argument in “Truth by Convention”
(1936) that the truths of logic cannot be fixed by convention, since one will need general conventions
to apply to the infinite number of logical truths, and logic will be needed to derive particular
conclusions from the general conventions, which would lead to an infinite regress. Many of my
arguments below are also in this spirit.
22Note that I am not attempting to define logical form in terms of rationality. It isn’t clear that
one could do so without circularity. I am grateful to Justin Clarke-Doane for emphasizing this point.
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First-order languages often include a special logical relation-symbol interpreted
as identity. Can we give a similar argument to justify its standard treatment as a
logical relation? Note that there is an extensive literature on whether we ought to
treat identity as a logical relation, and I cannot do justice to it here.23 Arguing for
my position in detail would require another dissertation. Here I can only make the
first moves in what deserves a much longer discussion.
I argued above that linking distinct representations as of the same object is nec-
essary for the possibility of rational agency. Could it be learned from experience?
That is, could experience teach you to recognize an object as the same again if you
had no conception of sameness?
I claim that it could not. I argued above that a distinction between particulars and
patterns instantiable by multiple particulars is necessary to learn from experience. I
claim that representing a particular requires linking that representation with possible
representations of the same particular. In effect, in order to represent a particular one
must locate one’s representation within a space of possible representations structured
in accordance with the properties one is representing that particular as instantiating.
Compare my example of perceiving a cube: a particular perception of a cube includes
commitments regarding how that cube would appear from various other positions in
space (including the positions of distinct observers), and for this reason I argued in
the previous chapter that the content of such a perception (at the level of abstraction
23Two classic positions that I will not be addressing are Wittgenstein’s attempt to dispense with
identity in the Tractatus (1922) and Peter Geach’s notion of relative identity (e.g. (Geach 1972)). In
the case of Wittgenstein, there is no symbol for identity in his language because of his metaphysical
conception of objects. The natural way of formalizing Geach’s position is to use a many-sorted
language in which the identity symbol is relativized to predicates.
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we’re considering) is best treated as a space of possible perceptions of that cube. I
claim that the same structure applies to object-representation more generally.
Given that representing a particular requires locating that representation within
a space of possible representations of that particular, and given that identity corre-
sponds to linking these possible representations as of the same particular, representa-
tion of a particular is impossible without possessing a primitive conception of identity.
That is to say, one can’t represent an object without having a primitive conception
of identity, a conception corresponding to an ability to link representations as of the
same object.24
Hence, the atomic forms we’ve considered correspond to distinctions and concepts
that are both unlearnable and necessary for the possibility of rational agency. In the
next section we’ll consider whether the classical logical connectives also satisfy these
two conditions.25
24The reader may disagree. It should be clear that the more central point for my purposes is
that structural features of thoughts that correspond to distinctions and conceptions both necessary
for the possibility of rational agency and unlearnable have a strong claim to be considered logical
forms. Personally, I think that if a primitive conception of identity could in fact be learned from
experience, then it shouldn’t count as a logical relation.
25First-order languages often include function-symbols among the possible constituents of atomic
formulas. While I do believe that the connection between functions and rational agency is worth
pursuing (I believe it hinges on the possibility of acting in accordance with rules governing the
transition from an initial state to a goal state, although this is insufficient to capture the general
notion of a function), for now I’ll merely point out that a function is a special sort of relation,
and hence an atomic formula such as ‘R(f(a), b)’ can be translated as “the unique object bearing
the f -relation to object a bears the R-relation to object b.” Uniqueness can then be captured via
identity, conjunction, negation, and universal quantification, the latter three of which we’ll consider
in the next section.
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4.4 Logical Connectives
In this section I’ll consider various arguments that the classical first-order logical con-
nectives, like the object/property/relation distinction, are unlearnable and necessary
for the possibility of rational agency. I do not find all of these arguments compelling,
especially the arguments concerning the material conditional and negation. In partic-
ular, many of the arguments we’ll consider are quite controversial; considering them
in full would take another dissertation. For example, we lack the space to discuss
logical pluralism (the view that there is more than one correct logic, see (Beall and
Restall 2006)), although the reader may have surmised that our focus on structurally-
guaranteed truth-preservation and the fundamental structure of a rational mind rules
out many versions of the view.
The point of this section is not to convince the reader that the classical first-order
logical connectives do in fact correspond to logical structure under the conception of
logic I have been working with throughout this chapter; it is instead to suggest how
one might begin arguing for such a conclusion in order to give the reader some idea
of the value of this conception of logic.26
Lewis Carroll, in his well-known paper “What the Tortoise said to Achilles” (1895),
constructed a dialogue in which Achilles attempts to force the tortoise to accept that
Z is true given that he accepts that A, B, and C are true, where C is: if A and B are
true then Z must be true. The tortoise responds that he could reject the hypothetical
26In particular, I don’t believe that the arguments of this section would convince either the anti-
realist or the philosopher who rejects the link between the possession-condition of a concept and an
ability to apply it to relevant cases, among others. As we will see below, the overall argument we’re
considering may also hinge on viewing standard connectives as more “primitive” than non-standard
counterparts.
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D: if A and B and C are true then Z must be true. Achilles then asks him to add
D as a premise, and the whole process repeats indefinitely.
Some philosophers have argued that this dialogue shows that the inference rule
Modus Ponens is unlearnable.27 However, it isn’t clear what learnability means when
talking about inference rules. Beginning to make Modus Ponens inferences due to
divine intervention or brain surgery doesn’t seem to count as learning it, but what
about being embedded in a community that tends to make assertions following a
pattern associated with Modus Ponens, and adopting a practice of making assertions
in accordance with that pattern?
I will focus on a more specific claim: one cannot come to recognize Modus Ponens
as truth-preserving and make inferences governed by it that are ultimately based
on that recognition, since in order to do so one would already need to be making
inferences governed by Modus Ponens.28 Note that I am not insisting that this recog-
nition be conscious; one may come to recognize an inference rule as truth-preserving
subpersonally.
Anyway, if one didn’t already implicitly accept the pattern of inferring ‘q’ from ‘p’
and ‘if p then q’ as truth-preserving then one certainly couldn’t come to recognize that
pattern as truth-preserving by coming to recognize that ‘if p and if p then q then q’ is
always true, since adding this as an additional premise wouldn’t help you to actually
draw the conclusion that ‘q’ is true under the given assumptions, an inference which
27This is Saul Kripke’s diagnosis. See (Padro 2015) for discussion. I don’t think this is a proper
interpretation of Carroll, although it may still be a reasonable conclusion to draw from the dialogue.
28This is in fact my suggestion for how we should understand learning an inference rule, although
I will avoid speaking of learning inference rules in the rest of this section and will instead focus on
the more specific claim.
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would still require you to apply the very rule that you are supposed to be coming to
appreciate as truth-preserving.29
Is there some other method for coming to recognize that Modus Ponens is truth-
preserving, given that recognizing that ‘if p and if p then q then q’ is always true
won’t work? For example, one might think that one could come to accept that every
instance of Modus Ponens is truth-preserving in a way that needn’t involve accepting
a conditional of that form as always true.
But note that applying this knowledge would require an application of Universal
Instantiation (i.e. inferring that a particular instance of Modus Ponens is truth-
preserving). And it is difficult to see how Universal Instantiation could be applied
in this case without resulting in a conditional of the form “if this transition is an
instance of Modus Ponens, then it is truth-preserving”, the application of which
would require an application of Modus Ponens after all.30 Furthermore, applying the
knowledge that Modus Ponens is truth-preserving would require a transition from
a meta-level representation of Modus Ponens as truth-preserving to an object-level
inference governed by Modus Ponens.
The reader may feel that these sorts of transitions could be made without any use
29Note that I said “implicitly accept”. In actual practice an individual may first explicitly consider
whether this inference rule is truth-preserving while studying a truth-table in an Introduction to
Logic course. The point is that in reasoning through the truth-table they are applying this very
inference rule and implicitly presupposing that it is truth-preserving. See (Peacocke 2008, Chapter
4) for an extended discussion of implicit conceptions.
The point that one cannot give a reduction of the classical logical connectives via truth-tables due
to circularity is well-known. However, the truth-tables can still be illuminating. Similar remarks
may apply to the correspondence theory of truth. I owe these latter points to Haim Gaifman.
30And note that that application of Modus Ponens couldn’t be recognized as truth-preserving on
pain of infinite regress. The point being, one couldn’t recognize an instance of Modus Ponens as
truth-preserving without already presupposing it.
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of Modus Ponens. I conjecture that any attempted recognition of truth-preservation
and ultimate adoption based on that recognition would involve coming to recog-
nize that if something is true, then something else is true, and hence to rely on an
application of Modus Ponens after all. Note that this point isn’t essential to the
overall argument we’re considering in this section, which aims in part to establish
that the structure of thoughts corresponding to the material conditional deserves to
be called logical form. Given that the material conditional is definable solely in terms
of conjunction and negation, this conclusion would follow from the soundness of the
arguments below.
Turning to the material conditional, I claim that one couldn’t possess a no-
tion of the material conditional without treating Modus Ponens inferences as truth-
preserving. So, the claim is that it is essential to a possessing a notion of the material
conditional that the agent treats a transition to a thought that q from a thought
that p and a thought that if p then q as a potential truth-preserving inference.31 A
notion of the material conditional is essentially tied to a particular sort of inference,
and hence if one is unable to make the corresponding inference, then one is either
failing to grasp the truth-conditions associated with a material conditional (and thus
actually working with a distinct notion) or somehow failing to link truth-conditional
information to potential inferences. In either case one fails to possess the notion.32
31More carefully: the agent’s mind presents the inference as a potential truth-preserving inference.
If the agent is in the grip of a particular philosophical theory, they may be unwilling to actually draw
the inference. Compare: an agent is enjoying a perception of an object, a perception that presents
that object as instantiating various properties, but the agent chooses not to take her perception at
face-value, perhaps due to background information or philosophical theory.
32So, it is essential to possessing a notion of the material conditional that one be able to make
the relevant inferences with it. Compare: it is essential to possessing a particular concept that one
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Given that one couldn’t come to recognize that Modus Ponens is truth-preserving
(since one would need to already be presupposing this), and given that possessing a
notion of the material conditional essentially involves treating Modus Ponens infer-
ences as truth-preserving, it isn’t clear that a notion of the material conditional is
the sort of thing that could be acquired, since it seems that in order to do so one
would need to come to recognize that Modus Ponens is truth-preserving.33 34 Is it
necessary for the possibility of rational agency?
Rational agency essentially involves being able to reason. And reasoning essen-
tially involves drawing conclusions from premises. Drawing conclusions from premises
essentially involves treating the truth of the conclusion as a consequence of the truth
of the premises, i.e. treating them as instantiating a consequence relation. Hence, one
could draw the desired conclusion by arguing that the most primitive consequence
be able to apply it to the relevant cases.
Note that I am not arguing that what makes the concept of the material conditional the concept
it is is its role in particular sorts of inferences (i.e. I’m not giving individuation-conditions); I am
instead arguing that in order to possess a notion of the material conditional one must be able to
make the relevant inferences with it. So, this account is perfectly compatible with e.g. Peacocke’s
(2008) treatment of concepts as individuated by their fundamental reference rules, as we discussed
in Chapter 2.
33Note that this argument does not generalize to all concepts whose possession-conditions es-
sentially involve treating particular inference rules as truth-preserving. One could acquire both the
concept and a practice of using the inference rule without in any sense needing to acquire one before
the other. This argument essentially depends on being unable to recognize the inference rule as
truth-preserving without already making inferences governed by that inference rule.
One might alternatively argue along the lines of the following paragraph in the main text that
one couldn’t acquire a notion of a new consequence relation without relying on one’s antecedent
understanding of some other consequence relation, and one couldn’t understand any consequence
relation at all unless one already understood what is arguably the most primitive consequence
relation: the material conditional. I am hesitant to endorse this argument, but I state it here for
the reader’s consideration.
34An intuitionist logician, for example, needn’t disagree. The point is that if one possesses a
notion of the (classical) material conditional, then one treats Modus Ponens inferences as truth-
preserving. The point is not that if one treats Modus Ponens inferences as truth-preserving, then
one possesses a notion of the (classical) material conditional.
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relation is the material conditional. The idea would be that an ability to draw conclu-
sions from premises presupposes an ability to relate those premises to the conclusion
via a material conditional.35
In support of this, note that the truth of a material conditional merely guarantees
that a transition from the antecedent as premise to the consequent as conclusion will
not in fact be a transition from a truth to a falsity (i.e. its truth leaves you unable to
determine which of the additional three rows of its truth-table is correct). So the claim
is that a rational agent must be able to relate premise(s) and conclusion in this way.
While a rational agent may grasp a more demanding consequence relation (e.g. where
the premise(s) and conclusion must be related in some appropriate way), the claim is
that one cannot grasp a more demanding consequence relation without also grasping
this primitive consequence relation.36 Again, note that since the material conditional
is definable solely in terms of conjunction and negation, even if the reader disagrees
with this point they may still be committed to accepting the material conditional as
a logical connective due to the arguments below.
Turning now to conjunction, here is one way to argue that a basic ability corre-
sponding to conjunction is necessary for the possibility of rational agency: a rational
agent needs to be able to combine multiple representations of the same entity together
into a united representation. Recall that I argued above that true thoughts refer to
35Such an argument may remind the reader of the Deduction Theorem. Note that I am not
collapsing the important distinction between a logical connective and a logical consequence relation.
I am instead arguing that relating a premise and a conclusion via a material conditional is treating
them as instantiating a weak (and non-logical) consequence relation, as I explain further in the main
text below.
36An intuitionist, of course, will disagree. As I stated above, I myself do not find this argument
compelling. Much more would need to be said in order to resolve such a dispute.
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the True: the actual world. Hence, conjunction corresponds to an ability to combine
multiple representations of the actual world into a larger picture of the world. A
rational agent must be able to link the conclusions they draw with the premises they
drew them from into a larger picture of the world.37
Could a notion of conjunction be acquired? Possessing a notion of conjunction
essentially involves being able to infer the truth of ‘p and q’ from the truth of ‘p’
and the truth of ‘q’. Consider an agent who doesn’t already possess a notion of
conjunction. Imagine trying to teach them when the notion ought to be applied.
Lewis: “Do you accept that p is true?” Saul: “Yes.” Lewis: “Do you accept that
q is true?” Saul: “Yes.” Lewis: “So this is a case in which you should also accept
that p and q is true.” Saul: “Wait, what? What sort of case is it?” Lewis: “A case
in which you both accept that p is true and you accept that q is true!” Saul: “Wait,
what sort of case?”
The point being, you couldn’t learn to recognize a case in which to apply a notion
of conjunction without already possessing it, and it is essential to possessing such a
notion that one be capable of applying it to cases. These considerations suggest that
a notion of conjunction both cannot be acquired from experience and is necessary for
the possibility of rational agency.
What about negation? Like conjunction, it isn’t clear that one could acquire a
notion of negation because it seems that one couldn’t learn how to recognize a case in
which to apply it without already possessing it (I encourage the reader to construct
37Alternatively, one might argue that rational agents must be able to draw a conclusion from
multiple premises, and furthermore they must be able to deliberate about the consequences of
multiple conditions holding.
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the analogous dialogue: “What do you mean by false?”). However, whether it is
necessary for the possibility of rational agency seems more controversial.
Here is one argument: some conditions hold and some conditions fail to hold.
Indeed, things couldn’t have been otherwise. A rational agent must be capable of
what I’ll call binary deliberation: reasoning about both the consequences of some
condition holding and the consequences of that condition failing to hold. An obvious
case of this is reasoning about both the consequences of performing an action and
the consequences of failing to perform that action. This ability presupposes a notion
of negation.
Alternatively, one might argue that one cannot grasp a thought without being
capable of grasping its negation, since one can’t recognize the conditions under which
a sentence would be true without also being capable of recognizing the conditions
under which that sentence would be false, and recognizing the truth-conditions of a
complete sentence is the paradigm case of grasping a thought: namely, the thought
the sentence expresses.38
However, one might think that one could possess these abilities without possessing
the classical notion of negation, but rather by possessing some non-classical notion
(e.g. intuitionistic negation). So, as in the case of the material conditional, this argu-
ment may hinge on the classical notion of negation being the most primitive notion
in the sense that already possessing the classical notion is necessary for possessing
38Note that this latter argument is controversial: one may think that one could understand a
sentence such as ‘That object is green’ without having any understanding its negation. Personally,
I don’t think one can possess a concept of a color without possessing concepts of other colors as
well and recognizing that nothing can be entirely one color and entirely a distinct color at the same
time.
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any other notion of negation.
I won’t consider the other standard propositional connectives. Note that it is a
well-known result that any truth-functional connective can be defined in terms of
conjunction and negation.39 Hence, provided one accepts that any concept definable
solely in terms of logical concepts is itself a logical concept, one will be committed
to accepting the other standard propositional connectives as logical connectives as
well.40
Turning finally to the universal quantifier, one couldn’t possess a corresponding
notion without being able to make inferences governed by Universal Instantiation.
Could one come to recognize Universal Instantiation as truth-preserving? Consider
the following argument due to Kripke: Suppose an agent doesn’t already recognize
Universal Instantiation inferences as truth-preserving. They then decide to accept on
your authority as a logician that every instance of Universal Instantiation is truth-
39To see why, note that one can define the disjunction ‘p ∨ q’ as ‘¬(¬p ∧ ¬q)’. Now, consider the
truth-table of an arbitrary truth-functional connective. For any row in which the application of the
connective results in a formula with the truth-value True, construct a corresponding conjunction
consisting of the subformulas specified by the truth-table as taking the truth-value True in that row
and the negations of the subformulas specified by the truth-table as taking the truth-value False
in that row. After considering every row and constructing the relevant conjunctions, construct a
formula consisting of the disjunction of all the constructed conjunctions. The resulting formula will
be true in circumstances in which the application of the connective results in a formula with the
truth-value True and false otherwise.
For all technical details I refer the reader to (Ebbinghaus et. al. 1994). Note that this sketch
of a proof assumes that the semantics for negation correspond to the classical truth-table. While
there is clearly room for other notions of negation, the claim would be (as I stated in the previous
paragraph in the main text): a rational agent must at least possess the classical notion (compare
the suggestion that the material conditional is a primitive consequence relation discussed above).
As I stated at the outset of this section, these arguments will not convince e.g. the anti-realist. We
lack the time or space for an extended discussion of the relevant issues.
40One might think that combining logical concepts into a new concept counts as learning, and
furthermore isn’t necessary for rational agency. Note that one can still recover all of first-order
logic solely via conjunction, negation, and universal quantification. Furthermore, the extension of
the account of logical form to concepts definable solely in terms of the concepts discussed is quite
natural.
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preserving. However, when confronted with a particular case of Universal Instantia-
tion, they remain skeptical.
The point being, drawing the conclusion that this particular instance of Universal
Instantiation is truth-preserving from the premise that every instance of Univer-
sal Instantiation is truth-preserving is itself an application of Universal Instantia-
tion.41 Hence, one couldn’t come to recognize that Universal Instantiation is truth-
preserving, since one would already need to presuppose this in one’s own inferential
practice. But then it isn’t clear that one could acquire a notion of the universal
quantifier, possession of which essentially involves treating Universal Instantiation as
truth-preserving, and hence acquisition of which would seem to require coming to
recognize Universal Instantiation as truth-preserving.
Is Universal Instantiation necessary for the possibility of rational agency? Note
that applying any rule whatsoever involves proceeding from the general case to a
particular case: e.g. this pattern is subsumed under that one, hence this particular
instance of the former pattern is also an instance of the latter pattern. Part of the
nature of a rule is to be generally applicable to a variety of cases (i.e. all cases of a
particular type). Hence, applying a rule will involve proceeding from the general case
to the particular case. But this seems to be the essence of Universal Instantiation.
Put another way, it is essential to rational agency that one be able to draw conclu-
sions about a particular case based upon a general rule. Drawing such a conclusion
involves treating the particular case as instantiating a pattern specified by the general
rule, and making an inference about the particular case due to its instantiating that
41See (Padro 2015) for an extended discussion of Kripke’s argument.
200
pattern. Hence, it seems that this inference will crucially hinge on an application of
Universal Instantiation. Since rational agency essentially involves applying rules to
particular cases, and since Universal Instantiation essentially involves the universal
quantifier, the universal quantifier is necessary for the possibility of rational agency
as well.
The reader may feel that an ability corresponding to the application of some other
quantifier could be used to apply rules to particular cases. I suspect that like the
case of the material conditional above, the overall argument we’re considering in this
section may hinge on the universal quantifier being a primitive quantifier in the sense
that possessing a notion of it is necessary for possessing a notion of any quantifier
at all. Personally, I find this line of argument in the case of the universal quantifier
to be quite compelling, but am less convinced by the claims of primitiveness in the
cases of the material conditional and negation.
So, one can bring forth various considerations in favor of the standard connec-
tives of classical first-order logic being either both unlearnable and necessary for the
possibility of rational agency or definable solely in terms of connectives satisfying
those two conditions. If one accepts these considerations, I believe that one should
conclude that the corresponding structural features of thoughts are logical forms, and
inferences hinging solely on these structural features are deductive inferences.
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4.5 Conclusion
We have thus considered various reasons why structural features of thoughts cor-
responding to the sentences of a standard first-order language should be considered
logical forms, and hence inferences governed by rules whose truth-preservation can be
explained solely in terms of these structural features ought to be considered deductive
inferences. Are there other structural features of thoughts that are also unlearnable
and necessary for the possibility of rational agency?
In Chapter 2 I argued that a distinction between representations and meta-
representations of those representations is necessary for the possibility of reflective
judgment (e.g. a judgment that reality is as it appears to be). However, according
to the account developed in this chapter, it doesn’t follow that the structure corre-
sponding to the hierarchy of senses is logical structure. This is because a capacity
for reflective judgment is not a necessary condition of rational agency. One could
imagine a rational agent who makes rational transitions between thoughts without
being capable of representing those thoughts as distinct from the objects, properties,
and relations the thoughts are about. Such an agent would have no need to compare
a representation of something with the thing represented, but would instead merely
transition between representations in rule-governed ways. Indeed, small children and
various animals may think in this way.42
Still, reflective judgment is a central aspect of the sort of reasoning that we engage
in, and hence the structure corresponding to the hierarchy of senses is a natural
42I owe this point to Tyler Burge, who may nonetheless disagree that such mental structure is
required for reflective judgment. See Burge (2010) for a thorough treatment of these issues.
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extension of logical structure. One would expect there to be various other natural
extensions of logical structure as well.
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Conclusion
This dissertation has been focused on the sort of content or meaning relevant to
determining whether what we say or think is true or false. I have argued that we
ought to characterize such content (i.e. thought) at a level of abstraction at which
various sentences with differing syntactic structure can express the same thought, and
furthermore the same thought will instantiate many distinct logical forms. Grasping
a thought in a particular way will make a variety of possible inferences salient while
masking others. I have demonstrated that this was in fact Gottlob Frege’s actual view
and have argued for it primarily in three ways: (1) reflecting on cases, (2) showing
how it resolves various puzzles concerning the hierarchy of senses, demonstratives,
and indexicals, and (3) drawing connections to plausible views on the structure of
consciousness, perception, judgment, objectivity, and truth.
Over the course of this dissertation I have drawn various conclusions about the
structure of thought. I have argued that we can best characterize such structure using
Frege’s function/object distinction, where (for example) one can grasp the thought
that the number two is prime as consisting of the result of applying the function-
sense expressed by ‘is prime’ to the object-sense expressed by ‘the number two’ as
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argument, where both this function-sense and this object-sense are parts of that very
thought. As a particular case of this I have argued that every thought contains its own
canonical sense as a part, a sense which is mapped by the function-sense expressed by
the truth predicate to that complete thought. I have also shown that Frege himself
was committed to this position on the structure of thought.
I have also argued that the senses expressed by spatial and temporal indexicals, in
combination with places and times of utterance, express senses that themselves have
the structure of spaces and timelines, respectively. I have shown that this elegantly
captures one’s commitments to the perspective-independence of the truth-conditions
of one’s assertions about the spatiotemporal world while also (due to multiple decom-
positions) capturing the contribution of one’s perspective to one’s way of thinking of
that world. Again, I have also shown that Frege was committed to such a view.
I have also considered logical forms of thoughts in more detail, arguing that the
sort of structural features of thoughts that must exist in order for rational agency to
be possible and could not be acquired ought to be considered logical forms. In effect,
these features correspond to the structure that one would have to put in place if one
were designing a rational mind, and in that sense can be thought of as fundamental
to the structure of thought.
As stated above, I have drawn connections to various other philosophical positions
over the course of this dissertation. The independent plausibility of those positions
lends further support to my outlined position on the structure of thought, although
none of them are essential to my position.
Let me briefly mention some of those positions: (1) that part of the cognitive value
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of being able to represent our own conscious experience as structured is that it aids in
conscious decision-making leading to various actions (including mental actions such
as judging or inferring), (2) that our capacity for meta-representation is linked to our
capacity to reflectively judge whether reality is as it appears to be, (3) that the belief
relation is in fact a three-place relation between a subject, a thought, and the world,
(4) that one’s perception of an object as having a particular geometric shape carries
commitments to how that object would appear from various positions in space, (5)
that conscious perceptions are used as representations of themselves in the context of
conscious meta-level reflection on them, (6) that the cognitive value of representing
something as an object is that it allows one to combine various representations as of
the same object in accordance with particular rules, and (7) that something like an
object/property/relation distinction is necessary for the possibility of rational agency.
Each of these positions warrants further discussion and I hope to address them
elsewhere. Furthermore, much more could be said about the structure of thought. In
chapter 2 I gesture at a formal system meant to elucidate the hierarchy of senses in
accordance with the positions that I have adopted. I hope to develop such a formal
system in the future. In chapter 4 I point in the direction of a general investigation
of the logical forms of thoughts, an investigation which I plan to continue.
Self-reference has played a fundamental role in many parts of this dissertation. I
believe that at present we do not have a good philosophical account of the nature
of self-reference, although we are well-aware of the many paradoxes that arise in
connection with it. I intend to contribute to this ongoing discussion.
While I have drawn many conclusions about the level of sense, I have said rela-
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tively little about the level of reference or the nature of the relation between sense
and reference. Doing justice to such a topic would require drawing quite general
conclusions about the relation between mind and world. Here I have merely taken
the first steps in what I expect to be a lifelong project.
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